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abstract.  Persons of faith are now seeking religious exemptions from laws concerning sex, 
reproduction, and marriage on the ground that the law makes the objector complicit in the as-
sertedly sinful conduct of others. We term claims of this kind, which were at issue in Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, complicity-based conscience claims. Complicity-based conscience claims dif-
fer in form and in social logic from the claims featured in the free exercise cases that the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) invokes. The distinctive features of complicity-based 
conscience claims matter, not because they make the claim for religious exemption any less au-
thentic or sincere, but rather because accommodating claims of this kind has the potential to in-
flict material and dignitary harms on other citizens. 
Complicity claims focus on the conduct of others outside the faith community. Their ac-
commodation therefore has potential to harm those whom the claimants view as sinning. Today 
complicity claims are asserted by growing numbers of Americans about contentious “culture 
war” issues. This dynamic amplifies the effects of accommodation. Faith claims that concern 
questions in democratic contest will escalate in number, and accommodation of the claims will 
be fraught with significance, not only for the claimants, but also for those whose conduct the 
claimants condemn. Some urge accommodation in the hopes of peaceful settlement, yet, as we 
show, complicity claims can provide an avenue to extend, rather than settle, conflict. 
We highlight the distinctive form and social logic of complicity-based conscience claims so 
that those debating accommodation do so with the impact on third parties fully in view. We 
show how concern about the third-party impact of accommodation structured the Court’s deci-
sion in Hobby Lobby and demonstrate how this concern is an integral part of RFRA’s compelling 
interest and narrow tailoring inquiries. At issue is not only whether but how complicity claims 
are accommodated. 
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“I don’t think the culture wars are over . . . but are moving into a new phase.”  
  —Russell Moore, President, Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission, 
Southern Baptist Convention1  
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,2 closely held for-profit corporations 
asserted claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)3 to ex-
emptions from provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) that require em-
ployee health insurance plans to include coverage of contraception. While 
much attention has focused on the fact that the claimants in these cases were 
corporate entities,4 far less attention has been paid to the kind of religious liber-
ties claims the corporate claimants asserted.5 The claimants in Hobby Lobby ob-
jected to providing their employees health insurance benefits under the ACA. 
They contended that providing insurance coverage would make them complicit 
with employees who might use the insurance to purchase forms of contracep-
tion that the employers viewed as sinful. 
Claims of this kind—religious objections to being made complicit in the as-
sertedly sinful conduct of others—are often raised in response to contested 
sexual norms, and they now represent an important part of courts’ religious 
 
1. Byron York, Evangelical Leader Shows How GOP Can Finesse Gay Marriage, WASH. EXAMIN-
ER, Mar. 27, 2014, http://washingtonexaminer.com/evangelical-leader-shows-how-gop-can 
-finesse-gay-marriage/article/2546413 [http://perma.cc/QQ9F-YN78]. 
2. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) to (b) (2012). 
4. But cf. Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 78-80 (2015) (suggesting that the claim of for-profit corporations 
was within the contemplation of both free exercise law and RFRA). The coverage of corpo-
rate claimants continues to be debated. See, e.g., Letter from Robert P. Bartlett III, Professor, 
Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Sch. of Law, et al. to Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs. (Oct. 8, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507305 [http://perma 
.cc/V2BV-9LJY] (commenting on the proposed definition of “eligible organization” for the 
purposes of the coverage of certain preventative services under the ACA); Letter from 
Lyman P. Q. Johnson, Professor, Washington & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, et al. to Ctrs. for 
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Oct. 20, 2014), 
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlufac/377 [http://perma.cc/6XY9-S7AP] (same).  
5. But see Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions in 
Hobby Lobby’s Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2496218 [http://perma.cc/JDW8-6YT8]; Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, It’s About Money:  
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liberties docket.6 Consider, for instance, claims arising in the same-sex mar-
riage context. A growing number of business owners have begun to voice reli-
gious objections to providing goods and services for same-sex weddings.7 Bak-
ing a cake, it is claimed, makes a baker complicit in a same-sex relationship to 
which he objects.8  
We term religious objections to being made complicit in the assertedly sin-
ful conduct of others complicity-based conscience claims. There are at least two 
important dimensions to such claims. The claim concerns the third party’s 
conduct—for example, her use of contraception—but, crucially, it also concerns 
the claimant’s relationship to the third party. Complicity claims are faith claims 
about how to live in community with others who do not share the claimant’s 
beliefs, and whose lawful conduct the person of faith believes to be sinful. Be-
cause these claims are explicitly oriented toward third parties, they present spe-
cial concerns about third-party harm.  
Hobby Lobby did not discuss the kinds of harm that accommodating com-
plicity-based conscience claims can impose on other citizens, but the Court de-
cided the case on grounds that made concerns about the interests of third par-
ties central.9 It emphasized that because the government had other means of 
ensuring that women have access to affordable contraception, the plaintiffs’ re-
ligious beliefs could be accommodated with “precisely zero” effect on female 
employees and dependents.10 In what follows, we examine the distinctive fea-
tures of complicity-based conscience claims in order to give visibility, practical 
meaning, and principled sense to the concerns about third-party harm that al-
ready structure the Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby.  
As we show, complicity-based conscience claims differ in form and in social 
logic from the claims featured in the free exercise cases RFRA invokes. The 
claims may be just as authentic and sincere as any other claim of faith protected 
by the statute, yet these differences in form and logic matter because they am-
 
6. In the 2013 Supreme Court term alone, religious exemption claims of this kind appeared in 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751; Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014); Little Sisters 
of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2013); and Elane Photography, LLC v. 
Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014). 
7. See, e.g., Odgaard v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, No. CV046451 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Apr. 3, 
2014); Elane Photography, 309 P.3d 53; Complaint, Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Ferguson, No. 
13-2-01898-2 (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 2013). 
8. See, e.g., Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR2013-0008 (Colo. Admin. Ct. Dec. 
6, 2013). 
9. See infra Part I.B. 
10. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760 (“The effect of the HHS-created accommodation on the 
women employed by Hobby Lobby and the other companies involved in these cases would 
be precisely zero.”). We probe the accuracy of this claim infra Part V. 
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plify the material and dignitary harms that accommodation of the claims can 
inflict on other citizens. 
In the free exercise cases that RFRA invokes, claims were advanced by reli-
gious minorities who sought exemptions based on unconventional beliefs gen-
erally not considered by lawmakers when they adopted the challenged laws; 
the costs of accommodating their claims were minimal and widely shared.11 
Complicity-based conscience claims differ in form. Because the claims concern 
the conduct of citizens outside the faith community, accommodating the claims 
can harm those whose conduct the claimants view as sinful. Complicity-based 
conscience claims also differ in social logic. Complicity claims are now asserted 
by growing numbers of Americans about some of the most contentious “cul-
ture war” issues of our day.12 As we show, complicity claims are often encou- 
raged by those seeking to mobilize the faithful against laws that depart from 
traditional sexual morality.13 When those engaged in “culture war” conflicts 
encourage the faithful to seek exemptions from laws that protect citizens who 
depart from customary morality, religious accommodation will affect other ci- 
tizens in ways not at issue in the free exercise cases RFRA invokes. Faith claims 
that concern questions in democratic contest will escalate in number, and ac-
commodation of the claims will be fraught with significance, not only for the 
claimants, but also for those whose conduct the claimants condemn. Accom-
modating these religious liberty claims will have social meaning and material 
consequences for the law-abiding persons who the claimants say are sinning.14 
Some, tacitly acknowledging the democratic contests in which complicity 
claims are entangled, urge religious accommodation in the hopes of peaceful 
settlement.15 Yet the complicity-based conscience claims asserted in these con-
texts are often not simple claims to withdraw. As we show, complicity claims 
can provide an avenue to extend, rather than settle, conflict about social norms 
in democratic contest. Those seeking to preserve traditional norms governing 
sex, reproduction, and marriage may speak as a majority endeavoring to defend 
or enact laws that enforce community-wide customary norms—or, without 
change in numbers, they may speak as minorities endeavoring to avoid com-
 
11. See infra Part I.A. 
12. As examples throughout illustrate, complicity-based religious objections are expressed about 
persons who act outside of traditional family roles; engage in contraception, abortion, or as-
sisted reproduction; cohabit or have children outside marriage; have nonmarital or same-
sex sex; or enter a relationship with or marry a person of the same sex. The religious claim-
ants seek exemptions from laws designed to protect others whose beliefs and actions the 
claimants condemn. 
13. See infra Part III. 
14. See infra Part IV. 
15. See infra note 152. 
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plicity when law departs from those norms.16 Religious accommodation claims 
of this kind may continue democratic conflict in new forms, or so at least some 
advocates hope.17 Faith claimants are free to assert claims for religious exemp-
tion in this context, as in any other, but it is important to consider the exemp-
tion’s impact on those the law protects in deciding whether and how to restrict 
the law’s enforcement.  
To date, the features of complicity-based conscience claims that distinctive-
ly endow them with the capacity to inflict harms on third parties have not been 
well appreciated in debates over accommodation. Our purpose in writing is to 
draw attention to the distinctive features of these claims so that they are clearly 
in view in the many legal contexts and institutional settings in which the ques-
tion of accommodation is now being debated. We examine the distinctive fea-
tures of complicity-based conscience claims in the belief that these features 
matter in judgments about accommodation, and in the belief that others will 
recognize that this is so, even if they may weigh these concerns differently be-
cause they hold different views about the importance of integrating religion in 
public life.18 
Conscience claims have long played a crucial role in our ethical, political, 
and religious lives.19 Yet respect for conscience does not require us to ignore 
the special features of complicity-based conscience claims that endow them 
with capacity to harm other citizens. However differently those in the debate 
may weigh claims for accommodation, few would affirm a result in which 
some citizens are singled out to bear significant costs of another’s religious ex-
ercise. Appreciating the consequences for third parties may affect which reli-
gious liberties claims are accommodated, how religious liberties claims are ac-
commodated, and why judges and legislators shape religious liberties law in 
particular ways.20 
We proceed in five Parts. We begin our analysis of complicity-based con-
science claims in Hobby Lobby, move outside doctrine to consider mobilization 
around claims of complicity, and finally return to law to consider how our 
analysis bears on judicial and legislative approaches to accommodation.  
Part I shows that complicity-based conscience claims are distinctive in 
form, focusing on third parties in ways that the claims in the free exercise cases 
 
16. See infra Part III.B. 
17. See infra Part III.B. 
18. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 103 (2015) (raising concerns with third-party harm in an account that is deeply 
sympathetic to claims for religious accommodation). 
19. See infra notes 79, 105. 
20. See infra Part V. 
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that RFRA invokes do not. It also shows how a concern about third-party 
harm with deep roots in our religious liberties case law shaped the Court’s de-
cision in Hobby Lobby. Part II illustrates the third-party effects of complicity 
claims in legislation that authorizes conscience objections to providing 
healthcare services—legislation from which the complicity-based conscience 
claims in Hobby Lobby may have descended. Drawing on the example of 
healthcare refusal laws, Part III begins to explore how claims about complicity 
have a life in religion and in politics. Unlike the claims in the free exercise cases 
RFRA invokes, complicity-based conscience claims have become a locus of 
mobilized political action seeking law reform designed to preserve traditional 
sexual morality. Drawing on this evidence, Part IV demonstrates how the dis-
tinctive form and social logic of complicity-based conscience claims amplify the 
material and dignitary harms that accommodating such claims can inflict. By 
material harms we mean tangible, practical effects, such as access to goods and 
services. By dignitary harms, we refer to the social meaning, including stigma, 
which may result from accommodating complicity-based objections. 
In Part V, we reconnect these concerns about third-party harm to doctrine. 
We show how inquiry into the third-party harms of religious accommodation 
arises under RFRA’s compelling interest and least restrictive means analysis, as 
well as under other bodies of federal and state law. These third-party harms 
raise questions of fundamental fairness and can implicate different constitu-
tional values in the many contexts in which claimants now seek accommoda-
tion of complicity-based conscience claims.  
i .  burdens of accommodation under hobby lobby  
The claimants in Hobby Lobby challenged a law requiring employers to pro-
vide their employees health insurance that covered contraceptives the claimants 
deemed “abortifacients.”21 The law, they argued, forced them to “provid[e] in-
surance coverage for items that risk killing an embryo [and thereby] makes 
them complicit in abortion.”22 The concept of complicity has a richly elaborated 
 
21. Brief for Respondents at 14, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) 
(Nos. 13-354, 13-356). The plaintiffs termed the contraceptives “abortifacients” on the basis 
of their religious belief that pregnancy begins at fertilization (rather than implantation) of 
an egg. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[O]ne 
aspect of the Greens’ religious commitment is a belief that human life begins when sperm 
fertilizes an egg.”). The contraceptives at issue in Hobby Lobby operate before implantation 
of a fertilized egg in the uterus, the point at which medical science (and federal law) under-
stand pregnancy to begin. In fact, several of these contraceptives operate before ovulation. See 
infra note 273. 
22. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 21, at 9 (emphasis added). 
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theological basis in Catholicism.23 But evangelical Christians, such as the 
Greens, who own Hobby Lobby,24 also assert that their beliefs preclude them 
from engaging in conduct that would make them complicit in sin.25 As Justice 
Alito explained in Hobby Lobby, the claimants believe “it is immoral and sinful 
for [them] to intentionally participate in, pay for, facilitate, or otherwise sup-
port these drugs.”26 
 
23. Catholic doctrine on “cooperation” and “scandal” admonishes Catholics to avoid “complicity 
in the sins of others.” 2 BERNARD HÄRING, THE LAW OF CHRIST 494-517 (Edwin G. Kaiser 
trans., Newman Press 1963) (1954). For more contemporary texts, see ANTHONY FISHER, 
CATHOLIC BIOETHICS FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM 69-98 (2012); 3 GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY 
OF THE LORD JESUS: DIFFICULT MORAL QUESTIONS 871-97 (1997). Principles of cooperation 
address the circumstances under which an individual or institution can be involved in oth-
ers’ illicit actions. The Catechism of the Catholic Church explains:  
Sin is a personal act. Moreover, we have a responsibility for the sins committed by 
others when we cooperate in them:  
- by participating directly and voluntarily in them; 
- by ordering, advising, praising, or approving them; 
- by not disclosing or not hindering them when we have an obligation to do so; 
- by protecting evil-doers. 
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH pt. 3, ¶ 1868. Formal cooperation, which is morally 
wrong, occurs when the individual intends the other’s illicit action. Material cooperation, 
which can be morally licit, occurs when the individual does not intend the object of the oth-
er’s action. Even cooperation that in other respects appears morally licit is proscribed if it re-
sults in scandal. Id. ¶ 2284 (defining scandal as “an attitude or behavior that leads another to 
do evil”). Scandal occurs when the individual or institution engages in conduct that appears 
to sanction someone else’s wrongful behavior. Id. ¶¶ 2284, 2286 (explaining that “[t]he per-
son who gives scandal becomes his neighbor’s tempter” and that “[s]candal can be provoked 
by laws or institutions, by fashion or opinion”). As we explain in Part IV, the U.S. Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) has applied these concepts in the context of Catholic-run 
healthcare delivery. See Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, U.S. 
CONF. CATH. BISHOPS, app. at 29 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Religious Directives for Catholic 
Health Care Services] (outlining the principles governing cooperation). 
24. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765 (describing the Greens as “Christians”); Alan Rappeport, 
Family Behind Hobby Lobby Has New Project: Bible Museum, N.Y. TIMES, July  
17, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/17/us/politics/family-that-owns-hobby-lobby 
-plans-bible-museum-in-washington.html [http://perma.cc/GU56-SERE] (describing the 
Greens as an “evangelical Christian family”). The Greens own Hobby Lobby through a trust 
of which each family member is a trustee. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765 n.15. 
25. Evangelical Protestants do not have the same elaborately developed concept of cooperation. 
Compare Brief of 67 Catholic Theologians and Ethicists as Amici Curiae in Support of Hob-
by Lobby and Conestoga et al., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), with Brief 
of 38 Protestant Theologians, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, Coalition of Afri-
can American Pastors, Manhattan Declaration, and Instep International as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga et al., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (Nos. 13-354, 13-
356). 
26. 134 S. Ct. at 2765 (quoting Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 382 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
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Claims based on complicity are different in form than other kinds of reli-
gious liberty claims. Consider the claim the Court most recently confronted. In 
Holt v. Hobbs,27 a Salafi Muslim inmate claimed an exemption from a rule for-
bidding prisoners to wear beards.28 Gregory Holt sought an exemption to 
groom in accordance with precepts of his religion—not to avoid complicity in 
what he believed were the sinful acts of another citizen.29 This difference in the 
structure of religious exemption claims is relevant—not to the claim’s sincerity 
or religious significance, but instead to the claim’s potential to inflict harms on 
specific third parties. The Court held that Holt was entitled to an accommoda-
tion.30 Accommodating Holt’s religious exercise claim imposed modest costs 
on the public and the prison system; no persons or groups were singled out to 
bear the burden of Holt’s religious exercise. Indeed, in her very brief concur-
rence, Justice Ginsburg explained that “accommodating petitioner’s religious 
belief in this case would not detrimentally affect others who do not share peti-
tioner’s belief.”31 In these respects, the claim for religious exemption in Holt 
differs from the claim in Hobby Lobby and more closely resembles claims in the 
classic free exercise cases on which Congress focused in enacting RFRA.  
In this Part, we begin to explore differences between the complicity-based 
claim featured in Hobby Lobby and the kinds of religious liberty claims at issue 
in the paradigmatic free exercise cases Congress invoked in RFRA. Complicity-
based claims concern other citizens and so may inflict distinctive burdens on 
them. The Court has expressed concern about accommodating religious liberty 
when it may inflict harm on third parties. We show how this concern shaped 
the Court’s judgment in Hobby Lobby. 
A. Differentiating Claims with Attention to Accommodation’s Impact 
RFRA invokes three free exercise cases32: Sherbert v. Verner33 and Wisconsin 
v. Yoder,34 canonical cases representing the high-water mark of free exercise ju-
 
27. 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). 
28. Holt asserted his claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA), a statute that shares significant common ground with RFRA. See Hobby Lobby, 
134 S. Ct. at 2761 (explaining that RLUIPA “imposes the same general test as RFRA but on a 
more limited category of governmental actions” and that “RLUIPA amended RFRA’s defi-
nition of the ‘exercise of religion’”). 
29. Even though Holt believed he should not trim his beard at all, he asked only for permission 
to grow a half-inch beard. See Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 861. 
30. Id. at 867. 
31. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4)-(b)(1) (2012). 
33. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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risprudence, and Employment Division v. Smith, the precedent departing from 
this free exercise tradition that prompted the passage of RFRA.35 None of these 
cases featured complicity-based claims.  
The claimants in these cases were minority religious practitioners who as-
serted unfamiliar religious convictions.36 The Seventh-day Adventist in Sher-
bert, the Amish in Yoder, and the members of the Native American Church in 
Smith claimed belief systems outside the mainstream.37 They sought exemp-
tions to act in accordance with unconventional beliefs generally not contem-
plated by the government when it originally crafted the laws being challenged. 
The claimant in Sherbert, who observed a Saturday Sabbath, asked that the 
state extend “unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday 
worshippers.”38 The claimants in Yoder asked for an exemption from compul-
sory education laws because they believed secondary school education would 
 
34. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
35. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). RFRA explicitly responded to Smith, where the Court, in holding that 
“the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 
‘valid and neutral law of general applicability,’” id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 
U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)), articulated a standard that most viewed 
as significantly less protective of religious liberty than prior case law had been. There is de-
bate over whether RFRA “restore[d] the compelling interest test as set forth in [Sherbert] 
and [Yoder],” as would be suggested by the language of § 2000bb(b)(1), or merely restored 
the less demanding standard consistent with the state of the law the “day before Smith.” 
Compare 139 CONG. REC. 26178 (1993) (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (explaining 
that RFRA was “designed to restore the compelling interest test for deciding free exercise 
claims”), with H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 15 (1993) (“The amendments . . . make clear that the 
purpose of the statute is to ‘turn the clock back’ to the day before Smith was decided.”). On 
this point, see Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer’s Guide to the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 193-98 (1995). 
36. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in 
Common, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206, 221 (2010) (describing Yoder as involving an Amish 
practice that “ran against the strong social norm”); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Ori-
gins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1420 
(1990) (observing that “[j]udicially enforceable exemptions under the free exercise clause  
. . . ensure that unpopular or unfamiliar faiths will receive the same consideration afforded 
mainstream or generally respected religions by the representative branches”). 
37. Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 (involving a Seventh-day Adventist who observed a Saturday Sab-
bath); Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (involving members of Amish communities who opposed formal 
education of children after the eighth grade); Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (involving members of 
the Native American Church who used peyote as part of religious practice). Even after 
RFRA, the Court’s central pre-Hobby Lobby precedent applying the statute featured minority 
religious claimants—“a religious sect with origins in the Amazon Rainforest”—seeking space 
to engage in an anomalous religious ritual—“drinking a sacramental tea . . . that contains a 
hallucinogen.” Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
423 (2006). 
38. 374 U.S. at 409.  
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“endanger their own salvation and that of their children.”39 And the claimants 
in Smith sought an exemption from drug laws that precluded them from en-
gaging in ritual peyote use.40 
In these central free exercise cases, the effects of the sought-after accom-
modation were limited and borne by society as a whole. In Smith, for instance, 
the exemption would only have modestly detracted from the public health and 
safety interests advanced by the drug laws.41 And in Sherbert, where it was clear 
that a relatively “insignificant number of seventh-day observers [were] in-
volved,”42 accommodation imposed at most generalized costs on the state un-
employment system.43 Critically, in Yoder, the Court conceptualized the inter-
ests of the Amish children as aligned with their parents, such that the 
accommodation benefitted, rather than potentially harmed, the children them-
selves.44 In the cases that RFRA cites, accommodating the religious liberty 
claims would not have harmed specifically identified third parties.45 
 
39. 406 U.S. at 209. While Yoder involved claims relating to the conduct of others—the claim-
ants’ children—it did not feature a complicity claim. The claimants did not object to being 
made complicit in the sins of their children, but rather asserted their own religious duty to 
comply with religious principles regarding the rearing of their children. See id. at 211 
(“[T]hey view secondary school education as an impermissible exposure of their children to 
a ‘worldly’ influence in conflict with their beliefs.”). 
40. 494 U.S. at 874. 
41. Id. at 911-12, 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
42. Brief of Synagogue Council of America et al. as Amici Curiae at 12, Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 
(No. 526).  
43. 374 U.S. at 407. Nonetheless, in this situation, the employer may experience a modest in-
crease in its unemployment tax rate. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 1199 (2d ed. 1988); Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1513 & n.154 (1999).  
44. 406 U.S. at 215. In fact, over the objection of Justice Douglas’s dissenting opinion, the Court 
dismissed as “highly speculative” the state’s concern with “the possibility that some [Amish] 
children will choose to leave the Amish community, and that if this occurs they will be ill-
equipped for life.” Id. at 224. 
45. In addition to explicit reference to Sherbert, Yoder, and Smith, RFRA also refers to “prior 
Federal court rulings.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2012). The only pre-RFRA Supreme 
Court free exercise decision that includes a claim involving complicity is Thomas v. Review 
Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981). In that case, the claim-
ant, a Jehovah’s Witness, was denied unemployment benefits after refusing employment be-
cause “his religious beliefs forbade participation in the production of armaments.” Id. at 
709. The claim in Thomas differs from the complicity-based conscience claims we are exam-
ining in that it does not single out a particular group of citizens as sinning. And in the rela-
tively few times when Thomas appears in the legislative history of RFRA, it concerns matters 
having nothing to do with complicity claims. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1991: Hearing on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 121 (1992) (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz) (quot-
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The claims featured in Sherbert, Yoder, and Smith differ in form from the 
claim at issue in Hobby Lobby. Complicity-based conscience claims are oriented 
toward third parties who do not share the claimant’s beliefs about the conduct 
in question. For this reason, their accommodation has distinctive potential to 
impose material and dignitary harm on those the claimants condemn. 
RFRA’s language sweeps broadly enough to cover complicity-based con-
science claims. But, we observe, these are not the kind of claims on which Con-
gress focused when it adopted the statute’s framework for protecting religious 
liberty. In fact, several years later, when Congress encountered a complicity-
based claim while considering new religious liberties legislation, members ex-
pressed great concern about the third-party harms the claim’s accommodation 
would inflict. In Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, a federal appel-
late court recognized a free exercise claim to exemption from state antidiscrim-
ination law for landlords who refused to rent to unmarried couples based on 
their belief that “facilitating cohabitation in any way is tantamount to facilitat-
ing sin.”46 When Congress confronted the prospect of accommodating this type 
of claim, legislators worried that granting religious exemption claims from 
state and local antidiscrimination laws could harm vulnerable groups of citi-
 
ing Thomas for the proposition that the government must use “the least restrictive means of 
achieving a compelling state interest,” 450 U.S. at 718); id. at 153 (statement of Edward 
McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Dean and Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law) 
(citing Thomas in a string citation of unemployment compensation cases). 
“[P]rior Federal court rulings” might also include Bob Jones University v. United States, 
461 U.S. 574 (1983). After refusing to admit African-American students, Bob Jones Universi-
ty shifted to a policy of refusing to admit unmarried African-American students before ulti-
mately settling on a policy admitting such students but maintaining a disciplinary rule pro-
hibiting interracial dating and marriage, as well as advocacy of interracial marriage. Id. at 
580-81. The university defended its policy on religious free exercise grounds, which the 
Court rejected. Id. at 603-04. While accommodating this religious exercise claim would have 
inflicted third-party harms, we do not understand the claim as complicity-based. The uni-
versity did not object to students’ interracial dating and marriage because the university 
would be complicit in the students’ sinful conduct, but rather because the university deemed 
such conduct to violate the religious principles governing the faith community. 
46. 165 F.3d 692, 696, 718 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 
2000). RFRA had passed the Senate 97-3 (after passing by voice vote in the House). U.S. 
Senate Roll Call Vote No. 331, 103d Cong. (Oct. 27, 1993); 139 CONG. REC. 9680-87 (1993). 
After the Court struck down RFRA as applied to the states, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 511 (1997), Congress considered a new religious liberties bill, the Religious Liberty 
Protection Act (RLPA), which would have applied the RFRA standard to the states pursuant 
to Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998, § 2(a), 
H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 12-13 (1999). As it considered 
this bill, however, lawmakers were confronted with the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Thomas. This became a significant focus of congressional debate over RLPA. 
See, e.g., Religious Liberty: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 148, 161 
(1999); H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 14, 38. 
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zens, including lesbians, gay men, and unmarried parents.47 Ultimately, Con-
gress did not enact the statute that lawmakers feared would have sanctioned 
this claim.48 
This is not surprising. In adjudicated religious liberties law, when accom-
modation has threatened to impose significant burdens on other citizens, 
courts have repeatedly rejected the exemption claims. The underlying intuition 
seems to be that one citizen should not be singled out to bear significant costs 
of another person’s religious exercise.49 Concerns of this kind are expressed 
across a range of doctrinal locations.50 In free exercise case law,51 the Court has 
 
47. Congressional members, including Representative Jerrold Nadler, expressed “concern[] that 
this legislation, as drafted, would not simply act as a shield to protect religious liberty, but 
could also be used by some as a sword to attack the rights of many Americans, including 
unmarried couples, single parents, [and] lesbians and gays.” H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 41. 
48. Congressional support for RLPA fell apart, and Representative Nadler introduced an 
amendment that would have foreclosed the use of RLPA to avoid antidiscrimination law. 145 
CONG. REC. 16,233-34 (1999). While the House passed RLPA without the Nadler amend-
ment, 145 CONG. REC. 16,245 (1999), the bill never came up for a vote in the Senate, H.R. 
1,691, 106th Cong. (1999) (recording that on November 19, 1999, the bill was received in 
the Senate, read twice, and referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary). See also 145 
CONG. REC. 31,077 (1999) (listing referred measures). 
Cases featuring conflicts between religious exemption claims and antidiscrimination law 
existed at the time that Congress passed RFRA. See Lupu, supra note 35, at 208-10; William 
P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Establishment, Equal Protection and Free 
Speech Concerns, 56 MONT. L. REV. 227, 228 (1995). 
49. See infra Part V.B. 
50. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, One Cheer for Hobby Lobby: Improbable Alternatives, Truly 
Strict Scrutiny, and Third-Party Employee Burdens, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 153, 172 (2015); 
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception 
Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 
356-57 (2014); Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-Party Harms, 84 
MINN. L. REV. 589, 622 (2000); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality 
and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 274, 290-91 & n.84 (2010); James M. Oleske, 
Jr., The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing the Unequal Treatment of Religious Objections 
to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (2015); Robert M. 
O’Neil, Religious Freedom and Nondiscrimination: State RFRA Laws Versus Civil Rights, 32 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 785, 801 (1999); Elizabeth Sepper, Gendering Corporate Conscience,  
38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 193, 206 (2015); Marty Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part X—A  
Quick Word on the Conestoga Wood Reply Brief, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 12, 2014,  
12:22 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/hobby-lobby-part-x-quick-word-on.html 
[http://perma.cc/5ZL6-XRRD]. For an argument in favor of a more systematic approach to 
third-party harm in religious accommodation law, see generally Kara Loewentheil, When 
Free Exercise Is a Burden: Protecting “Third Parties” in Religious Accommodation Law, 62 DRAKE 
L. REV. 433 (2014). 
51. E.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 304-05 (1985); United 
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). Lower courts also have enforced sex discrimination 
laws against employers despite those employers’ requests for religious exemptions. See, e.g., 
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rejected exemption claims that would, for example, “impose the employer’s re-
ligious faith on the employees.”52 Under the Establishment Clause, the Court 
has invalidated accommodations that impose “significant burdens” on third 
parties.53 And, in applying the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Per-
sons Act (RLUIPA), the Court has explained that “courts must take adequate 
account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbenefi-
ciaries.”54 As we now show, the Supreme Court reasoned in this same tradition 
in Hobby Lobby, where concerns about third parties guided judgments about 
accommodation. 
B. Hobby Lobby and the Question of Third-Party Harm  
In Hobby Lobby, religious claimants sought to be excused from a law requir-
ing employers who provide health insurance to their employees to cover forms 
of contraception the claimants viewed as sinful. The Court required the gov-
ernment to provide the exemption, but without declaring that the religious lib-
erty claim trumped the government’s interest in providing employees access to 
contraception. Instead, the Court resolved the case on grounds that treated as 
 
Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1399 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that a re-
ligious school must comply with federal law requiring equal pay for men and women); 
EEOC. v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); Ganzy v. Al-
len Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that a religious school 
could not rely on its religious opposition to premarital sex as a pretext for pregnancy dis-
crimination, and noting that “it remains fundamental that religious motives may not be a 
mask for sex discrimination in the workplace”). 
52. Lee, 455 U.S. at 261. Only in limited circumstances, for example in the context of the minis-
terial exception for religious institutions, has the Court accommodated religious liberty 
claims despite direct effects on specific third parties. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lu-
theran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). The ministerial exception is a judicial-
ly created doctrine grounded in both establishment and free exercise principles; this doc-
trine can shield churches from some claims by employees, including clergy, whose jobs 
entail substantial religious obligations. See id. at 702. We note also that, in certain circum-
stances, Title VII allows religious organizations to discriminate in employment on the basis 
of religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012). 
53. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985). On this point, see Gedicks & 
Van Tassell, supra note 50, at 357-59. 
54. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). Similarly, in the Title VII context, courts 
have denied claims to accommodation by employees where the accommodation would bur-
den fellow employees and other third parties. See Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 
232 F. App’x 581, 584-85 (7th Cir. 2007) (ruling that “an accommodation that requires other 
employees to assume a disproportionate workload (or divert them from their regular work) 
is an undue hardship as a matter of law”); Endres v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 925-26 
(7th Cir. 2003); Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, 58 F.3d 1337, 1338 (8th Cir. 1995). 
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weighty both the claimants’ religious liberty claim and Congress’s interest in 
protecting women’s health.  
Because the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had already 
offered an accommodation to religiously affiliated nonprofit institutions, the 
Court reasoned that application of the insurance requirement to closely held 
for-profit corporations with religious objections was not narrowly tailored.55 
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito several times emphasized that the gov-
ernment could provide plaintiffs the benefit of a similar arrangement without 
restricting employees’ access to contraception.56 Concern about protecting 
third parties from harm was a structuring principle of the Court’s decision, 
even if the Court may have erred in assuming that the accommodation would 
impose no burdens on third parties.57  
Justice Kennedy appears to have guided the Court to a decision that en-
deavored to vindicate both the interests of the claimants seeking religious ex-
emptions and of the government in enforcing the statute. Justice Alito’s ma-
jority opinion proceeded on the assumption that the government has a  
compelling interest in ensuring women’s “cost-free access to . . . contraceptive 
methods.”58 Justice Kennedy separately concurred in order to emphasize: “It is 
important to confirm that a premise of the Court’s opinion is its assumption 
that the HHS regulation here at issue furthers a legitimate and compelling in-
 
55. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014). 
56. See id. at 2780, 2782 (explaining that the government could itself “assume the cost of provid-
ing” the contraceptives or could replicate the accommodation provided for religiously affili-
ated nonprofit organizations). Nonetheless, the Court reserved the question of whether the 
accommodation provided to religiously affiliated nonprofits would survive a challenge un-
der RFRA. Id. at 2782. 
57. Significant uncertainty remains. In the wake of Hobby Lobby, the government sought com-
ments on a proposal to extend to closely held for-profit corporations the accommodations 
offered to religiously affiliated nonprofits. See 79 Fed. Reg. 51,118 (Aug. 27, 2014); 79 Fed. 
Reg. 51,092 (Aug. 27, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510, 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). But as of this writing the government has not yet adopted 
the proposal. Meanwhile, religiously affiliated nonprofits continue to challenge those ac-
commodation mechanisms. It is not clear how these challenges will be resolved. Cf. Priests 
for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 265 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (observ-
ing that the accommodations proposed by the religiously affiliated nonprofits “would add 
steps . . . or pose other financial, logistical, informational, and administrative burdens,” as 
reason to reject those challenges). For commentators questioning the accuracy of the Court’s 
premises, see Gedicks, supra note 50, at 159-62; and Andrew Koppelman & Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, Is Hobby Lobby Worse for Religious Liberty Than Smith?, 9 ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y (forthcoming 2015) (on file with authors). We observe also that the majority focused 
on the material effects of the accommodation, but not its social meaning. See infra notes 272-
275 and accompanying text. 
58. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779-80. 
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terest in the health of female employees.”59 Along with the four dissenting Jus-
tices, he affirmed the government’s compelling interest in enacting laws to 
promote women’s health.60 
Justice Kennedy was clearly concerned about the impact of accommodation 
on the statute’s beneficiaries. At oral argument, he questioned how accommo-
dation would affect “the rights of the employees, . . . [who] may not agree with 
these religious beliefs of the employer.”61 And in his Hobby Lobby concurrence, 
he noted that the accommodation of religious liberty may not “unduly restrict 
other persons, such as employees, in protecting their own interests.”62 
These concerns about accommodation’s effects on the statute’s intended 
beneficiaries shaped the terms on which the Court recognized the plaintiffs’ 
RFRA claim. The Court concluded that an accommodation could be designed 
so as “to protect the asserted needs of women as effectively as the contraceptive 
mandate.”63 Indeed, the Court began its opinion by emphasizing its view that 
the effect of “accommodation on the women employed by Hobby Lobby and 
the other companies involved in these cases would be precisely zero.”64 
Mere days after issuing its Hobby Lobby decision, the Court provisionally 
recognized another complicity-based conscience claim in its interim order in 
Wheaton College v. Burwell.65 Again, the Court did so on the assumption that 
third parties would not bear the impact of accommodation. Wheaton College, a 
religiously affiliated institution, claimed that the self-certification form—the 
 
59. Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
60. Id.; id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting “compelling interests in public health and 
women’s well being”); see also id. at 2787-88 (“‘The ability of women to participate equally 
in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control 
their reproductive lives.’ Congress acted on that understanding when, as part of a nation-
wide insurance program intended to be comprehensive, it called for coverage of preventive 
care responsive to women’s needs.” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 856 (1992))).  
61. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356). 
62. 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Striking a similar note, Justice Kennedy noted 
in his concurrence in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet: “[A] 
religious accommodation demands careful scrutiny to ensure that it does not so burden 
nonadherents or discriminate against other religions as to become an establishment.” 512 
U.S. 687, 722 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In her Hobby Lobby dissent, Justice Gins-
burg also made this point: “Accommodations to religious beliefs or observances, the Court 
has clarified, must not significantly impinge on the interests of third parties.” 134 S. Ct. at 
2790 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
63. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782. But see supra note 57 (observing several respects in which the 
majority’s claim is incorrect). 
64. Id. at 2760 (emphasis added). 
65. 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014). 
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religious accommodation mechanism, referred to above, provided by the gov-
ernment to religiously affiliated nonprofits—would “make it complicit in the 
provision of contraceptives by triggering the obligation for someone else to 
provide the services to which it objects.”66 In ordering accommodation pend-
ing appeal, the Court explained, “[n]othing in this interim order affects the 
ability of the applicant’s employees and students to obtain, without cost, the 
full range of FDA approved contraceptives.”67 Wheaton College, like Hobby Lob-
by, appears to tie accommodation to the fact that the government has other 
ways of providing for the statute’s intended beneficiaries so that no third-party 
harm would result from the accommodation.68 
Yet if the opinions in Hobby Lobby and Wheaton College demonstrate con-
cern with third-party harm, they do not examine the kinds of harm that ac-
commodation of complicity-based conscience claims might inflict, nor do they 
offer guidance about how principles concerned with third-party harm might 
apply in future cases. The Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby is now being cited to 
support accommodation of complicity-based conscience claims not merely in 
litigation involving insurance for contraception or claims under RFRA, but in a 
wide range of legal and institutional settings. In the LGBT context alone, Hob-
by Lobby has been used to bolster arguments for exemptions from state antidis-
 
66. Id. at 2808 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Other religiously affiliated non-
profits have raised similar challenges. See, e.g., Mich. Catholic Conference & Catholic Family 
Servs. v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372, 379 (6th Cir. 2014); Reply in Support of Emergency Applica-
tion for Injunction Pending Appellate Review or, in the Alternative, Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari & Injunction Pending Resolution at 8, Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the 
Aged v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014) (No. 13A691). 
67. Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2807. Unlike in Hobby Lobby, see 134 S. Ct. at 2758, there was no 
alternative accommodation in place, see Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2807. Accordingly, in lieu 
of the form to which Wheaton College objected, the Court required the college to “inform[] 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services in writing that it is a nonprofit organization 
that holds itself out as religious and has religious objections to providing coverage for con-
traceptive services.” Id. 
68. In response to Wheaton College, the government issued interim final regulations allowing 
religiously affiliated nonprofits to use the alternative notice procedure required by the Court 
in that case. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 51,092 (Aug. 27, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510, 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). These regulations were immediately challenged and en-
joined by a federal district court. See Ave Maria Univ. v. Burwell, No. 2-13-cv-630, 2014 WL 
5471048 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 2014). But see Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (rejecting a challenge to accommodations offered to re-
ligiously affiliated nonprofits). The government also sought comments on a proposal to 
make the same accommodation mechanisms available to for-profit corporations that meet 
the new definition of “eligible organizations.” Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Un-
der the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,118. 
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crimination laws requiring businesses to serve same-sex couples69 and from the 
federal executive order banning sexual orientation and gender identity em-
ployment discrimination by federal contractors.70 It is an important moment, 
therefore, to explore the concerns about third parties that already structure 
Hobby Lobby, and to show how and why these concerns are an integral part of 
the RFRA inquiry. 
To illustrate the third-party effects of complicity-based conscience claims, 
we examine healthcare refusal laws—a legislated body of religious liberties law 
in which complicity-based claims predominate. In this body of law, the risk of 
third-party harm is substantial and yet largely left unaddressed. The legislation 
makes plain the impact that accommodating complicity claims can have on 
other members of the community.  
i i .  another religious l iberties  antecedent:  complicity  and 
healthcare refusals   
A body of state and federal law allows persons and institutions in the 
healthcare industry to assert conscience-based refusals to provide patient ser-
vices. While early healthcare refusal laws focused on the conscience claims of 
professionals opposed to performing certain procedures, over time refusal laws 
expanded through concepts of complicity to cover an increasing number of 
 
69. See, e.g., Supplemental Authority Letter of Defendant-Appellant Aloha Bed & Breakfast at 1, 
Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, No. CAAP-13-0000806 (Haw. Ct. App. July 25, 2014) 
(“alert[ing] the Court to pertinent supplemental authority,” in the form of the Hobby  
Lobby decision, to defend a bed-and-breakfast that discriminated against a same-sex  
couple); see also Emma Margolin, How Hobby Lobby Will Reverberate Throughout the  
LGBT Community, MSNBC (July 7, 2014,), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/hobby-lobby 
-reverberate-throughout-lgbt-community [http://perma.cc/377E-5982] (“‘I do think that 
ruling will have a major impact,’ said the Rev. Terry Fox, a Southern Baptist minister in 
Wichita, Kansas, and a leader of the successful movement to ban same-sex marriage in that 
state. ‘The Supreme Court has given a strong statement that people have a right in business 
if they have religious convictions to take a stand.’”); Greg Stohr, Gay Marriage Stirs Backlash 
as Businesses Assert Religion, BLOOMBERG (July 18, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/2014-07-18/gay-marriage-stirs-backlash-as-businesses-assert-religion.html [http://perma 
.cc/9ZGR-P2PA] (suggesting that Hobby Lobby “added fuel” to the debate over whether 
businesses should be exempted from laws requiring them to serve same-sex couples). 
70. See Carl H. Esbeck, Differences: Real and Rhetorical—Responding to Non-Discrimination  
Executive Order and Religious Freedom, BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE &  
WORLD AFF.: CORNERSTONE (July 22, 2014), http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/rfp/blog 
/non-discrimination-executive-order-and-religious-freedom/responses/differences-real-and 
-rhetorical [http://perma.cc/2JZH-9XZJ]; Letter from Stanley Carlson-Thies, President,  
Institutional Religious Freedom Alliance, et al., to President Barack Obama, at 1  
(June 25, 2014), http://www.irfalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/LGBT-EO-letter 
-to-President-6-25-2014-w-additional-signatures.pdf [http://perma.cc/2T8Z-KGDV]. 
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persons and institutions in healthcare services. The complicity-based con-
science claims in Hobby Lobby resemble and perhaps descended from these leg-
islated exemptions, popularly termed healthcare refusal laws or conscience 
clauses.71 A brief look at this body of law illustrates the shape of this statutory 
religious liberties tradition—significant not only as an antecedent for the claims 
in Hobby Lobby but also as an illustration of complicity-based claims in action. 
With this illustration, we can then begin to examine the distinctive social logic 
of complicity claims. 
A. Understanding Healthcare Refusal Laws 
Refusal laws exempt medical providers from duties of patient care that are 
imposed by various bodies of state and federal law governing institutions and 
professionals.72 Licensing boards enforce professional standards against 
healthcare institutions, doctors, nurses, and pharmacists.73 Tort law, and spe-
cifically medical malpractice, provides redress to patients injured by breaches of 
professional duties.74 Institutional actors and individual providers are also sub-
ject to common law and statutory obligations, including those imposed on 
public accommodations and healthcare facilities.75 And patients have constitu-
 
71. Many healthcare refusal laws cover both religious and moral objections. See infra note 103 
and accompanying text. 
72. Healthcare providers do not generally have legal obligations to accept specific patients, but 
legal and professional standards may regulate healthcare providers in the selection of pa-
tients and impose obligations on providers once care has commenced. See Elizabeth Sepper, 
Conscientious Refusals of Care, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN HEALTH LAW (Glenn Co-
hen et al. eds., forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 2) (on file with authors). 
73. See Kathleen M. Boozang, Deciding the Fate of Religious Hospitals in the Emerging Health Care 
Market, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1429, 1446-75 (1995) (examining conflicts between conscience 
claims and patients’ rights rooted in professional ethics, common law, and constitutional 
doctrine). 
74. See, e.g., Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 256 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Ct. App. 1989); 
Hummel v. Reiss, 589 A.2d 1041 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), aff’d, 608 A.2d 1341 (N.J. 
1992).  
75. See, e.g., N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Superior Ct., 189 P.3d 
959 (Cal. 2008) (denying doctors’ claims that free exercise rights exempt them from compli-
ance with state antidiscrimination law regarding provision of reproductive healthcare to a 
lesbian patient). Outside the antidiscrimination domain, some states maintain regulations 
regarding hospital responses to sexual assault, requiring hospitals to provide victims with 
“[m]edically and factually accurate written and oral information about emergency contra-
ception.” ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 545.60(a)(3) (2010); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-
10D-3(A) (West 2014). 
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tional rights, including reproductive and medical decision-making rights, in 
the healthcare context.76 
Against this backdrop, refusal laws allow individuals and institutions in the 
healthcare industry to express conscience objections to interacting with persons 
who seek certain medical services—most commonly abortion, sterilization, and 
contraception. The laws provide religious exemptions for those who assert that 
abortion, sterilization, and contraception are sinful, and who object to acting in 
ways that, the claimants assert, would make them complicit in the sinful con-
duct of others. The laws appear to exempt healthcare providers from duties to 
patients.77 And they generally do not provide mechanisms to mediate their im-
pact on patients. 
B. The Church Amendment  
We can trace the emergence of healthcare refusals legislation to Congress’s 
passage of the Church Amendment in 1973.78 That legislation followed on the 
heels of two significant judicial decisions: the Supreme Court’s 1973 Roe v. 
 
76. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. 
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
77. Many of the statutes have not been authoritatively construed. Litigation over healthcare re-
fusal laws appears to have been more common in the 1970s, when these laws first appeared, 
than in more recent years. See, e.g., Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189, 193 (C.D. Utah 
1973); Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 366 A.2d 641, 647 (N.J. 1976). For a recent liti-
gated example in the professional ethics context relating to pharmacists, see Noesen v. State 
Department of Regulation and Licensing, Pharmacy Examining Board, 751 N.W.2d 385, 388, 391 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2008), which affirmed that a pharmacist who objected to participating in 
“certain tasks . . . for contraceptive purposes” and therefore refused to fill a contraception 
prescription or to transfer the prescription to another store departed from the standard of 
care. There is also pending litigation by pharmacies and pharmacists challenging, on free 
exercise grounds, a Washington Board of Pharmacy regulation requiring pharmacies to 
deliver all lawfully prescribed medications, including emergency contraceptives. See 
Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, No. 12-35221 (9th Cir. argued Nov. 20, 2014); see also Stormans, 
Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925 (W.D. Wash. 2012). Some state refusal laws indicate that 
refusal does not constitute unprofessional conduct. See, e.g., GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 480-5-
.03(n) (2014) (providing that “[i]t shall not be considered unprofessional conduct for any 
pharmacist to refuse to fill any prescription based on his/her professional judgment or ethi-
cal or moral beliefs”). More broadly, some state refusal laws provide that the refusal cannot 
form the basis for civil, criminal, or administrative liability. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-
107-5 (West 2014).  
78. The Church Amendment was passed as part of the Health Programs Extension Act of 1973, 
Pub. L. No. 93-45, § 401(b)-(c), 87 Stat. 91, 95. 
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Wade decision invalidating criminal prohibitions on abortion;79 and a 1972 fed-
eral district court decision enjoining a Catholic affiliated hospital, which was 
deemed to engage in state action because of its receipt of federal funding, from 
prohibiting sterilization at its facilities.80 The Church Amendment, which 
passed with near unanimous support,81 provided that receipt of federal funds 
would not provide a basis for requiring a physician or nurse “to perform or assist 
in the performance of any sterilization procedure or abortion if his performance 
or assistance in the performance of such procedure or abortion would be con-
trary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions.”82 It also provided that no 
“entity” could be compelled to “make its facilities available for the performance 
 
79. 410 U.S. 113. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, conscience arguments circulated in de-
bates over war and abortion. Jeremy Kessler explains that “it was during the 1960s that ma-
jor religious organizations, the press, and the federal judiciary all came to embrace the indi-
vidual conscientious objector as a legitimate and even laudable kind of citizen.” Jeremy 
Kessler, The Legal Origins of Catholic Conscientious Objection 1-2 (Jan. 20, 2014) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with authors). He emphasizes that Catholics played a prom-
inent role “as they used the legal language of conscience to both criticize the American state 
and insist upon the compatibility of Catholic and American identity.” Id.  
 In the 1960s, “conscience talk” spread from conflict over war to conflict over abortion. 
See id. In this era, conscience appeared on both sides of the abortion conflict, and in support 
of religious and secular claims. See LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. 
WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING 
(2d ed. 2012) (excerpting sources in the decade before Roe in which conscience was invoked 
on both sides of the abortion debate, more commonly to assert the case for access to abor-
tion). After Roe protected a woman’s choice to end a pregnancy, conscience was increasingly 
associated with claims to exemption from the responsibility to perform abortions.  
80. See Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973) (dissolving the prelimi-
nary injunction, granted on October 27, 1992, in light of the Church Amendment). For dis-
cussion of this decision, see Sara Dubow, “A Constitutional Right Rendered Utterly Meaning-
less”: Religious Exemptions and Reproductive Politics, 1973-2014, 27 J. POL’Y HIST. 1, 6 (2015). 
81. See Dubow, supra note 80, at 1. The Senate first passed the Amendment by a 92-1 vote, the 
House passed a slightly revised version 372-1, and the Senate ultimately passed the final bill 
that included the provision in a unanimous 94-0 vote. See id. at 25-26 n.2. The Church 
Amendment emerged at a time when more Republicans than Democrats supported in-
creased access to abortion, and Republicans were just beginning to use the abortion issue to 
distinguish themselves from Democrats. See GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 79, at 113, 
207, 224, 263; Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New 
Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2034, 2082 n.191 (2011). Nonetheless, some re-
productive rights advocates did express concern about the statute’s coverage of institutional 
entities. See Harriet F. Pilpel & Dorothy E. Patton, Abortion, Conscience and the Constitution: 
An Examination of Federal Institutional Conscience Clauses, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 279, 
280 (1974-75). For Pilpel’s role as an architect of modern privacy law, see generally LEIGH 
ANN WHEELER, HOW SEX BECAME A CIVIL LIBERTY (2013). 
82. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).  
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of any sterilization procedure or abortion if [such] performance . . . is prohibit-
ed by the entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions.”83 
The Church Amendment inaugurated a widespread tradition of healthcare 
refusals legislation at the federal and state levels.84 Yet the Amendment differed 
in important ways from the body of healthcare refusal laws that would follow. 
The Amendment protected from discrimination not only individuals who, fol-
lowing the dictates of conscience, refused to perform abortion and sterilization 
but also those who, following the dictates of conscience, performed such pro-
cedures.85 More importantly for our purposes, the Church Amendment’s cov-
erage of individuals focused on the conduct of doctors and nurses who “per-
form[] or assist[] in the performance of a lawful sterilization procedure or 
abortion.”86 The legislation was concerned with those professionals directly in-
volved in the procedures. The Congressional debate confirms this focus. Sena-
tor Russell Long worried that the accommodation could be invoked by “a 
nurse or an attendant somewhere in the hospital who objected to [the proce-
dure or] . . . someone who had nothing to do with the matter and was not in-
volved in it one way or the other, just someone who happened to be working in 
a hospital.”87 In response, Senator Frank Church explicitly rejected such an ex-
pansive reading of the acts and actors covered. Instead, he affirmed Senator 
Long’s position that the accommodation would not cover “someone working in 
the hospital . . . who had no responsibility, directly or indirectly, with regard to 
the performance of [the] procedure.”88 
 
83. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(2)(A) (2012). Women’s rights advocates raised objections to this in-
stitutional coverage at the time. See Pilpel & Patton, supra note 81. 
84. A handful of healthcare refusal laws existed at the state level before the Church Amendment. 
See, e.g., Act of Feb. 17, 1969, No. 61, § 8, 1969 Ark. Acts 177 (codified as amended at ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 20-16-601 (West 2014)); Act of Apr. 3, 1972, ch. 72-132, §§ 1-6, 1972 Fla. Laws 
412, 413-14 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(5) (West 2014)). 
85. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)(1)(B) (2012) (prohibiting federal funding recipients from discrimi-
nating against “any physician or other health care personnel . . . because he performed or as-
sisted in the performance of a lawful sterilization procedure or abortion [or] because he re-
fused to perform or assist in the performance of such a procedure or abortion”). Willing 
providers were merely protected from discrimination if they previously performed the pro-
cedure or performed it off-site; they had no right to an accommodation allowing them to 
perform the procedure at an objecting institution. See Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience 
Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1512-13 (2012). 
86. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Notably, the Amendment did not provide an 
exception to protect the health or life of the patient. 
87. 119 CONG. REC. 9597 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1973) (statement of Sen. Long). 
88. Id. (statement of Sen. Long); id. (statement of Sen. Church) (“The Senator is correct.”). As 
Senator Church’s response suggests, the focus of the legislation was not on complicity. Still, 
the language of “assistance,” as well as the coverage of institutions, might be seen to draw 
on the logic of complicity. However we read the Church Amendment itself, the concept of 
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C. The Expansion of Healthcare Refusals: Operationalizing Complicity  
In the immediate wake of the Church Amendment, many states enacted 
healthcare refusal laws.89 But the expansion of healthcare refusals legislation 
occurred on a much larger scale in the 1990s and 2000s. Laws at the state and 
federal levels grew to include contraception90 and to cover a much broader 
range of acts and actors. This new generation of laws went beyond the Church 
Amendment and plainly sought to accommodate objections to many more 
forms of conduct, interactions, and associations thought to make the objector 
complicit in the wrongdoing of another person. 
In this period, the federal government and a number of states enacted laws 
that allowed a range of healthcare professionals and institutions with objec-
tions to abortion or contraception to refuse to refer or counsel patients. On the fed-
eral level, a 1996 omnibus appropriations bill provided that neither the federal 
government nor any state or local government could “subject any health care 
entity to discrimination” based on the entity’s refusal to provide abortion ser-
 
complicity, as we now show, drove expansion of healthcare refusals legislation in the ensu-
ing decades. 
89. Between the decision in Roe and July 1973, fifteen states passed conscience clauses regarding 
abortion. By the close of 1974, twenty-eight states had laws allowing physicians to refuse to 
participate in abortions, and twenty-seven states had laws that applied to hospitals. See A 
Review of State Abortion Laws Enacted Since January 1973, 3 FAM. PLAN./POPULATION REP. 88, 
88-94 (1974); Dubow, supra note 80, at 25 n.3. Some of these early laws went beyond the 
Church Amendment by covering contraception in addition to abortion and/or sterilization, 
see, e.g., Act of Mar. 7, 1973, No. 235, §4, 1973 Ark. Acts 778, 780 (codified as amended at 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304 (West 2014)), by protecting only individuals who objected to 
the procedures, rather than also including those whose conscience supported the proce-
dures, see, e.g., Act of Mar. 21, 1974, ch. 177, § 4, 1974 Minn. Laws 265, 267 (codified as 
amended at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.414 (West 2014)), and by including medical personnel 
beyond doctors and nurses, see, e.g., Act of Oct. 3, 1973, ch. 624, § 1903, 1973 Me. Laws 1259, 
1260 (codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903(4) (2014)).  
90. A range of potential factors may account for the widespread inclusion of contraception. Re-
ligious objections to contraception, most notably from Catholics, clearly predated the inclu-
sion of contraception in healthcare refusal laws. But in the 1990s, new types of contracep-
tives, including emergency contraception, entered the market, see Office of Population 
Research, History of Plan B OTC, PRINCETON U., http://ec.princeton.edu/pills/planbhistory 
.html [http://perma.cc/WG4S-Z6KW], eliciting objections from some who, as a matter of 
religious conviction, believed them to be “abortifacients.” Around the same time, states be-
gan to pass contraceptive equity laws that required healthcare insurance to include coverage 
of ordinary forms of contraception; these laws often included exemptions for religious em-
ployers. See, e.g., Women’s Contraception Equity Act, ch. 538, 1999 Cal. Stat. 3718, 3719 
(codified as amended at CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196(a)(1) (West 2015)); An Act Requiring 
Health Insurers To Cover Prescription Birth Control, Pub. Act No. 99-79, §§ 1(b)-(c), 1999 
Conn. Pub. Acts 198, 198-99 (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-503e(a) 
(West 2015)). 
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vices, abortion training, arrangements for abortion services, or referrals to other 
entities that provide abortion services.91 Some states, particularly when covering 
contraception, explicitly included the provision of information among the list 
of covered acts.92 Colorado law, for instance, provides: “No private institution 
or physician, nor any agent or employee of such institution or physician, shall 
be prohibited from refusing to provide contraceptive procedures, supplies, and 
information when such refusal is based upon religious or conscientious objec-
tion . . . .”93 
Just as the range of acts continued to grow in ways that gave practical 
meaning to the concept of complicity, so did the range of covered actors. Mis-
sissippi, which in 2004 passed the nation’s broadest healthcare refusal law,94 
provides an illustration of a provision drafted with the evident aim of making 
as many persons eligible for exemption as possible. The law defines “health 
care service” to include: 
any phase of patient medical care, treatment or procedure, including, 
but not limited to, the following: patient referral, counseling, therapy, 
testing, diagnosis or prognosis, research, instruction, prescribing, dis-
pensing or administering any device, drug, or medication, surgery, or 
any other care or treatment rendered by health care providers or health 
care institutions.95  
Mississippi’s law defines “health care provider” with similar breadth:  
“Health care provider” means any individual who may be asked to par-
ticipate in any way in a health care service, including, but not limited 
to: a physician, physician’s assistant, nurse, nurses’ aide, medical assis-
tant, hospital employee, clinic employee, nursing home employee, 
 
91. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134,    
§ 245(a), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-245 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 238n(a) (2012)).  
92. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304 (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-6-102 (2014); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 381.0051 (West 2014); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 70/4 (2014). See generally Adam 
Sonfield, Rights vs. Responsibilities: Professional Standards and Provider Refusals, GUTTMACHER 
REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, Aug. 2005, http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/08/3/gr080307.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/7APA-Y7D4]. 
93. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-6-102 (2014) (emphasis added). 
94. Mississippi Health Care Rights of Conscience Act, ch. 568, § 2(a), 2004 Miss. Laws 977, 
978. 
95. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(a) (West 2014). For a law that also dramatically increases the 
number of covered individuals, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-741(B) (West 2014), 
providing that “[n]o person may be required to perform, induce or participate in medical 
procedures which result in an abortion which are in preparation for an abortion or which 
involve aftercare of an abortion patient . . . .”. 
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pharmacist, pharmacy employee, researcher, medical or nursing school 
faculty, student or employee, counselor, social worker or any profes-
sional, paraprofessional, or any other person who furnishes, or assists 
in the furnishing of, a health care procedure.96 
In particular, as the Mississippi law demonstrates, as healthcare refusal laws 
grew to include contraception, some states specifically covered pharmacists and 
pharmacies with objections to selling contraception.97  
As changes occurred in the economic organization of the healthcare field, 
conscience legislation began to apply the logic of complicity to insurance plans’ 
and HMOs’ financial relationships.98 In 1997, Congress passed a Balanced Bu- 
dget Act that provided conscience provisions for Medicaid and Medicare ma- 
naged care providers that objected to providing, reimbursing for, or covering 
abortion counseling or referral.99 A 2004 appropriations bill broadened the de- 
 
96. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(b) (West 2014). For another particularly broad refusal statute 
in terms of covered acts, actors, and services, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.43.065 (West 
2014), providing that “[n]o individual health care provider, religiously sponsored health car-
rier, or health care facility may be required by law or contract in any circumstances to partic-
ipate in the provision of or payment for a specific service if they object to so doing for reason 
of conscience or religion. No person may be discriminated against in employment or profes-
sional privileges because of such objection.” 
97. While Arkansas’s family planning statute, enacted in 1973, covered pharmacists, Act of Mar. 
7, 1973, No. 235, § 4(c), 1973 Ark. Acts 778, 780 (codified as amended at ARK. CODE ANN. § 
20-16-304 (West 2014)), South Dakota seems to have initiated the recent wave of laws that 
included pharmacists. See Act of Mar. 13, 1998, ch. 226, 1998 S.D. Sess. Laws 292, 293 (codi-
fied as amended at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2015)) (“No pharmacist may be required 
to dispense medication if there is reason to believe that the medication would be used to: (1) 
Cause an abortion; or (2) Destroy an unborn child as defined in subdivision 22-1-
2(50A)[.]”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(50A) (2015) (defining “unborn child” as “an indi-
vidual organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth”). Other states 
followed. See, e.g., GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 480-5-03 (2005); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 70/3-/4 
(2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5 (West 2006). On consideration of third-party harm in 
this context, see Lora Cicconi, Pharmacist Refusals and Third-Party Interests: A Proposed Judi-
cial Approach to Pharmacist Conscience Clauses, 54 UCLA L. REV. 709 (2007). 
98. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(j)(3)(B) (2012) (creating an exemption for managed care 
providers covering reimbursement for abortion counseling and referral services).  
99. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 1852(j)(3)(B), 111 Stat. 251, 295 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(j)(3)(B) (2012)). For similar legislation, see 42 U.S.C. § 
1396u-2(b)(3)(B) (2012). Shortly thereafter when Congress passed a contraceptive equity 
law that required health insurance plans and carriers participating in the Federal Employees’ 
Health Benefits Program to include contraceptives in prescription drug coverage, it exempt-
ed existing and future plans with religious objections to covering contraceptives. Omnibus 
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-
277, § 656(b), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-530 (1998) (“Nothing in this section shall apply to a con-
tract with . . . any existing or future plan, if the plan objects to such coverage on the basis of 
religious beliefs.”). 
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finition of a healthcare entity to include HMOs and insurance plans, and with-
held federal funding from any federal agencies or state governments that dis-
criminated against healthcare entities on the basis of their refusal to cover, pay 
for, or refer for abortion.100 In 2008, the Bush Administration adopted regula-
tions that expanded the coverage of the Church Amendment itself, defining 
“Health Care Entity” to include HMOs and health insurance plans and assis-
tance to include “counseling, referral, training, and other arrangements for the 
procedure.”101 
Over time, the body of healthcare refusals legislation took on a very differ-
ent form than that originally seen in the Church Amendment. While the 
Church Amendment focused on persons directly involved in religiously objec-
tionable conduct, over time the legislation was self-consciously expanded to 
reach an ever-widening number of persons who might count themselves as 
complicit. Fueled by complicity-based objections, refusal laws expanded to 
cover acts and actors only remotely connected to the challenged healthcare ser-
vice.102 And even as healthcare refusal laws offered exemptions for ever-
growing numbers of institutions and persons, efforts to offset the impact of re-
fusals on patients remained rare. In fact, many of the laws expressly authorized 
providers to withhold referrals, as well as the kinds of counseling or infor-
mation that would provide patients with notice that there were alternative 
forms of treatment available in which they might be interested.  
 
100. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 508(d), 118 Stat. 2809, 
3163 (2004) (“[T]he term ‘health care entity’ includes an individual physician or other 
health care professional, a hospital, a provider-sponsored organization, a health mainte-
nance organization, a health insurance plan, or any other kind of health care facility, organi-
zation, or plan.”). That provision was repeated annually in subsequent appropriations bills. 
See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 508(d), 123 Stat. 
3034, 3280 (2009). 
101. See Ensuring that Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support Coer-
cive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law, 73 Fed. Reg. 78072, 
78097 (Dec. 19, 2008). The Obama Administration reversed the regulations in part in 2011, 
after receiving public comments regarding the attenuated relationship between the covered 
acts and the performance of an abortion. Regulation for the Enforcement of Federal Health 
Care Provider Conscience Protection Laws, 76 Fed. Reg. 9968-02 (Feb. 23, 2011) (codified at 
45 C.F.R. pt. 88 (2014)). 
102. We observe another striking difference between the earlier and later legislation. While the 
Church Amendment protected from discrimination both those who performed and those 
who refused to perform an abortion, subsequent healthcare refusal laws provided protection 
only to those who refused to perform the procedure. See Sepper, supra note 85, at 1512 (“On-
ly in the exceptional case does legislation acknowledge the willing individual provider.”). 
State laws that protect from discrimination those willing to perform an abortion, see KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800(5)(b)-(c) (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.20184 (2014), 
cover only “prior or off-site performance.” Sepper, supra note 85, at 1512. 
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Overall, the claims upon which recent healthcare refusal laws are based 
contrast sharply with the claims featured in the cases that Congress referenced 
in RFRA. Rather than invoking unfamiliar religious beliefs, the claimants ob-
ject to laws departing from traditional social norms. The claims for accommo-
dation are generally not asserted in courts; instead, they are primarily asserted 
in politics, and redressed through legislation. The accommodations provided 
by healthcare refusal laws are not designed for particular religious claimants, 
such as the Amish or members of the Native American Church; instead, they 
authorize exemptions for persons asserting conscience objections based on any 
religion or, with the inclusion of “moral” objections, no religion at all.103 Ac-
commodation of these claims does not entail costs borne by society as a whole; 
instead, accommodation has consequences for the third parties whose conduct 
is at issue. Crucially, healthcare refusal laws make little or no effort to offset 
their impact on third parties.  
i i i .  religion in politics   
The concepts of complicity that shape more recent and expansive 
healthcare refusal laws play a growing role in religious conflicts over contracep-
tion, abortion, and same-sex marriage. For example, in Hobby Lobby, the em-
ployers objected to providing insurance coverage that their employees might 
use to purchase contraceptives the employers viewed as sinful. Similarly, wed-
ding-related vendors have objected to providing goods and services to same-
sex couples because doing so would make them complicit in a relationship they 
deem sinful.104 
Not only do these complicity-based conscience claims differ in form from 
claims at issue in the free exercise cases RFRA invokes, but as this Part demon-
strates, complicity claims also differ in social logic. Our brief consideration of 
healthcare refusals legislation suggests that complicity-based conscience claims 
are entangled in long-running “culture war” conflicts about laws that break 
from traditional morality. In this Part we show that political leaders are en-
couraging the faithful to assert complicity claims. Unlike the claims in the cases 
to which Congress referred when it passed RFRA, complicity-based conscience 
claims are asserted in society-wide conflicts by mobilized groups and individu-
als acting in coalitions that reach across religious denominational lines and in 
 
103. Indeed, some laws allow refusals without even explicitly invoking conscience. See Sepper, 
supra note 85, at 1510 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-16(e) (2011); and 20 PA. CONS. STAT.    
§ 5424 (2012)). 
104. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
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coordination with a political party.105 Complicity offers a shared language and 
mode of reasoning that persons can employ in these conflicts to voice objec-
tions that are rooted in different faiths and in convictions that are both reli-
gious and secular.106 
Asserting a complicity-based conscience claim can serve larger law reform 
goals in “culture war” conflicts. Many who join in cross-denominational coali-
tion to assert complicity-based conscience claims endorse laws concerning 
abortion or same-sex marriage that would preserve traditional morality for the 
society as a whole. Some invoke complicity-based conscience claims when they 
cannot entrench traditional morality through laws of general application. As 
the conditions of conflict change and arguments rooted in traditional morality 
lose their ability to persuade, movement leaders have advocated shifting to re-
ligious liberty arguments for exemption as part of a long-term effort to shape 
community-wide norms.107 
It is commonplace for people of faith to engage in political action.108 We 
devote special attention to political mobilization around complicity-based con-
 
105. See, e.g., infra notes 124-129, 132-133 and accompanying text (documenting support for con-
science claims in the Manhattan Declaration and by the Family Research Council); infra 
notes 140-141 and accompanying text (documenting the Republican Party platform’s sup-
port for complicity-based conscience claims).  
106. The cross-denominational claims on complicity growing out of this coalition have begun to 
shape religious liberties law. In Hobby Lobby, when Justice Alito discussed the religious be-
liefs of the claimants, who are not Catholic, he appealed to Catholic sources on cooperation. 
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 n.34 (2014) (citing THOMAS J. 
HIGGINS, MAN AS MAN: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF ETHICS 353, 355 (1949); and HENRY DAVIS, 
MORAL AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY 341 (1935)). 
107. See infra notes 175-179 and accompanying text. 
108. It has become so common for religious leaders to speak to political questions that the Alli-
ance Defending Freedom (ADF) now objects to the restrictions on religious institutions 
supporting particular candidates that are imposed as a condition for these institutions secur-
ing tax-exempt status. See Speak Up.: Protect and Promote the Rights of Our Churches, ALLI-
ANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, http://www.alliancedefendingfreedom.org/content/docs/issues 
/church/Pulpit-Freedom-Sunday-FAQ.pdf [http://perma.cc/U4KM-9FT7] (describing a 
campaign “to generate test cases” to end IRS restrictions “on the rights of pastors to use 
moral and biblical standards to support or oppose candidates for public office”); see also Pul-
pit Freedom Sunday, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, http://www.alliancedefendingfreedom 
.org/pulpitfreedom [http://perma.cc/3HV3-BHXQ] (noting that thousands of pastors “vio-
lated the [restrictions],” “preached an election sermon,” and support ADF’s position). 
Other examples are too numerous to count. Religious faith moved many of those who 
both supported and opposed segregation earlier in our nation’s history. See, e.g., William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Noah’s Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status, Belief, and Conduct To Resist 
Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L. REV. 657, 669-670, 678-79 (2011). And examples of po-
litical action grounded in religious identity are common in other countries. See Nancy L. 
Rosenblum, Religious Parties, Religious Political Identity, and the Cold Shoulder of Liberal Demo-
 
  
the yale law journal 124:2516   20 15  
2544 
 
science claims for two reasons. The first should be self-evident. Mobilization 
will amplify the effects of accommodating complicity claims. Complicity claims 
concerning issues in democratic contest will increase in number, and accom-
modation of the claims will have significance, not merely for the claimants, but 
for the other citizens who the claimants believe are sinning. 
Considering mobilization is important for a second reason. Many who ad-
vocate accommodation of complicity-based conscience claims assert that doing 
so will settle conflict. By examining how complicity-based conscience claims 
are part of a contest over community norms, we can see how religious accom-
modation may extend, rather than resolve, conflict. 
A. Complicity’s Social Logic: Cross-Denominational Mobilization  
Today, Catholics and evangelical Protestants assert shared religious beliefs 
in conflicts over sexual norms. This coalition did not exist at the time of Roe, 
for example, when evangelical Protestants had different views about abortion 
and were unwilling to join in political coalition with Catholics in opposing 
it.109 But the views of evangelical Protestants about abortion have changed in 
the intervening years,110 as has their willingness to assert claims of common 
faith with Catholics on the question. Theological differences, of course, persist. 
But since the era of Ronald Reagan’s election, when Republican leaders en-
couraged evangelical Protestants to enter politics in common cause with Catho-
lics opposed to abortion,111 a conservative, cross-denominational coalition of 
Christians has pursued self-consciously traditional and conservative ends. 
 
cratic Thought, 6 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 23, 24-27 (2003) (analyzing religious par-
ties and religious political identity in democratic societies). 
109. At the time of Roe, evangelical Protestants had a variety of positions on abortion and had not 
mobilized in politics against abortion, in part because they saw abortion as a “Catholic is-
sue” with which they did not wish to be associated. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 81, 
at 2063. 
110. For evolving views on abortion asserted by various religious denominations in the decade 
before and after Roe, see GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 79, at 69-80; and Greenhouse & 
Siegel, supra note 81, at 2063 n.132. 
111. In the late 1970s, Republican leaders helped build a political coalition of evangelical 
Protestants and Catholics to oppose abortion. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 81, at 
2065–67 (drawing on historical accounts, as well as sources recounting the recollections of 
participants); see also MICHELE MCKEEGAN, ABORTION POLITICS: MUTINY IN THE RANKS OF 
THE RIGHT 20-21 (1992); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism 
and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 420-24 (2007); Deana A. Rohlinger & Jill 
Quadagno, Framing Faith: Explaining Cooperation and Conflict in the US Conservative Chris-
tian Political Movement, 8 SOC. MOVEMENT STUD. 341, 345-49 (2009). This cross-
denominational organizational work continued in the 1990s. See, e.g., Evangelicals and 
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We can see an example of this coalition in the Manhattan Declaration: A 
Call of Christian Conscience, the 2009 manifesto of conservative Christian prin-
ciples set forth by Robert George and Chuck Colson and endorsed by Catholic 
and evangelical Protestant leaders as well as conservative political activists.112 
The Declaration calls upon Christians to unite across denominational lines in 
support of three central principles: “the sanctity of human life, the dignity of 
marriage as a union of husband and wife, and the freedom of religion.”113 The 
Declaration presents claims for religious liberty—prominently including com-
plicity-based conscience claims about healthcare and marriage—alongside 
planks opposing abortion and same-sex marriage.114 
From the perspective of the various religious traditions that find common 
ground in this cross-denominational coalition, the practices that form the basis 
of today’s complicity-based conscience claims are related: same-sex marriage, 
abortion, and contraception divert sex and marriage from procreative ends. 
Same-sex marriage, the Manhattan Declaration argues,  
would lock into place the false and destructive belief that marriage is all 
about romance and other adult satisfactions, and not, in any intrinsic 
way, about procreation and the unique character and value of acts and 
relationships whose meaning is shaped by their aptness for the genera-
tion, promotion and protection of life.115  
 
Catholics Together: The Christian Mission in the Third Millennium, FIRST THINGS, May 1994, 
at 15. 
112. Manhattan Declaration: A Call of Christian Conscience, MANHATTAN DECLARATION  
(Nov. 2009), http://manhattandeclaration.org/man_dec_resources/Manhattan_Declaration 
_full_text.pdf [http://perma.cc/MGW8-7WTE]. See generally MANHATTAN DECLARATION, 
http://manhattandeclaration.org [http://perma.cc/3XB9-2TV2]. The first signers included 
leading social conservative advocates, such as Gary Bauer, Brian Brown, James Dobson, 
Maggie Gallagher, Tony Perkins, and Alan Sears, and religious figures, such as the Rever-
end Jonathan Falwell, the Reverend Jim Garlow, the Reverend Ken Hutcherson, Bishop 
Harry Jackson, a number of Roman Catholic archbishops, and the primate of the  
Orthodox Church in America. See List of Religious & Organizational Leaders Signatories,  
MANHATTAN DECLARATION, http://manhattandeclaration.org/man_dec_resources/list_of 
_religious_leaders.pdf [http://perma.cc/6U2Q-3FPM]; see also Laurie Goodstein, Christian 
Leaders Unite on Political Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009 
/11/20/us/politics/20alliance.html [http://perma.cc/EF85-5Z34].  
113. See Manhattan Declaration: We Make the Following Declaration, MANHATTAN DECLARATION, 
http://manhattandeclaration.org/#2 [http://perma.cc/EG8R-XNMB]. 
114. Manhattan Declaration, supra note 112, at 7-8. 
115. Id. at 5. 
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While the Declaration opposes abortion as “deliberate killing,”116 abortion also 
detaches sex from procreative ends. A 1996 statement signed by the Declara-
tion’s authors, as well as many other social conservatives and religious leaders, 
declared: “The abortion license is inextricably bound up with the mores of the 
sexual revolution. Promotion of the pro-life cause also requires us to support 
and work with those who are seeking to reestablish the moral linkage between 
sexual expression and marriage, and between marriage and procreation.”117 
Putting it more succinctly, Pat Robertson recently explained on the 700 Club 
that abortion and same-sex marriage are connected because both “destroy 
[our] opportunities to reproduce.”118 
Religious conservatives opposed to practices that separate sex from procre-
ation may object not only to same-sex marriage and abortion, but also to con-
traception. While Hobby Lobby featured an objection to contraceptives the 
claimants viewed as “abortifacients,”119 many religious claimants object to con-
traception generally. There are Catholics and evangelical Protestants who ob-
ject to a “contraceptive mentality” that separates sex from procreation.120 The 
 
116. Id. at 3. 
117. The America We Seek: A Statement of Pro-Life Principle and Concern, FIRST THINGS, May 
1996, http://www.firstthings.com/article/1996/05/005-the-america-we-seek-a-statement-of 
-pro-life-principle-and-concern [http://perma.cc/A7P8-8QCD]. 
118. The 700 Club—March 26, 2014, CHRISTIAN BROADCASTING NETWORK (Mar. 26, 2014), http: 
//www.cbn.com/tv/3394811325001 [http://perma.cc/B345-MV36] (video at 22:50). As Alan 
Keyes boldly asserted at a 2006 Protecting Life and Marriage Rally, “Abortion does at the 
physical level what homosexual marriage does at the institutional level.” Ryan Woodard, 
Speakers Rally Against Abortion, Gay Marriage, RAPID CITY J., Oct. 16, 2006, http:// 
www.rapidcityjournal.com/news/local/article_4cd6bab0-77f1-547b-9857-97e41fc52b2b.html 
[http://perma.cc/XAH4-P2TW]; see also Anthony Esolen, Marriage Is Not a Water Fountain, 
PUB. DISCOURSE (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/09/13730 
[http://perma.cc/7ZX7-ZDCT] (connecting same-sex marriage to the broader debate over 
sex and family, including sexual liberty, abortion, gendered notions of parenting, and no-
fault divorce, such that “the whole sexual revolution is at issue”). 
119. See supra note 21; see also infra note 273. 
120. See, e.g., Bishop Burke on the Dignity of Human Life and Civic Responsibility, ZENIT (Jan. 10, 
2004), http://www.zenit.org/en/articles/bishop-burke-on-the-dignity-of-human-life-and 
-civic-responsibility [http://perma.cc/PP8Y-VH8N] (printing a pastoral letter from Bishop 
Raymond Burke of Wisconsin, stating: “The port of entry for the culture of death in our so-
ciety has been the abandonment of the respect for the procreative meaning of the conjugal 
act. It is the contraceptive way of thinking, the fear of the life-giving dimension of conjugal 
love, which very much sustains that culture.”); Brian Clowes, The “Contraceptive  
Mentality” and Its Consequences, LIFEISSUES.NET, http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/clo/clo 
_10contraceptivrmind.html [http://perma.cc/X286-6CLL] (“And once a person, Catholic or 
non-Catholic, has adopted the aberrant contraceptive mentality, other disordered views and 
behaviors follow in their wake.”); Albert Mohler, Can Christians Use Birth Control?, AL-
BERTMOHLER.COM (June 5, 2012), http://www.albertmohler.com/2012/06/05/can-christians 
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plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby were supported by amici who opposed contracep-
tion121 and advised the Court that contraception harms women.122 And in other 
litigation over the ACA, claimants have expressed objections to coverage of any 
FDA-approved contraceptives.123 
 
-use-birth-control-4 [http://perma.cc/3CGX-QE7P] (“[W]e must start with a rejection of 
the contraceptive mentality that sees pregnancy and children as impositions to be avoided 
rather than as gifts to be received, loved, and nurtured. This contraceptive mentality is an 
insidious attack upon God’s glory in creation, and the Creator’s gift of procreation to the 
married couple.”); Jerry J. Pokorsky, Obama and the New Evangelization, CATH. THING (July 
9, 2014), http://www.thecatholicthing.org/2014/07/09/obama-and-the-new-evangelization 
[http://perma.cc/ZA8G-PJL5] (discussing “[t]he consequences of the sexual revolution and 
the widespread availability of contraception” and asserting that “[t]he contraceptive mental-
ity reduces men and women to mere objects of sexual pleasure, destroys marriages and is ar-
guably the ultimate justification for ‘gay marriage’”). 
121. A number of amicus briefs in Hobby Lobby made claims in opposition to contraception gen-
erally, rather than confining opposition to the four methods identified by Hobby Lobby. See 
Brief of 67 Catholic Theologians and Ethicists as Amici Curiae in Support of Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., supra note 25, at 12; Brief of Beverly 
LaHaye Institute and Janice Shaw Crouse, Ph.D. as Amici Curiae in Support of Hobby Lob-
by Stores Inc. and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., et al. at 20-21, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 
2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356); Brief of Amicus Curiae Women Speak for Themselves in 
Support of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Conestoga Wood Specialties, et al. at 24-26, Bur-
well v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356). 
122. A brief filed in support of Hobby Lobby by Women Speak for Themselves, a project of the 
non-denominational Chiaroscuro Institute, argued that “the persistence or worsening of 
high rates of unintended pregnancy, abortion, STIs [sexually transmitted infections], and 
nonmarital births are the ‘logical’ results of the new marketplace for sex and marriage made 
possible by increasingly available contraception and legal abortion.” Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Women Speak for Themselves in Support of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Conestoga 
Wood Specialties, et al., supra note 121, at 25. In contemporaneous writing, the brief’s lead 
author remarked that “the churches opposing the Mandate hold, and teach women and men 
to maintain, an understanding of the sacredness of sexual intercourse, and its intrinsic con-
nection with the procreating of new, vulnerable, human life.” Helen M. Alvaré, No Compel-
ling Interest: The “Birth Control” Mandate and Religious Freedom, 58 VILL. L. REV. 379, 435 
(2013). 
123. See, e.g., Newland v. Sebelius, 542 F. App’x 706 (10th Cir. 2013); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 
730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013), vacated by Autocam Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2901 (2014). 
The Hobby Lobby decision applies to claimants with such objections. See Lyle Denniston, 
Wider Impact of Hobby Lobby Ruling?, SCOTUSBLOG (July 1, 2015, 12:05 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/07/wider-impact-of-hobby-lobby-ruling [http://perma 
.cc/34HM-AJSN]. And, of course, many religiously affiliated nonprofit organizations con-
tinue to assert complicity-based objections to the religious accommodations offered by the 
government from the contraceptive coverage requirement. See Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y of U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 13–3536, 14–1374, 14–1376, 14–1377, 2015 WL 543067 
(3d Cir. Feb. 11, 2015); Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 
(D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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Christians mobilize across religious denominations to enforce traditional 
morality in the law of abortion and marriage and to seek conscience-based ex-
emptions from laws that depart from traditional morality. The Manhattan Dec-
laration invokes Christian principles as it urges signers “to labor ceaselessly to 
preserve the legal definition of marriage as the union of one man and one 
woman” and “to roll back the license to kill that began with the abandonment 
of the unborn to abortion.”124 At the same time, the Declaration exhorts Chris-
tians to seek conscience exemptions from laws on marriage and healthcare that 
do not conform to its understanding of Christian values.125 The Declaration’s 
authors understand themselves as “build[ing] a movement—hundreds of 
thousands, perhaps millions, of Catholic, Evangelical, and Eastern Orthodox 
Christians”126—seeking to influence law and politics.127 Signers are urged to 
“share information” about the document at meetings of a “civic group like Ki-
wanis or Rotary,”128 and Christian social clubs, like the Christian Motorcyclists 
Association, have distributed the document.129 
The Manhattan Declaration offers one prominent example of an organiza-
tion that mobilizes a cross-denominational coalition of Christians to advocate 
for laws of general application that preserve traditional values and to assert 
conscience claims under a banner of religious liberty. The Family Research 
Council (FRC) is another.130 FRC works to pass laws banning same-sex mar-
 
124. Manhattan Declaration, supra note 112, at 3, 7. 
125. See id. at 7-9. Robert George’s strong endorsement of judicially enforced religious  
exemptions arguably departs from his earlier views. See James M. Oleske, Jr., The Born-
Again Champion of Conscience, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 75 (2015) (reviewing ROBERT  
P. GEORGE, CONSCIENCE AND ITS ENEMIES: CONFRONTING THE DOGMAS OF LIBERAL  
SECULARISM (2013)), http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/01/the-born-again-champion-of 
-conscience [http://perma.cc/FT9E-7U6Z]. 
126. Letter from Robert George, Timothy George & Chuck Colson to All Signers of the Manhat-
tan Declaration (Dec. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Letter from Robert George et al.] (on file with 
authors). 
127. For a list of some of those who have endorsed the Manifesto, see supra note 112. Those who 
sign on to the Declaration are exhorted to engage in politics. When the document was first 
disseminated, its recipients were asked to “let [their] representatives know what [they] 
think about the issues,” including the then-pending ACA. Letter from Robert George et al., 
supra note 126. 
128. Letter from Robert George et al., supra note 126; see also DANTE CHINNI & JAMES GIMPEL, 
OUR PATCHWORK NATION 53 (2010). 
129. See E-mail from Jim Oliver, Christian Motorcyclists Ass’n (CMA), to CMA Brothers and 
Leaders (Dec. 3, 2009, 08:34 AM EST) (on file with authors).  
130. FRC was founded by evangelical Christian leaders and eventually merged with Focus on the 
Family, a Christian evangelical ministry. FAQs, FAM. RES. COUNCIL (2015), http://www.frc 
.org/faqs [http://perma.cc/ZL88-GMJD]; History of Family Research Council, FAM. RES. 
COUNCIL (2015), http://www.frc.org/historymission [http://perma.cc/FB6U-3QRP]. FRC’s 
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riage and abortion.131 At the same time, the organization supports religious ex-
emptions for business owners whose “consciences prevent them from partici-
pating in”132 a same-sex marriage and “health care professionals and organiza-
tions who have conscientious objections to . . . participation in or cooperation 
with the delivery and marketing of abortion or abortifacients, sterilization, 
[and] contraception.”133 
To create collective political action in the name of Christian principles, FRC 
sponsors “Watchmen on the Wall,” a conference that brings to the nation’s 
capital approximately five hundred Christian pastors, who represent various 
denominations as well as non-denominational Christian ministries,134 to facili-
tate advocacy for laws that reflect Biblical values.135 The 2014 conference fo-
cused on defending “Biblical marriage” and responding to perceived attacks on 
religious liberty, including in the domain of abortion and contraception,136 
while the 2013 conference featured back-to-back sessions on “Threats to Reli-
gious Freedom” and “Protecting Marriage and Life in America.”137 FRC pro-
vides pastors with a Voter Impact Toolkit created with the Southern Baptist 
Convention’s Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, as well as a Culture 
Impact Manual, which, for example, instructs pastors to stop others from 
 
self-described “mission is to advance faith, family and freedom in public policy and the cul-
ture from a Christian worldview.” Vision and Mission Statements, FAM. RES. COUNCIL (2015), 
http://www.frc.org/mission-statement [http://perma.cc/34MP-ZXCP]. 
131. FRC “believes that homosexual conduct is harmful” and “supports state and federal consti-
tutional amendments” banning same-sex marriage. Homosexuality, FAM. RES. COUNCIL 
(2015), http://www.frc.org/homosexuality [http://perma.cc/3KDG-C4E2]. And it seeks to 
“build a culture of life” and to ensure that Roe’s “grave error will be corrected.” Abortion, 
FAM. RES. COUNCIL (2015), http://www.frc.org/abortion [http://perma.cc/8ACK-MZMK]. 
132. Hostility to Religion: The Growing Threat to Religious Liberty in the United States, FAM. RES. 
COUNCIL 22 (July 30, 2014), http://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF14G83.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/6GR5-A3ZR]. 
133. Conscience Protection, FAM. RES. COUNCIL (2015), http://www.frc.org/conscience-protection 
[http://perma.cc/Z3D7-UEUJ]. 
134. See Watchmen on the Wall 2014: Schedule of Events, FAM. RES. COUNCIL (May 9, 2014), 
http://www.watchmenpastors.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Abbreviated-schedule.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/9KME-77T8] (listing some of the various churches represented). 
135. See Elizabeth Dias, Watchmen on the Wall: Pastors Prepare To Take Back America, TIME,  
May 30, 2014, http://time.com/138134/watchmen-on-the-wall-pastors-prepare-to-take-back 
-america [http://perma.cc/SH74-QYW4]. 
136. Id. The 2014 conference speakers included elected officials, social movement advocates, and 
pastors from Christian churches from around the country. See Watchmen on the Wall 2014: 
Schedule of Events, supra note 134.  
137. Watchmen on the Wall 2013: Schedule of Events, FAM. RES. COUNCIL (May 13, 2013), 
http://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF13E28.pdf [http://perma.cc/U5G4-PMZ8]. 
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“misus[ing] civil rights laws to protect homosexual conduct and gender identi-
ty disorder.”138 
The movements asserting complicity-based conscience claims regularly act 
in coordination with a political party that shares the movements’ law reform 
goals.139 The Republican Party platform asserts “support [for] a human life 
amendment to the Constitution” and “reaffirm[s] . . . support for a 
[c]onstitutional amendment defining marriage as the union of one man and 
one woman,” at the same time that it brings together the issues of healthcare, 
same-sex marriage, and abortion under the banner of a “war on religion.”140 As 
the Party’s 2012 platform asserted: “The most offensive instance of this war on 
religion has been the current Administration’s attempt to compel faith-related 
institutions, as well as believing individuals, to contravene their deeply held re-
ligious, moral, or ethical beliefs regarding health services, traditional marriage, 
or abortion.”141 
Republican Party support for complicity-based conscience claims is not 
limited to the statement of principles in the Party’s platform. The Party has 
long supported healthcare refusal laws.142 And, after passage of the ACA, which 
the Party fiercely opposed, Republican leaders attempted to pass legislation 
providing conscience exemptions from the law’s requirement that employer-
provided healthcare insurance cover particular items and services. In 2012, the 
 
138. See Dias, supra note 135. For another example of an effort to mobilize evangelical pastors, 
 see Jason Horowitz, Evangelicals Aim To Mobilize an Army for Republicans in 2016, N.Y.  
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/16/us/evangelicals-aim-to-mobilize 
-an-army-for-republicans-in-2016.html [http://perma.cc/M8XJ-R8X6] (quoting David 
Lane, founder of the American Renewal Project, speaking to an audience of pastors: “‘If the 
Lord were to call 1,000 pastors in America—1,000—and they ended up with an average of 
300 volunteers per campaign in 2016, that would be 300,000 grass-root, precinct-level, 
evangelical conservatives coming from the bottom up . . . . It would change America.’”). 
139. For example, FRC connected pastors with Republican lawmakers at “Watchmen on the 
Wall.” See Dias, supra note 135. 
140. See Republican Platform 2012: We Believe in America, REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION 10, 12, 
14 (2012), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/101961.pdf [http://perma.cc/QM2E 
-5CPV]. 
141. Id. at 12.  
142. Republican Party Platform of 2000, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 31, 2000), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25849 [http://perma.cc/2NG2-7AXW] 
(“Because we treasure freedom of conscience, we oppose attempts to compel individuals or 
institutions to violate their moral standards in providing health-related services.”). The Re-
publican platform began to champion “conscience” in 1996. See Republican Party Platform of 
1996, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 12, 1996), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index 
.php?pid=25848 [http://perma.cc/CC5Z-JFD3] (“[T]he extraordinary things about our 
country . . . result when men and women live in obedience to their conscience, not to the 
state.”). 
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Respect for Rights of Conscience Act, commonly referred to as the Blunt 
Amendment, sought to amend the ACA to exempt any employer from “provi- 
ding coverage” and any plan from “paying for coverage” of any “items or ser-
vices . . . contrary to the religious beliefs or moral convictions of the sponsor,  
issuer, or other entity offering the plan.”143 Debate over the Blunt Amendment 
focused on employers’ coverage of contraception.144 
The Blunt Amendment was narrowly defeated in the Senate, voted down 
51-48.145 The vote largely tracked party lines, with only one Republican oppo- 
sing the bill.146 After supporters failed to secure a legislated accommodation 
from the ACA’s employer coverage requirement, public interest law firms 
sought the same sort of accommodation through litigation. An attorney from 
the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty approached the general counsel of Hob-
by Lobby about filing suit.147 In the months that followed, Hobby Lobby, rep-
resented by the Becket Fund, and Conestoga Wood, represented by Alliance 
Defending Freedom (ADF, formerly Alliance Defense Fund), brought RFRA 
challenges to the ACA’s requirement that employer-provided insurance cover 
 
143. S. 1467, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011). While seeking to amend the ACA, the Blunt Amendment 
itself was proposed as an amendment to a highway-funding bill. 158 CONG. REC. S538 (daily 
ed. Feb. 9, 2012) (recording the amendment proposed by Sen. Blunt). The Amendment also 
provided that no “individual or institutional health care provider” could be required “to 
provide, participate in, or refer for a specific item or service contrary to the provider’s reli-
gious beliefs or moral convictions.” S. 1467 § 3(a).  
144. See, e.g., N.C. Aizenman & Rosalind S. Helderman, Birth Control Exemption Bill, the ‘Blunt 
Amendment,’ Killed in Senate, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/national/health-science/birth-control-exemption-bill-the-blunt-amendment-killed-in 
-senate/2012/03/01/gIQA4tXjkR_story.html [http://perma.cc/5N9K-CAVH]. The ACA al-
ready included a refusal provision relating to abortion: “No qualified health plan offered 
through an Exchange may discriminate against any individual health care provider or health 
care facility because of its unwillingness to provide, pay for, provide coverage of, or refer for 
abortions.” 42 U.S.C. § 18023(b)(4) (2012). 
145. See Aizenman & Helderman, supra note 144. 
146. Id. 
147. Janet Adamy, Are Firms Entitled to Religious Protections?, WALL ST. J., Mar.  
21, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304026304579451342576281698 
[http://perma.cc/5CWL-WYS9] (“In 2012, a lawyer for the Becket Fund for Religious Lib-
erty, a nonprofit Washington law firm, called Hobby Lobby’s general counsel to inform him 
of the health law’s contraception requirement and to ask whether the company wanted to 
file a suit.”). At that point, David Green, the founder of Hobby Lobby, was “shocked to dis-
cover Hobby Lobby was in fact offering in its insurance plan some of the emergency contra-
ceptives at issue. He called for the insurer to revoke that coverage and signed onto the law-
suit.” Id. See also Verified Complaint ¶¶ 14-15, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 
5:12-cv-01000-HE (W.D. Okla. Sept. 12, 2012) (seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 
against the ACA’s contraceptive coverage requirement).  
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contraception.148 After failing to achieve a complicity-based exemption through 
legislation, lawyers encouraged claimants to assert complicity-based claims to 
exemption through litigation.149 
B. Preservation Through Transformation  
We now examine how complicity-based conscience claims can serve the law 
reform goals of cross-denominational movements. As we have seen, many ad-
vocates of complicity-based conscience claims are interested in changing the 
sexual mores of the wider community. Seeking an exemption to avoid compli-
city in the sins of others can serve this same end. In seeking an exemption, a 
claimant need not withdraw but instead can employ the religious objection to 
criticize norms governing the entire community. Describing Hobby Lobby as “a 
mandate for evangelization,” Bishop James Conley explained a goal of religious 
exemption claims:  
Our religious liberty is not an end in itself. Instead, religious liberty is 
the freedom for something real—the freedom to “make disciples of all 
nations”—to spread the Gospel, and its fruits, joyfully. If we want to 
protect our religious liberty, the very best thing we can do is to use it—
to transform culture by transforming hearts for Jesus Christ.150 
Religious actors can evangelize by advocating for laws on abortion or mar-
riage that conform to traditional and religious values. Or, as these comments 
suggest, they can evangelize by seeking religious exemptions from laws of gen-
 
148. Verified Complaint, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394 
(E.D. Pa. 2013) (No. 5:12-cv-06744) (raising RFRA and free exercise challenges); Verified 
Complaint, supra note 147 (same). 
149. Senator Roy Blunt himself had predicted that the Supreme Court would ultimately resolve 
the issue. See Jennifer Haberkorn & Kate Nocera, Blunt Amendment Defeated in Senate, PO-
LITICO, Mar. 1, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/73497.html [http://perma 
.cc/2DX4-UKD3]. Blunt filed an amicus brief along with other members of Congress sup-
porting the challengers in Hobby Lobby and later issued a statement praising the decision. See 
Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress in Support of Respondents, Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356); Press Release, Roy Blunt, 
Senator Blunt Applauds Supreme Court Decision in Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood (June 30, 
2014), http://www.blunt.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news?ID=1a41b7fb-f3d8-4296-b8c9 
-ed857f1a3478 [http://perma.cc/CU8R-U5VC]. 
150. Bishop James Conley, Op-Ed., Hobby Lobby Decision Is Also a Mandate, S. NEB. REG.,  
July 11, 2014, http://www.lincolndiocese.org/op-ed/bishop-s-column/2093-hobby-lobby 
-decision-is-also-a-mandate [http://perma.cc/L2F2-L88C] (quoting Pope Francis, Evangelii 
Gaudium, VATICAN PRESS ¶ 19 (Nov. 24, 3013), http://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco 
/pdf/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-gau 
dium_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/E7MJ-GAVS] (quoting Matthew 28:19-20)). 
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eral application that they believe contravene traditional and religious values. 
Without change in numbers or belief, religious actors can shift from speaking as 
a majority seeking to enforce traditional morality to speaking as a minority seek-
ing exemptions from laws that offend traditional morality. Changing the form 
of the claim in this way matters. When defenders of traditional marriage can 
no longer persuade by appeal to shared beliefs about the wrongs of same-sex 
relationships, they may instead appeal to beliefs about the importance of pro-
tecting religious pluralism, revising the secular rationale for the claim in a way 
that gives more direct and uninhibited expression to its religious logic. Ac-
commodating complicity-based conscience claims in these circumstances may 
function to enable “preservation through transformation”: when an existing 
legal regime is successfully challenged so that its rules and reasons no longer 
seem persuasive or legitimate, defenders may adopt new rules and reasons that 
preserve elements of the challenged regime.151 
For these reasons, accommodating religious exemption claims may not set-
tle conflict, as many contend.152 Instead, claims for religious exemption can 
provide a way to continue conflict over community-wide norms in a new form. 
To demonstrate this dynamic, we first look back at how healthcare refusals le- 
 
151. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 
2117, 2119 (1996); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms 
of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997). In the sexual orientation 
context, see Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemp-
tions, and the Perpetuation of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1212-
13 (2012). 
152. To see this argument made by the cross-denominational coalition itself, see Ryan T.  
Anderson, The Defense of Marriage Isn’t Over, PUB. DISCOURSE (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www 
.thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/10/13889 [http://perma.cc/UA54-7EH5], which argues that 
“[p]rotecting religious liberty and the rights of conscience is the embodiment of a principled 
pluralism that fosters a more diverse civil sphere. Indeed, tolerance is essential to promoting 
peaceful coexistence even amid disagreement”; and Thomas M. Messner, From Culture Wars 
to Conscience Wars: Emerging Threats to Conscience, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 13, 2011), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/04/from-culture-wars-to-conscience-wars 
-emerging-threats-to-conscience [http://perma.cc/5HBD-WBCX], which argues that “[i]n 
pluralistic societies where consensus is elusive, protecting religious liberty and rights of con-
science is one of the most effective and principled ways to promote social peace and civic fra-
ternity.” Legal scholars supportive of religious exemptions in these settings—for instance, 
for wedding-related, for-profit businesses—commonly argue that such exemptions will re-
duce or resolve conflict. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 36, at 207 (“[R]ecognizing same-sex mar-
riage without significant religious exemptions will multiply the number of conflicts and cre-
ate new legal exposure for objectors, either immediately or in the long term.”); Robin 
Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, 
and Other Clashes between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1417, 1431 (2012) (arguing 
that accommodations “impose some costs on both sides, but also turn down the tempera-
ture on heated social debates”). For an insightful response, see Elizabeth Sepper, Doctoring 
Discrimination in the Same-Sex Marriage Debates, 89 IND. L.J. 703, 752-56 (2014). 
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gislation has functioned within the broader anti-abortion agenda. As we then 
show, advocates look to the healthcare context as a model for how similar con-
science claims might function within campaigns against same-sex marriage and 
LGBT equality.  
1. Healthcare Refusals  
Americans United for Life (AUL) annually publishes a comprehensive set 
of model abortion restrictions to “enable[] legislators to easily introduce bills 
without needing to research and write the bills themselves.”153 The model laws 
restrict abortion in different ways, including “informed consent,” “clinic regu-
lation[],” and bans at earlier points in pregnancy.154 
AUL’s model legislation includes a Healthcare Freedom of Conscience 
Act.155 The 2013 model act opens with a statement of purpose: “It is the pur-
pose of this Act to protect as a basic civil right the right of all healthcare provid-
ers, institutions, and payers to decline to counsel, advise, pay for, provide, per-
form, assist, or participate in providing or performing healthcare services that 
violate their consciences.”156 The model act defines “healthcare provider” 
broadly to include “any individual who may be asked to participate in any way 
in a healthcare service, including” not only a physician or nurse but also a 
“physician’s assistant . . . nurses’ aide, medical assistant, hospital employee, 
clinic employee, nursing home employee, pharmacist, pharmacy employee, re-
searcher, medical or nursing school faculty, student or employee, counselor, 
social worker, or any professional, paraprofessional, or any other person who 
furnishes, or assists in the furnishing of, healthcare services.”157 And the model 
act provides that “participate” means not just “perform” or “assist in” but also 
“counsel, advise, provide . . . refer for, admit for purposes of providing, or par-
ticipate in providing any healthcare service or any form of such service.”158 The 
 
153. Legislation, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, http://www.aul.org/legislative-resources [http://perma 
.cc/B4HP-4PBL]. 
154. Defending Life 2015: Celebrating Ten Years of Defending Life, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE 292,  
305 (2015), http://aul.org/downloads/defending-life-2015/AUL_Defending_Life_2015.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/F24W-2BBA]. 
155. Healthcare Freedom of Conscience Act: Model Legislation and Policy Guide for the 2014 Legislative 
Year, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE (2013), http://www.aul.org/downloads/2014-Legislative 
-Guides/ROC/Healthcare_Freedom_of_Conscience_Act_-_2014_LG.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/SD4B-E2VC] [hereinafter Healthcare Freedom of Conscience Act]. 
156. Id. § 2(a)(3).  
157. Id. § 3(b). 
158. Id. § 3(f). 
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AUL model act seeks to spread the logic of complicity-based conscience claims 
to more types of healthcare, to more actors, and to more acts. 
The network of conscience exemptions that the anti-abortion movement 
seeks to enact functions like other laws pressed by the movement: it impedes 
access to abortion.159 For example, Mississippi’s broad healthcare refusal law, 
described in Part II, is explicitly based on the AUL model statute.160 Unlike the 
Church Amendment, which protected those who supported and those who op-
posed abortion and sterilization, Mississippi’s law protects only individuals or 
institutions opposing abortion. At the same time, Mississippi has enacted a 
range of other measures, including some based on other AUL model statutes, 
to restrict access to abortion.161 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
cently blocked enforcement of an admitting privileges law that would have 
closed the only remaining clinic in the state.162 
As Mississippi illustrates, the anti-abortion movement seeks expansive con-
science clauses at the same time that it continues to seek Roe’s overturning and 
to pursue a variety of measures to limit access to abortion.163 Given the num-
bers mobilized in opposition to abortion in the region, exemptions, like other 
forms of anti-abortion legislation, can obstruct and stigmatize abortion, func-
tioning as part of a broader legislative strategy to make access to abortion—and 
contraception—increasingly difficult. 
This use of conscience clauses illustrates how opponents of abortion can 
change the kinds of rules and reasons they employ to enforce contested 
 
159. See Legislative Victories, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, http://www.aul.org/legislative 
-resources/legislative-victories [http://perma.cc/6YKD-9NZ8]; see also Heather D. Boonstra 
& Elizabeth Nash, A Surge of State Abortion Restrictions Puts Providers—and the Women They 
Serve—in the Crosshairs, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Winter 2014, at 9, http://www 
.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/17/1/gpr170109.pdf [http://perma.cc/9T8N-YEH6] (discussing a 
new wave of state-level anti-abortion measures introduced in the past three years). 
160. See Mississippi 2014 Report Card, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, http://www.aul.org/states 
/mississippi [http://perma.cc/GVZ9-GJGK] [hereinafter Mississippi 2014]. AUL has a state 
director in Mississippi. See Legislation, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, supra note 153. 
161. See Mississippi 2014, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, supra note 160.  
162. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2014). 
163. See Legislation, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, supra note 153 (explaining that the organization’s 
model laws, which include its Freedom of Conscience Act, “help legislators enact new pro-
life laws . . . while continuing to roll back Roe v. Wade in the courts”). On this point, see 
Cathleen Kaveny, The Right To Refuse: How Broad Should Conscience Protections Be?, COM-
MONWEAL, May 8, 2009, at 6 (“Many prolife arguments for abortion conscience clauses take 
this form: ‘A decent society ought to ban abortion, but at the very least, it ought to protect 
those morally courageous doctors who refuse to perform it.’ This appeal to conscience is 
provisional. When we are in political power, we will try to ban abortion, when we are out of 
power, we will claim the protections of conscience.”). 
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norms—an example of “preservation through transformation.”164 Constitu-
tional decisions protecting the right to privacy have partly disestablished social 
norms that were once enforced through laws criminalizing contraception and 
abortion.165 Advocates seek the reversal of these decisions. But where unable to 
reinstate a law of general application that enforces traditional sexual morality, 
they seek exemptions in the name of religious liberty from laws that contravene 
customary morality. In this way, anti-abortion advocates shift from speaking as 
a majority enforcing customary morality through the criminal law to speaking 
as a minority seeking religious exemptions in the civil law. 
Through this lens, we can appreciate how conscience provisions allow ad-
vocates to rework a traditional norm that was once enforced through the crimi-
nal law into a norm that is now enforced through a web of exemptions in the 
civil law. With the law’s authority, traditional and religious norms can be en-
forced against third parties outside the religious community. By enacting laws 
exempting individuals and institutions in the healthcare industry from duties 
of patient care and authorizing them to express complicity-based objections to 
associations with certain patients, the state creates a parallel legal order. 
The separate normative order authorized by healthcare refusal laws may 
take a highly institutionalized form. For example, Catholic healthcare delivery 
is governed by the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services (Directives), promulgated by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops 
(USCCB).166 Implementation of the Directives, which ensure that healthcare is 
delivered in conformance with Catholic theological principles regarding coop-
eration and scandal,167 is enabled by healthcare refusal laws. According to the 
Catholic Health Association, one in six patients in the United States is treated 
 
164. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
165. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
166. The USCCB was previously known as the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. 
167. See, e.g., Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services: Fifth Edition,  
U.S. CONF. CATH. BISHOPS 36 (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action 
/human-life-and-dignity/health-care/upload/Ethical-Religious-Directives-Catholic-Health 
-Care-Services-fifth-edition-2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/5GTX-FSUF] [hereinafter 2009 Re-
ligious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services] (“If a Catholic health care organization is 
considering entering into an arrangement with another organization that may be involved in 
activities judged morally wrong by the Church, participation in such activities must be li- 
mited to what is in accord with the moral principles governing cooperation.”); id. at 37 
(“The possibility of scandal must be considered when applying the principles governing co-
operation.”). 
  
complicity-based conscience claims 
2557 
 
by a Catholic hospital.168 (In Washington State, approximately half of the 
state’s healthcare system is now Catholic-run.169) It is clear, then, that 
healthcare refusal laws empower a substantial segment of the healthcare indus-
try to operate in conformity with religious principles that dictate limitations on 
services relating to abortion and contraception. 
But the Catholic hospital system is not the only organization coordinating 
claims on refusal laws. Religious hospitals represent nearly a fifth of the 
healthcare delivery system in the United States,170 and eight of the twenty-five 
largest healthcare systems are religiously owned.171 Even secular hospitals may 
act on a traditional norm widely shared in the community.172 And other loosely 
affiliated providers may act on the basis of shared convictions. For example, re-
sistance to emergency contraception may be widespread and include both hos-
 
168. Catholic Health Care in the United States, CATH. HEALTH ASS’N U.S. 1 (Jan. 2014), 
https://www.chausa.org/docs/default-source/general-files/cha_miniprofile_final.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/J3WL-Z4SA]. 
169. See Danny Westneat, Is Catholic Church Taking Over Health Care in Washington?, SEATTLE 
TIMES, May 22, 2013, http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2021029685_westneat22xml 
.html [http://perma.cc/7LCU-MLUY]. Hospital mergers have substantially extended  
the reach and influence of Catholic healthcare in rural Washington. See Kirk Johnson,  
Hospital Mergers Reset Abortion-Access Battle, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2013, http://www 
.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/us/hospital-mergers-in-northwest-raise-issue-of-abortion-barriers 
.html [http://perma.cc/6MX9-TJZG] (“Ten counties out of 39 in the state would have 100 
percent of their hospital beds in Catholic health system hands by year’s end if all the pro-
posed mergers went through.”). 
170. Jennifer Harper, Doctors Face Religious Conflicts at Hospitals, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/14/doctors-report-religious-conflicts-at 
-hospitals [http://perma.cc/TN3T-UDBE]. 
171. See Karen Branz, Ranking the Nation’s 25 Largest Healthcare Systems by Employees,  
DARK DAILY (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.darkdaily.com/ranking-the-nations-25-largest 
-healthcare-systems-by-employees-825 [http://perma.cc/E9B6-CDVJ]. Religious hospitals, 
of course, do not necessarily claim belief systems that support restrictions on access to abor-
tion and contraception. 
172. See Kent Greenawalt, Objections in Conscience to Medical Procedures: Does Religion Make a Dif-
ference?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 824 (“[T]here certainly are nonreligious hospitals—public 
and private—in areas where many people condemn abortion. The directors of such hospitals 
might wish not to have abortions performed there for moral or political reasons, and their 
moral reasons might be religiously informed. They might wish to have hospital policy re-
flect their sense of what is morally acceptable practice.”). The New York Times, for instance, 
reported that in Mississippi, “hospitals, especially in conservative and rural areas, have re-
fused to grant privileges to abortion clinic doctors in order to avoid controversy.” Campbell 
Robertson & Erik Eckholm, Judges Block Abortion Curb in Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES, July  
29, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/us/mississippi-abortion-clinic-federal-court 
-blocks-closing.html [http://perma.cc/N7WX-83L2]. 
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pitals and pharmacies.173 In states and regions where abortion and certain 
forms of contraception are stigmatized, healthcare refusal laws, along with oth-
er restrictions, may create a system in which the disestablished sexual norms 
continue to be enforced. With widespread, cross-denominational assertion of 
claims for exemption, accommodation of complicity-based conscience objec-
tions can have far-reaching effects. 
2. Same-Sex Marriage and LGBT Equality  
Looking back at the spread of healthcare refusals legislation raises ques-
tions about the future trajectory of religious exemptions concerning same-sex 
marriage. In the sexual orientation context, complicity-based conscience 
claims, which are beginning to proliferate, have been modeled on healthcare 
refusals.174 As religious groups opposing same-sex marriage suffer losses in 
 
173. See Editorial, Moralists at the Pharmacy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2005/04/03/opinion/03sun2.html [http://perma.cc/B9MF-M9WU] (describing a series of 
denials of contraception and support for these refusals by Pharmacists for Life); Rob Stein, 
Pharmacists’ Rights at Front of New Debate; Because of Beliefs, Some Refuse To Fill Birth Control 
Prescriptions, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn 
/articles/A5490-2005Mar27.html [http://perma.cc/GA27-GDVQ] (same); see also Rob  
Stein, ‘Pro-Life’ Drugstores Market Beliefs, WASH. POST, June 16, 2008, http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/15/AR2008061502180.html [http:// 
perma.cc/J37X-UBEE] (reporting on the proliferation of pharmacies refusing to stock birth 
control). Cross-denominational organizing against contraception continued during the ACA 
debates. See Tom Howell Jr., Holy Alliance: Catholics, Southern Baptists Unite Against 
Obamacare Contraception Mandate, WASH. TIMES, June 21, 2013, http://www.washington 
times.com/news/2013/jun/21/catholics-southern-baptists-against-obamacare [http://perma 
.cc/3MP8-7VTT]. 
174. See Lynn D. Wardle, Religious Liberties: “Conscience Exemptions”, ENGAGE, Feb. 2013, at 77,  
http://www.fed-soc.org/library/doclib/20130628_ConscienceExemptions.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/CDJ3-EEJX] (“At least forty-seven states and the District of Columbia also have enacted 
conscience-protection laws relating to abortion. Likewise, when it appeared that some state 
[sic] might legalize same-sex marriage, and especially since 2003 when the [sic] Massachu-
setts became the first state to announce that it would legalize same-sex marriage, there has 
been proposal, discussion, and some limited adoption of ‘conscience exemptions’ that pro-
tect some individuals and entities with religious or moral objection to same-sex marriage 
from any legal duty to or liability for declining to assist in creating same-sex marriages.” (in-
ternal citations omitted)); Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson, Class of 1958 Law Alumni 
Professor of Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law et al. to Brian E. Frosh, Chairman, Judi-
cial Proceedings Comm., Md. State Senate 2, 6 & n.15 (Jan. 31, 2012), http://mirrorofjustice 
.blogs.com/files/maryland-letter.pdf [http://perma.cc/CC5R-KZKC] (arguing for “mar-
riage conscience protection” in the same-sex marriage context by appealing to laws “accom-
modating health care professionals who conscientiously object to participating in medical 
procedures such as abortion or sterilization”). For scholarly analysis connecting exemptions 
in the same-sex marriage context to those in the healthcare, and specifically abortion, con-
text, see Berg, supra note 36, at 233-34; and Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: 
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politics and litigation, critics of same-sex marriage, including the Manhattan 
Declaration’s Robert George, encourage them to look to the abortion context 
for a model for long-term change.175 The abortion example illustrates how to 
resist legal settlement of conflict. As Ryan Anderson176 wrote in National Re-
view, “we must . . . make clear that court-imposed same-sex marriage via a Roe-
style decision will not settle the marriage debate any more than it has settled 
the abortion debate.”177 He immediately pivoted to religious freedom: “What-
ever the Court does will cause less damage if we . . . highlight the importance 
of religious liberty. Even if the Court were to redefine marriage, government 
should not require third parties to recognize a same-sex relationship as a mar-
riage.”178 It is not accidental that at the very moment general arguments for 
“traditional marriage” are failing, Anderson urges claims on religious liberty. 
As Anderson emphasizes, the abortion context illustrates how creative advocacy 
can adapt to conditions of loss. Unsurprisingly, then, conscience clauses se-
 
Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELI-
GIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 77, 77-81 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008). For a re-
sponse, see Sepper, supra note 152. 
175. See, e.g., ROBERT P. GEORGE, CONSCIENCE AND ITS ENEMIES: CONFRONTING THE DOGMAS OF 
LIBERAL SECULARISM 145-46 (2013); Ryan T. Anderson, Marriage: Where Do We Go From 
Here?, NAT’L REV. (May 22, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/378538 
/marriage-where-do-we-go-here-ryan-t-anderson [http://perma.cc/5A7X-XSJ9]; David 
Crary, Associated Press, Losing Streak Lengthens for Foes of Gay Marriage, HUFFINGTON  
POST (June 15, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/15/gay-marriage 
-opponents_n_5496806.html [http://perma.cc/GK2V-ACJP] (noting remarks by National 
Organization for Marriage’s Brian Brown); Carson Holloway, Premature Talk of Surrender 
on Same-Sex Marriage, PUB. DISCOURSE (May 15, 2014), http://www.thepublicdiscourse 
.com/2014/05/13106 [http://perma.cc/4WPM-DBW5]. 
176. Anderson is a fellow at the Heritage Foundation, the editor of Public Discourse, the With-
erspoon Institute’s online journal, and the co-author of a leading defense of “traditional 
marriage.” See SHERIF GIRGIS, RYAN T. ANDERSON & ROBERT P. GEORGE, WHAT IS MAR-
RIAGE? MAN AND WOMAN: A DEFENSE (2012). Justice Alito cited this book in his dissenting 
opinion in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2715, 2718 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting), 
where the majority voted to strike down Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act. 
177. Ryan T. Anderson, The Roe of Marriage, NAT’L REV., Aug. 11, 2014, https://www 
.nationalreview.com/nrd/articles/383581/roe-marriage [http://perma.cc/DQW7-DHE9]. 
178. Id. Anderson makes the same sequence of arguments in other places. See, e.g., Ryan T. An-
derson, 7 Reasons Why the Current Marriage Debate Is Nothing Like the Debate on Interracial 
Marriage, DAILY SIGNAL (Aug. 27, 2014), http://dailysignal.com/2014/08/27/7-reasons 
-current-marriage-debate-nothing-like-debate-interracial-marriage [http://perma.cc/XU2F 
-SE5Y]. For similar claims, see Russell D. Moore, Same-Sex Marriage and the Future, MOORE 
TO THE POINT (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.russellmoore.com/2014/04/15/same-sex-marriage 
-and-the-future [http://perma.cc/2VT9-2VGT].  
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cured in the abortion domain have become an aspiration for same-sex marriage 
opponents.179 
We can see how advocates are adapting their arguments in the marriage 
context. For example, social conservatives long used arguments from traditio- 
nal morality to oppose recognizing same-sex relationships.180 But these argu-
ments about lesbians and gay men now sound illegitimate—like “bigotry.”181 In 
response, advocates have changed the secular rationale for their position in 
ways that give increasingly uninhibited expression to its religious logic. Advo-
cates now emphasize different justifications for excluding same-sex couples 
from marriage182—for example, that marriage is about biological procreation183 
 
179. See Anderson, supra note 177; see also Richard Fausset & Alan Blinder, States Renew Fight  
To Stop Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01 
/29/us/battles-over-same-sex-marriage-roil-statehouses-ahead-of-supreme-courts-decision 
.html [http://perma.cc/668E-YTQF] (quoting South Carolina Republican state senator Lee 
Bright, who introduced legislation that would exempt government employees from duties to 
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples: “We have similar language for folks that work 
in health care that don’t want to participate in abortions.”); Wardle, supra note 174, at 77-78. 
An ADF representative explains: “Are the situations morally different between a health-care 
provider and a business owner? Each person’s conscience is being wrongly violated. . . . 
[T]he same breach of conscience occurs . . . because both facilitate inherently immoral activ-
ity.” Jeffrey J. Ventrella, Resist or Accommodate Evil: There Is No “Third Way”, PUB. DIS-
COURSE (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/01/14264 [http://perma.cc 
/J3ET-T28R]. 
180. See, e.g., Answer Brief of Campaign for California Families on the Merits, In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147999); Brief of Ass’n of Maryland Families & Liber-
ty Counsel as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants, Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 
2007) (No. 44). 
181. See Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term—Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 78-79 (2013) (tracing debates in law and politics over allegations of bigotry). Litiga-
tion over anti-sodomy laws from the 1980s through the early 2000s relied on traditional 
norms to justify criminal prohibitions on homosexuality. See, e.g., Brief of Concerned 
Women for America Education & Legal Defense Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 2, 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140) (arguing that laws that would grant 
“legal protection to those who engage in homosexuality . . . are an affront to public morality 
and our dedication to family life”); Brief of the Rutherford Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of the Petitioner at 18-19, Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140) (describing “homosex-
ual conduct” as “perverse and deviant”). Subsequent litigation focused less on sex and more 
on marriage, yet continued to draw on traditional morality for the purpose of preserving re-
strictions on same-sex sex. See, e.g., Brief of the Family Research Council, Inc. & Focus on 
the Family as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondent at 10, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003) (No. 02-102). On the layering of anti-gay arguments, see William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judi-
cial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1331, 1346 (2000). 
182. For discussion of the evolving justifications for opposing same-sex marriage, see Siegel, su-
pra note 181, at 83-84 & n.422. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Sexual and Gender Variation 
in American Public Law: From Malignant to Benign to Productive, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1353 
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or that preserving “traditional marriage” protects religious liberty.184 At the 
same time, in anticipation of the possibility of defeat, they argue for exemp-
tions from laws that recognize same-sex marriage.185 In so doing, they shift 
from speaking as a majority enforcing customary morality to speaking as a mi-
nority seeking exemptions based on religious identity.186  
As in the case of healthcare refusals, these claims for religious exemption 
have spread and expanded through the concept of complicity. Many states that 
allow same-sex couples to marry have enacted legislation making clear that re-
ligious denominations and clergy have no obligation to solemnize a same-sex 
marriage.187 These actors can be analogized to the doctors and nurses covered 
 
(2010); Douglas NeJaime, Marriage, Biology, and Gender, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 83, 89-93 
(2013). 
183. See, e.g., Brief of Robert P. George et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Hollingsworth & Bi-
partisan Legal Advisory Group Addressing the Merits & Supporting Reversal at 20-23, Hol-
lingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (Nos. 12-144, 12-307).  
184. See, e.g., Brief of Manhattan Declaration as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent Bipar-
tisan Legal Advisory Group Addressing the Merits & Supporting Reversal at 15, United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) (“Religious freedom is our first, most 
cherished liberty, and its guarantee is threatened today by the redefinition of marriage. Such 
redefinition in practice would bring a new orthodoxy that circumscribes the ability of the 
Christian faithful to put their beliefs into practice.”); Brief of the Becket Fund for Religious 
Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Hollingsworth & the Bipartisan Legal Advisory 
Group Addressing the Merits at 5, Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 786 (Nos. 12-144, 12-307)  (argu-
ing that “the threat to religious liberty” furnished “a rational basis for Congress to proceed 
cautiously by enacting DOMA and for the people of California to return to the traditional 
definition of marriage by voting for Proposition 8”). 
185. See Richard Fausset & Alan Blinder, States Weigh Legislation To Let Businesses Refuse  
To Serve Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/06 
/us/anticipating-nationwide-right-to-same-sex-marriage-states-weigh-religious-exemption 
-bills.html [https://perma.cc/FH32-829R]; see also Anderson, supra note 152 (“Governmen-
tal recognition of same-sex relationships as marriages need not and should not require any 
third party to recognize a same-sex relationship as a marriage. We must vigorously advance 
the arguments for a classically liberal form of limited government and highlight the im-
portance of religious liberty.”). 
186. See Complaint at 5-13, Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Ferguson, No. 13-2-01898-2 (Wash. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 1, 2013) (asserting that a florist who voted against same-sex marriage in the state 
referendum is now being coerced by the state’s antidiscrimination laws into violating her re-
ligious beliefs and thus seeks an exemption); Ryan T. Anderson & Leslie Ford, Protecting  
Religious Liberty in the State Marriage Debate, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 10, 2014), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/04/protecting-religious-liberty-in-the-state 
-marriage-debate [http://perma.cc/3MDG-LVBG] (“Even in jurisdictions that have rede-
fined marriage, individuals and businesses that believe marriage is between a man and a 
woman should be free to live in accord with their moral and religious convictions.”). 
187. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/209(a-5) (West 2014) (“Nothing in this Act shall be 
construed to require any religious denomination . . . or any minister, clergy, or officiant act-
ing as a representative of a religious denomination . . . to solemnize any marriage.”). Of 
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by the healthcare refusal laws who object to performing abortions or steriliza-
tions.188 But as with healthcare refusals, advocates draw on concepts of com-
plicity to seek exemptions for those who object to facilitating or sanctioning 
another’s sinful conduct. Ryan Anderson describes the expanding sequence of 
these claims: “Some will conclude that they cannot in good conscience partici-
pate in same-sex ceremonies, from priests and pastors to bakers and flo-
rists.”189 
As recent litigation illustrates, business owners working in wedding-related 
fields are asserting complicity-based objections to serving same-sex couples.190 
Jack Phillips, the owner of Denver’s Masterpiece Cakes, turned away same-sex 
couples because he “believes that the Bible commands him . . . not to encour-
age sin in any way.”191 He contended that baking and selling a cake for a same-
sex wedding would force him to “participate” in a sinful same-sex relation-
ship.192 Similarly, owners of an Iowa art gallery used as an event space turned 
away a same-sex couple because “their religious beliefs prevent them from . . . 
facilitating . . . same-sex wedding ceremonies.”193 Moreover, through concepts 
 
course, this largely restates constitutional constraints. See Douglas Laycock, Afterword to 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 174, at 189, 
200. 
188. See Sepper, supra note 152, at 745 (“Granting a license and officiating a marriage come closer 
to the direct and proximate involvement exempted by medical conscience clauses. Both are 
central to the marriage, and the officiant is as proximate as a cooperator could possibly be to 
the act.”). 
189. Anderson, supra note 152; see also Ryan T. Anderson, Government to Ordained Ministers: Cele-
brate Same-Sex Wedding or Go to Jail, DAILY SIGNAL (Oct. 18, 2014), http://dailysignal.com 
/2014/10/18/government-ordained-ministers-celebrate-sex-wedding-go-jail [http://perma 
.cc/CV9B-367M] (moving from the example of “ordained ministers . . . in their own chapel” 
to “any third party [having] to recognize a same-sex relationship as a marriage”); Ryan T. 
Anderson, Why These Citizens Voted To Repeal a Bad ‘Civil Rights’ Law, DAILY SIGNAL  
(Dec. 10, 2014), http://dailysignal.com/2014/12/10/citizens-voted-repeal-bad-civil-rights 
-law [http://perma.cc/5VVM-DJM8] (“[N]o one has the right to have the government force 
a particular minister to marry them, or a certain photographer to capture the first kiss, or a 
baker to bake the wedding cake.”). 
190. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. Up to this point, the religious claimants have 
not prevailed in litigation, nor have states passing marriage equality legislation included re-
ligious exemptions from antidiscrimination law that cover for-profit businesses. Nonethe-
less, litigation continues, and legislative activity has shifted to more conservative states lack-
ing antidiscrimination laws that include sexual orientation. 
191. Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR2013-0008, slip op. at 3 (Colo. Admin. Ct. 
Dec. 6, 2013). 
192. Id.  
193. Complaint at 2, Odgaard v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, No. CV046451 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Oct. 
7, 2013); see also Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 440 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) 
(discussing how the owners of a photography company litigated for an exemption from a 
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of complicity,194 these exemption claims move beyond wedding-related ser-
vices. For example, legislative proposals supported by social conservative advo-
cacy groups would allow some for-profit employers who seek to avoid complic-
ity in their employees’ sinful conduct to refuse to provide health insurance that 
covers employees’ same-sex spouses.195 
Many assert that accommodating claims for religious exemption will help 
settle conflict,196 including claimants and their defenders who seek a “live-and-
let-live” resolution.197 In assessing the prospects for conflict settlement, it is 
important to recognize that accommodating religious objections may also ena-
ble the conflict to persist in a new, revitalized form. The claim to exemption 
may not be a simple claim to withdraw, conceding a new consensus in favor of 
same-sex marriage while preserving space for faith groups to maintain their re-
ligious views. Instead, as in the healthcare refusals context, complicity-based 
conscience claims can function as part of a long-term effort to contest society-
wide norms.198 
 
state antidiscrimination law because it forced them “to photograph [a lesbian client’s] cere-
mony, and thus engage in conduct [they] believe is disobedient to God’s commands”). 
194. Exemption proponents, for instance, use the language of “facilitation” and “participation.” 
See, e.g., Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson et al. to Pat Quinn, Governor of Ill. (Dec. 18, 
2012), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/ill-letter-12-2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/N7X9 
-SHWY]; Pending Illinois Same-Sex Marriage Bill Would Be Worst in US in Protecting 
 Religious Liberty, THOMAS MORE SOC’Y 2 (May 29, 2013), http://illinoisfamily.org 
/110files/uploads/201307/144752590-Thomas-More-Society-Letter-to-IL-House-Reps-Re 
garding-Same-Sex-Marriage-Pending-Illinois-Same-Sex-Marriage-Bill-Would-Be-Worst 
-in-US-in-Protecting-R.pdf [http://perma.cc/M3J3-M2UF]. On the reach of these concepts 
in the same-sex marriage context, see NeJaime, supra note 151, at 1230-35. 
195. Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson et al. to Pat Quinn, supra note 194, at 3. The “marriage 
conscience protection” advanced in the Wilson letter, for example, was supported by the 
Thomas More Society and the Illinois Family Institute. See THOMAS MORE SOC’Y, supra note 
194. While some proponents of accommodation have proposed a limitation based on “sub-
stantial hardship” to the same-sex couple, it is unclear what exactly would constitute an ina-
bility to “obtain . . . employment benefits . . . without substantial hardship.” Letter from 
Robin Fretwell Wilson et al. to Pat Quinn, supra note 194, at 3. 
For an argument that some religious employers should refuse to provide employee 
spousal benefits to same-sex couples, see Gerard V. Bradley et al., The Implications of Extend-
ing Marriage Benefits to Same-Sex Couples, PUB. DISCOURSE (Feb. 22, 2015), http://www 
.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/02/14522 [http://perma.cc/EM2Z-L6N8]. 
196. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.  
197. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 36, at 208; Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 852, 878. 
198. Brian Brown, the Executive Director of the National Organization for Marriage, recently 
explained how work against same-sex marriage will continue even if the Supreme Court 
recognizes a nationwide right for same-sex couples: “There’s a ton that will happen on reli-
gious liberty. We’re already preemptively moving in this direction.” Richard Wolf, Gay 
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With growing acceptance of the contested conduct, appeals to religious lib-
erty offer a more persuasive secular ground on which to base persisting objec-
tions to the conduct. The goal may be not only to restrict the legal recognition 
of same-sex marriage, but also to forestall or restrict an antidiscrimination re-
gime that includes sexual orientation. In states with antidiscrimination laws 
that cover sexual orientation, religious objections to same-sex marriage have 
provided a basis on which to seek the expansion of already-existing exemptions 
in the laws.199 For instance, enacting an exemption that allows an institution or 
individual to refuse to “facilitate the perpetuation” or “treat as valid” a same-
sex couple’s marriage would significantly broaden existing exemptions to per-
mit sexual orientation discrimination in situations that have nothing to do with 
weddings.200 In states without antidiscrimination laws covering sexual orienta-
tion, lawmakers have worked to restrict any future nondiscrimination obliga-
tions that may exist.201 While framed around marriage, the proposed legisla-
 
Marriage, Once Inconceivable, Now Appears Inevitable, USA TODAY, Oct. 6, 2014, http:// 
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/10/02/supreme-court-gay-lesbian-marriage 
/16264389 [http://perma.cc/GP9L-AZZQ]; see also Anderson, supra note 152 (“Whatever 
happens, it is essential to take the long view and to be ready to bear witness to the truth even 
if law and culture grow increasingly hostile. There are lessons to be learned from the pro-life 
movement.”). 
199. See, e.g., Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson et al. to Pat Quinn, supra note 194, at 15 (“In 
short, nondiscrimination statutes enacted years ago now take on a whole new level of signif-
icance, with a much greater need for religious exemptions. A Marriage Bill that provides no 
protection to individual objectors (other than authorized celebrants, who are already pro-
tected by the Constitution) would effectively leave any individual who refuses to assist with 
same-sex wedding ceremonies open to suit, whether framed as sexual orientation discrimi-
nation, sex discrimination, or, where applicable, marital-status discrimination.”). 
200. The proposed “marriage conscience protection” would allow “individuals and small busi-
nesses” to refuse to “(A) provide goods or services that assist or promote the solemnization 
or celebration of any marriage, or provide counseling or other services that directly facilitate 
the perpetuation of any marriage; or (B) provide benefits to any spouse of an employee,” and 
would allow “religious organizations” to refuse to “treat as valid any marriage.” Letter from 
Robin Fretwell Wilson et al. to Pat Quinn, supra note 194, at 2, 3 (emphasis added). With 
this language, not only would some wedding venues be permitted to turn away same-sex 
couples, but some restaurants would also be permitted to refuse to provide space for a same-
sex couple’s anniversary dinner years after their wedding. And some employers would be al-
lowed to refuse to provide family benefits to LGBT employees at any point in time. On the 
expansive reach of these provisions, see NeJaime, supra note 151, at 1230-32. 
201. See, e.g., S.B. 1062, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014); H.B. 2453, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Kan. 2014). Indeed, some social conservative advocates have begun to refer to LGBT non-
discrimination measures as “forced participation ordinances” to highlight their impact on 
those with complicity-based objections. See Mont. Family Found., Montana: True Tolerance 
vs. Forced Participation, CITIZEN LINK (May 16, 2014), http://www.citizenlink.com/2014 
/05/16/montana-true-tolerance-vs-forced-participation [http://perma.cc/KG3X-DFS8].  
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tion would allow businesses to refuse to serve same-sex couples more general-
ly.202 
These state-level campaigns appear to rehearse arguments to be made on 
the federal level. Recently, a cross-denominational coalition sought a broad ex-
emption from President Obama’s executive order barring federal contractors 
from engaging in sexual orientation and gender identity employment discrimi-
nation.203 This effort introduced arguments that will play a central role when 
there is support for the enactment of a federal antidiscrimination law that 
would cover sexual orientation discrimination.204 In addition, congressional 
lawmakers anticipating a Supreme Court ruling in favor of a nationwide right 
to marry for same-sex couples have introduced the Marriage and Religious 
Freedom Act, which would prohibit the federal government from taking “an 
adverse action against a person, on the basis that such person acts in accord-
ance with a religious belief that marriage is or should be recognized as the un-
ion of one man and one woman, or that sexual relations are properly reserved 
to such a marriage.”205 In this context, we can see how complicity-based claims 
for religious exemption are a part of society-wide conflict over LGBT equality. 
Having considered how complicity-based conscience claims have prolifer-
ated as part of society-wide conflicts over contested sexual norms, we are in a 
better position to understand how their accommodation can inflict material 
and dignitary harm on the individuals whose conduct the claims target.  
 
202. States have considered both sexual-orientation-specific measures and broad RFRAs clearly 
aimed at same-sex couples. See, e.g., Ariz. S.B. 1062; Kan. H.B. 2453. 
203. Letter from Stanley Carlson-Thies to Barack Obama, supra note 70, at 1. Even though the 
President did not provide such an exemption, the possibility of claims to exemption in this 
context continues to be debated. Compare Esbeck, supra note 70 (arguing that accommoda-
tions can be claimed under an existing executive order applying to religious employers and 
under RFRA), with Marty Lederman, Why the Law Does Not (and Should Not) Allow Reli-
giously Motivated Contractors To Discriminate Against Their LGBT Employees, BALKINIZATION 
(July 31, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/07/why-law-does-not-and-should-not 
-allow.html [http://perma.cc/26CP-ET8C] (challenging Esbeck’s arguments). 
204. Detecting the potential for religious accommodations to undermine employment nondis-
crimination legislation in a post-Hobby Lobby world, major LGBT rights organizations with-
drew their support for the recent version of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (EN-
DA) that included a religious exemption much broader than that in Title VII. See  
Chris Johnson, Major Legal Groups Won’t Support ENDA Because of Religious Exemption, 
WASH. BLADE (June 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2014/06/05/nclr-wont 
-support-enda-religious-exemption [http://perma.cc/R2XX-EVHU]; Chris Johnson, State 
LGBT Groups Split on ENDA’s Religious Exemption, WASH. BLADE (June 12, 2014), http:// 
www.washingtonblade.com/2014/06/12/state-lgbt-groups-split-enda-religious-exemption 
[http://perma.cc/AFB6-HU2R]. 
205. H.R. 3133, 113th Cong. (2013); see also S. 1808, 113th Cong. (2013) (having nearly identical 
language). 
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iv .  harms  
Complicity-based conscience claims assert a relationship to third parties 
whose conduct the claimants view as sinful. In this sense, the third-party ef-
fects of accommodation are bound up in the form of the claim itself. But ex-
ploring the social logic of complicity-based conscience claims suggests how the 
consequences of accommodation may be amplified. Mass mobilization of 
claimants assures that accommodation will affect large numbers of persons, es-
pecially in certain areas of the country. The impact is not only material. When a 
religious claim objecting to others’ sinful conduct is based on a traditional 
norm that is reiterated by a mass movement over time and across social do-
mains, accommodating the claim has the distinctive power to stigmatize and 
demean third parties. In this Part, we demonstrate some of the material and 
dignitary harms that result from accommodating complicity-based conscience 
claims.  
A. Material Harms  
Accommodation of complicity-based conscience claims may impose materi-
al burdens on third parties by deterring or obstructing access to goods and ser-
vices. This can occur as objectors deny services; it can also occur as objectors 
withhold information that would enable an individual to pursue alternative 
providers. 
Consider the healthcare refusal laws. A striking feature of these laws is that 
they provide expansive exemptions while only rarely furnishing mechanisms 
that would blunt the impact on third parties. Refusal laws might accommodate 
individuals with conscience objections within a framework that endeavors to 
ensure continuity of care for the patient.206 But many healthcare refusal laws 
allow doctors or nurses to refuse to treat a patient even in an emergency situa-
tion207 and do so without requiring that healthcare professionals provide ad-
 
206. In fact, this is what the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) rec-
ommends. See The Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medicine, AM. COLL.  
OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS 5 (2007), http://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee 
-Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/co385.pdf [http://perma.cc/5RSR-QF9X] (recommending 
that “at the very least . . . systems be in place for counseling and referral, particularly in re-
source-poor areas where conscientious refusals have significant potential to limit patient 
choice,” and that “[i]nstitutions . . . work toward structures that reduce the impact on pa-
tients of professionals’ refusals to provide standard reproductive services”). 
207. These refusal laws appear to contradict professional guidance. The ACOG document in-
structs: “In an emergency in which referral is not possible or might negatively affect a pa-
tient’s physical or mental health, providers have an obligation to provide medically indicated 
and requested care regardless of the provider’s personal moral objections.” Id. 
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vance notice of their objection to the employer so that the patient receives 
needed care.208 In addition, some of these laws allow healthcare workers and 
institutions to refuse to provide referrals, counseling, or information that 
would notify the patient of the availability of alternative care.209 Unlike the as-
sumption on which the Court granted the accommodation in Hobby Lobby—
that accommodation would have “zero” impact on third parties—healthcare re-
fusal laws generally do not provide for alternative means of addressing pa-
tients’ healthcare needs. In fact, these laws authorize refusals that appear to 
contravene state-law duties210 and professional obligations to patients.211 
An exemption’s material effects are amplified when the laws authorize large 
numbers of networked actors to refuse to provide services. This is a threat 
when institutionalized religious principles govern—such as with Catholic 
healthcare. The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Ser-
vices, which draw on Catholic principles regarding cooperation and scandal, 
govern how Catholic hospitals deliver healthcare.212 If the local hospital is a 
 
208. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.20181 (West 2014) (not imposing any employer no-
tice requirement or creating any exceptions for emergency situations); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
145.414 (West 2013) (same); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-107-5 (2004) (same); see also Sonfield, 
supra note 92 (“Only a handful of these laws specifically provide an exception to refusal 
rights in emergency circumstances; most do not require health care providers to notify their 
employers if they intend to opt-out of certain services, and only three require any notice to 
patients; and about a dozen go so far as to allow providers to refuse to provide infor-
mation.”). Nonetheless, the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act re-
quires hospitals to stabilize patients with an “emergency medical condition” or in active la-
bor, and provides directives regarding transfer of patients to other hospitals. See 42 U.S.C. § 
1395dd (2012). 
209. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304 (West 2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5 (2004); 
GA. COMP. R. & REGS. § 480-5-.03(n) (2001). 
210. There has been little litigation to clarify the scope of the exemptions and their relationship 
to professional duties and obligations. See, e.g., Noesen v. State Dep’t of Regulation & 
Licensing, Pharmacy Examining Bd., 751 N.W.2d 385 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008); Complaint, 
Means v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, No. 2:13-cv-14916 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 29, 
2013). 
211. See AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, supra note 206, at 1 (“In an emergency . . . 
providers have an obligation to provide medically indicated and requested care.”); id. at 5 
(“[A]t the very least . . . systems [must] be in place for counseling and referral . . . .”); AM. 
PHARMACISTS ASS’N, 1997-1998 POLICY COMMITTEE REPORT, PHARMACIST CONSCIENCE 
CLAUSE (1998) (“Pharmacists choosing to excuse themselves from such a situation continue 
to have a responsibility to the patient—ensuring that the patient will be referred to another 
pharmacist or be channeled into another available health system.”). 
212. The Directives provide that “Catholic health care services must adopt these Directives as 
policy, require adherence to them within the institution as a condition for medical privileges 
and employment, and provide appropriate instruction regarding the Directives for admin-
istration, medical and nursing staff, and other personnel.” 1995 Religious Directives for Catho-
lic Health Care Services, supra note 23, at 7. Of course, the Directives bind not only Catholics 
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Catholic affiliated or sponsored institution,213 patients in the area may not have 
much or any access to goods or services proscribed by the Directives.214 
Concern over access has only increased with the growth of mergers and 
partnerships involving Catholic hospitals.215 In fact, the 1995 Directives elabo-
rated concepts of cooperation and scandal in ways that explicitly reached these 
circumstances,216 thereby extending Catholic principles to a larger universe of 
 
but also non-Catholics administering healthcare in Catholic-run facilities. See JEAN DEBLOIS 
& KEVIN D. O’ROURKE, THE REVISED ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC 
HEALTH CARE SERVICES: SEEKING UNDERSTANDING IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 5 (1996) 
(explaining that the Directives “call on non-Catholics as well as Catholics to manage and 
administer Catholic healthcare facilities in accord with the norms contained in [the Direc-
tives]”). Nonetheless, it should be noted that at least in the context of medical malpractice 
litigation, USCCB has argued that while the Directives “‘provide authoritative guidance on 
certain moral issues that face Catholic health care today,’ . . . [t]he USCCB has no mecha-
nism to enforce them . . . [and] does not credential doctors, hospitals, or other health care 
providers.” Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 6-7, Means, No. 2:13-cv-14916 (E.D. Mich. 
Mar. 12, 2013) (quoting 1995 Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, supra note 
23, at 3-4). 
213. Ann Kutney-Lee et al., Distinct Enough? A National Examination of Catholic Hospital Affilia-
tion and Patient Perceptions of Care, 39 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 134, 135 (2014) (“In certain 
areas, Catholic hospitals are the primary or only hospital available.”). 
214. As merely one example, 60 Minutes reported in 2000 that a New Hampshire woman en-
dured an eighty-mile cab ride in order to obtain an emergency abortion after being turned 
away by the Catholic hospital in her area. See Brietta R. Clark, When Free Exercise Exemptions 
Undermine Religious Liberty and the Liberty of Conscience: A Case Study of the Catholic Hospital 
Conflict, 82 OR. L. REV. 625, 626-27 (2003). The Catholic hospital may govern healthcare ac-
cording to Catholic principles even though Catholics do not constitute a majority faith in the 
particular community. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, When a Hospital Becomes Catholic, 47 MERCER L. 
REV. 1087, 1102-03 (1996) (reporting that “[o]f the forty-six Catholic sole community pro-
viders, only two are located in counties where Catholics constitute a majority of the popula-
tion”).  
215. See Reed Abelson, Catholic Hospitals Expand, Religious Strings Attached, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/health/policy/growth-of-catholic-hospitals-may 
-limit-access-to-reproductive-care.html [http://perma.cc/3NJ5-XKD7]. Such concern may 
grow as the ACA produces additional consolidation in the healthcare industry. See Elizabeth 
B. Deutsch, Note, Expanding Conscience, Shrinking Care: The Crisis in Access to Reproductive 
Care and the Affordable Care Act’s Nondiscrimination Mandate, 124 YALE L.J. 2470 (2015).  
216. 1995 Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, supra note 23, at 25, 27 (after noting 
that “[i]n ever-increasing ways, Catholic health care providers have been involved with oth-
er health care organizations and providers,” instructing hospitals to act “in accord with the 
moral principles governing cooperation” and warning that “[t]he possibility of scandal . . . is 
an important factor that should be considered when applying the principles governing co-
operation”); see also M. Cathleen Kaveny & James F. Keenan, Ethical Issues in Health-Care 
Restructuring, 56 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 136, 144-45 (1995) (explaining how changes in 
healthcare delivery and payment, including mergers and partnerships involving Catholic 
hospitals, prompted increased concern regarding principles of cooperation). 
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non-Catholic providers and institutions.217 Those Directives expressed concern 
that scandal would result from Catholics’ association with non-Catholic 
healthcare providers, even if the association did not amount to illicit coopera-
tion.218 For instance, the Directives warned that scandal may be caused by “any 
association with abortion providers.”219 
 
217. The implications of increasing consolidation in the healthcare field are not limited to abor-
tion. Care regarding miscarriages may be affected as well. See Lori R. Freedman et al., When 
There’s a Heartbeat: Miscarriage Management in Catholic-Owned Hospitals, 98 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1774 (2008) (finding that physicians at Catholic-owned hospitals were restricted in 
their ability to undertake urgent uterine evacuation for miscarrying patients). Catholic-run 
healthcare systems may also proscribe access to contraception on a widespread basis. For in-
stance, when the local hospital in Bartlesville, Oklahoma, was acquired by a Catholic 
healthcare organization, the parent company issued a directive apparently attempting to 
prohibit local doctors with admitting privileges at the hospital from prescribing contracep-
tives for the purpose of birth control. See Kelli Williams, Reports: JPMC Doctors No  
Longer Allowed To Prescribe Birth Control, BARTLESVILLE EXAMINER-ENTERPRISE (Okla.), Mar.  
29, 2014, http://examiner-enterprise.com/news/local-news/reports-jpmc-doctors-no-longer 
-allowed-prescribe-birth-control [http://perma.cc/GJE5-HUM6]. A representative from the 
Catholic healthcare organization that had acquired the local hospital explained: “Consistent 
with all Catholic health care organizations, St. John Health System operates in accordance 
with the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Facilities.” Id. After the report-
ing of the issue, the healthcare organization issued a statement explaining that “St. John 
Health System operates in accordance with the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic 
Health Care Services, and therefore does not approve or support contraceptive practices,” 
but noting that “[w]hile our physicians agree to abide by the Directives, they also have the 
ability to prescribe medications, including hormonal medications, in accordance  
with their independent professional medical judgment.” St. John’s Health System Responds  
to Birth Control Issue, BARTLESVILLE EXAMINER-ENTERPRISE (Okla.), Mar. 31, 2014, http:// 
examiner-enterprise.com/news/local-news/st-john-health-system-responds-birth-control 
-issue [http://perma.cc/6ZB2-LN47]. As this situation suggests, issues arise when a reli-
gious hospital seeks compliance from physicians who simply affiliate with it. See Ikemoto, 
supra note 214, at 1102 n.84 (explaining that in Lane County, Oregon, a Catholic health sys-
tem not only provided about seventy percent of hospital services but also required physi-
cians joining its integrated delivery network to cease abortion and alternative insemination 
services).  
218. 1995 Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, supra note 23, at 27 (“Cooperation, 
which in all other respects is morally appropriate, may be refused because of the scandal that 
would be caused in the circumstances.”) 
219. Id. at 19. With regard to the 1995 provisions discussed here, the most recent 2009 Directives 
retain essentially the same guidance on issues regarding abortion, sterilization, and contra-
ception. 2009 Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, supra note 167. Yet while 
the 1995 Directives included an Appendix on cooperation, these most recent Directives omit 
this Appendix. See id. at 35-36 (“This new edition of the Ethical and Religious Directives omits 
the appendix concerning cooperation, which was contained in the 1995 edition. Experience 
has shown that the brief articulation of the principles of cooperation that was presented 
there did not sufficiently forestall certain possible misinterpretations and in practice gave 
rise to problems in concrete applications of the principles.”). The USCCB is currently work-
ing on revisions to the specific Directives pertaining to “collaboration with non-Catholic 
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Concerns with complicity may lead not only to the refusal to provide goods 
or services, but also to the refusal to provide information that would lead the 
patient to obtain those goods or services elsewhere.220 The Directives provide:  
Free and informed consent requires that the person . . . receive all rea-
sonable information about the essential nature of the proposed treat-
ment . . . and any reasonable and morally legitimate alternatives . . . . The 
free and informed health care decision of the person or the person’s 
surrogate is to be followed so long as it does not contradict Catholic 
principles.221 
The Directives define informed consent as requiring the patient to receive in-
formation on the proposed treatment and “morally legitimate” alternatives, 
and in this way seemingly instruct healthcare providers counseling patients to 
withhold information on services the Directives oppose.222 
A number of healthcare refusal laws sanction denying patients information. 
On the logic of complicity, these laws authorize healthcare institutions and 
 
health entities . . . .” Bishops Approve Items on Liturgy, Ethical and Religious Directives, Cause 
for Canonization at General Assembly, U.S. CONF. CATH. BISHOPS (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www 
.usccb.org/news/2014/14-186.cfm [http://perma.cc/6T5E-RB29]. 
220. For instance, in Wisconsin, a pharmacist who refused, based on the notion of complicity, to 
fill a prescription for contraception also refused, based on the notion of complicity, to pro-
vide an alternative means for the customer to obtain her medication. According to the state’s 
Pharmacy Examining Board, which disciplined the pharmacist, when the customer asked 
“where she could go to have her prescription refilled, [the pharmacist] stated that he would 
not tell her because he did not want to be a part in her receiving the contraceptives.” See 
Amended Final Decision and Order ¶ 28, Neil Noesen, No. LS031009PHM (Wis. Pharmacy 
Examining Bd. Oct. 29, 2008). 
221. 2009 Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, supra note 167, at 20 (emphasis 
added). 
222. Some Catholic thinkers and healthcare practitioners take the position that the provision of 
factually relevant information does not constitute proscribed cooperation. See, e.g., Michael 
R. Panicola & Ronald P. Hamel, Conscience, Cooperation, and Full Disclosure: Can Catholic 
Health Care Providers Disclose “Prohibited Options” to Patients Following Genetic Testing?, 
HEALTH PROGRESS 52 (2006). For broader discussions of the application of cooperation, see 
CATHLEEN KAVENY, LAW’S VIRTUES: FOSTERING AUTONOMY AND SOLIDARITY IN AMERICAN 
SOCIETY 245-51 (2012), which explains the principles regarding cooperation and scandal, in-
cluding how they have been applied in the context of healthcare; M. Cathleen Kaveny, Ap-
propriation of Evil: Cooperation’s Mirror Image, 61 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 280, 284 (2000), 
which argues that “[t]he Catholic moral tradition has developed an elaborate and sometimes 
abstruse matrix for evaluating cases of cooperation with evil. . . . [T]he matrix is not de-
signed automatically to generate undebatable answers to what are undeniably complicated 
questions . . . .”; and M. Cathleen Kaveny, Complicity with Evil, 42 CRITERION 20, 24-26 
(2003), which reviews the Roman Catholic manualist tradition of cooperation. 
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professionals to refuse to provide information, counseling, or referrals regarding 
abortion services and contraception.223  
When patients are denied information about treatment options, they are 
denied the opportunity to seek services from an alternative provider. For ex-
ample, in one litigated case, a Catholic hospital allegedly refused to provide any 
information to a rape victim whose mother explicitly asked about pregnancy 
prevention options.224 According to the victim, she did not get medical care 
from her own physician until more than seventy-two hours later, precluding 
her from availing herself of emergency contraception.225 In Michigan, a recently 
filed complaint alleges that a woman whose water broke when she was eight-
een weeks pregnant was twice sent home from her local Catholic hospital with-
out being treated for her pain and bleeding or given information that her preg-
nancy was not viable and that the safest medical course was abortion.226 The 
 
223. See supra Part II.C. In response to a federal rule that would require an organization with re-
ligious objections to providing healthcare services to refer the patient to an alternate provid-
er or notify the government of the refusal to provide the patient relevant services, a cross-
denominational group of Catholic and evangelical organizations objected on the grounds 
that the requirements would impose “a duty on the conscientious objector to refer for the 
very item or procedure to which it has a religious or moral objection.” See Letter from Galen 
Carey et al. to Office of Refugee Resettlement 5 (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.usccb 
.org/about/general-counsel/rulemaking/upload/02-20-15-comments-UM.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/QY5M-YYLG]. 
224. See Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 208 Cal. App. 3d. 405, 409 (1989). 
225. See id. In some situations, refusals can function as a de facto bar to goods or services. With 
emergency contraceptives, a narrow time window may render the availability of alternatives 
moot. For example, a forty-two-year-old married mother of two reported being denied 
emergency contraception by both her primary care physician and her internist, leaving her 
no other way to obtain the prescription within the seventy-two-hour effectiveness window. 
Having run out of time to have a prescription filled, she became pregnant and, due to health 
concerns, obtained an abortion. She explained that the refusal made it “impossible for [her] 
to get emergency contraception that would have prevented the pregnancy” and forced  
her into an “awful, painful, sickening” choice to have an abortion. Dana L., Op-Ed,  
What Happens When There Is No Plan B?, WASH. POST, June 4, 2006, http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/02/AR2006060201405.html [http:// 
perma.cc/W5VU-UKAQ]. 
226. Complaint at 2, Means v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, No. 2:13-cv-14916 (E.D. 
Mich. Nov. 29, 2013). The patient’s complaint alleges that she was nearly sent home a third 
time, despite presenting with severe pain and signs of infection, and was only treated when 
the fetus eventually breached her cervix. Id. at 3. It further alleges that the Directives re-
quired the hospital “to abide by their terms, even when doing so places a woman’s health or 
life at risk.” Id. at 2. In moving to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, USCCB challenged the 
plaintiff’s assertion that the hospital’s alleged treatment was required by the Directives. See 
Defendant United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss, supra 
note 213, at 6-7. On this point, see Cathleen Kaveny, The ACLU Takes on the Bishops:  
Tragedy at a Catholic Hospital Leads to a Misguided Lawsuit, COMMONWEAL, Jan. 10,  
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patient claimed that during her encounters with the hospital, she had not been 
told that certain care was being withheld. As she put it, “They never offered me 
any options. . . . They didn’t tell me what was happening to my body.”227 
While the example of Catholic healthcare systems suggests that denials can 
become widespread through institutionalized norms, widespread denials are 
also a threat when norms are simply widely shared. As we have seen, healthcare 
refusal laws that accommodate claims of complicity are not limited to Catho-
lics, and these laws have become a major focal point of a cross-denominational 
coalition that includes evangelical Protestants.228 In some areas, the accommo-
dations furnished by healthcare refusal laws may align the actual provision of 
hospital services with majority religious and moral beliefs in the locality.229 
Widely shared norms may result in the systematic denial of goods or services, 
even without formal organization around a governance instrument like the Di-
rectives. Healthcare providers may subscribe to those norms or may feel pres-
sure to conform to them in order to avoid controversy and maintain communi-
ty standing.230 Indeed, some healthcare refusal laws do not even specify that 
the refusal be based on the provider’s religious or moral objection, thereby 
seemingly authorizing refusals for any reason.231 
Healthcare refusals explicitly intersect with LGBT concerns. Healthcare 
providers have sought exemptions from state antidiscrimination law to avoid 
 
2014, https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/aclu-takes-bishops [https://perma.cc/6T9T 
-YL56], who states that “when it comes to secular law, what makes the directives binding on 
the Catholic hospital are their inclusion in its bylaws—a decision made by its religious spon-
sor, not the USCCB or even the local bishop.” Kaveny also argues that the Directives do al-
low a hospital to induce labor in situations like the plaintiff’s under the principle of double-
effect. In such a case, the death of the unborn child, who would not have survived anyway, 
is not intended; it is foreseen and accepted as a side effect of treating the mother’s illness. Id. 
227. ACLU Sues Bishops on Behalf of Pregnant Woman: Press Release, AM. C.L. UNION (Dec.  
2, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/religion-belief-womens-rights/aclu-sues-bishops-behalf 
-pregnant-woman-denied-care-catholic-hospital [https://perma.cc/WPV9-TSDQ]. 
228. See supra Part III.A; see also Letter from Galen Carey et al., supra note 223. 
229. For a vivid depiction of the “climate of extreme hostility to the practice of abortion” prevail-
ing in Alabama, see Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1334 (M.D. 
Ala. 2014). 
230. The market share of commercial actors without a religious affiliation thus becomes relevant. 
For instance, Wal-Mart initially refused to carry emergency contraception. But the company 
reversed its decision partly in response to concern that it served as the only pharmacy in 
some areas of the country. See Michael Barbaro, In Reversal, Wal-Mart Will Sell Contracep-
tive, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/04/business/04walmart 
.html [http://perma.cc/87RU-8FKQ]. Nonetheless, Wal-Mart announced that it would car-
ry emergency contraception while also allowing individual pharmacists to refuse service and 
refer customers to another pharmacist or pharmacy. See id. 
231. See Sepper, supra note 72 (manuscript at 12). 
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providing reproductive services to lesbian patients, for instance.232 Some 
healthcare refusal laws cover any service to which a provider objects, and the 
AUL model healthcare refusal act specifically includes not only abortion, con-
traception, and sterilization, but also “artificial insemination [and] assisted re-
production,”233 services vital to lesbian and gay family formation. Moreover, 
religious objections rooted in complicity historically have informed policy on 
HIV prevention. Some religiously affiliated organizations have resisted preven-
tion efforts that include condom distribution.234 And some Catholic hospitals 
have refused to counsel HIV-positive patients regarding condom use.235 As we 
have seen, there are healthcare refusal laws that authorize providers to deny 
this information.236 
Examining the spread of refusals in healthcare over the last several decades 
suggests how refusals could spread in the marriage context, where they have 
only recently been asserted. Religiously affiliated nonprofits regularly interact 
with persons in same-sex relationships, when acting as employers and in 
providing social services. In the for-profit sector, members of faith communi-
 
232. See, e.g., N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Superior Court, 189 
P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008). On the potential impact of healthcare refusal laws on same-sex cou-
ples, see Sepper, supra note 152, at 758.  
233. Healthcare Freedom of Conscience Act, supra note 155, § 2(a)(3). And Maryland’s healthcare 
refusal law specifically covers “artificial insemination.” MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-
214 (LexisNexis 2014). 
234. John Rivera, CRS Revising HIV Prevention Document, CATH. RELIEF SERVICES. NEWSWIRE 
(Aug. 31, 2012), http://http://newswire.crs.org/crs-to-revise-hiv-prevention-document 
[http://perma.cc/3YQA-XVXA]; see also Engaging Faith-Based Organizations in HIV Preven-
tion: A Training Manual for Programme Managers, UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND  
10 (2007), http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/2007 
/HIVTrainingManual_eng.pdf [http://perma.cc/QL4S-RCVT]. Most recently, LGBT advo-
cates have raised concern over whether employers might object to providing insurance that 
covers Pre-exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP), a daily drug regimen that has been recommended 
to reduce the risk of HIV transmission for some men who have sex with men. See Matt 
Baume, Does Hobby Lobby Have To Pay for My PrEP?, ADVOCATE.COM (Oct. 27, 2014, 7:00 
AM), http://www.advocate.com/31-days-prep/2014/10/27/does-hobby-lobby-have-pay-my 
-prep [http://perma.cc/ZB2Z-3AS7]. On the federal government’s guidelines regarding 
PrEP, see Preexposure Prophylaxis for the Prevention of HIV Infection in the United States, U.S. 
PUB. HEALTH SERVICE (2014), http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/PrEPguidelines2014.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/49UM-SBSJ]. 
235. See Mireya Navarro, Ethics of Giving AIDS Advice Troubles Catholic Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 3, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/03/nyregion/ethics-of-giving-aids-advice 
-troubles-catholic-hospitals.html [http://perma.cc/UL97-H23Z] (explaining a Catholic 
hospital’s “official policy” on HIV/AIDS care that “staff cannot counsel patients on condoms 
. . . or refer them out for such counseling”). 
236. See supra Part II.C. In addition, the AUL model healthcare refusal act, see supra note 153, 
would allow such denials.  
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ties are beginning to assert complicity-based refusals to engage in transactions 
with same-sex couples in public accommodations, in employment, and in 
housing. As in healthcare, refusals may vary regionally. While high-profile re-
fusals directed at same-sex couples first arose in states with antidiscrimination 
laws that include sexual orientation, refusals are now cropping up in states 
that, in the wake of court rulings, license same-sex couples’ marriages but do 
not include sexual orientation in state antidiscrimination laws.237 Some of these 
states are considering laws authorizing religiously motivated refusals.238 Such 
laws might provide exemptions from other state nondiscrimination obligations 
that could apply to same-sex couples,239 and exempt claimants from city and 
county nondiscrimination ordinances prohibiting sexual orientation discrimi-
nation. Going forward, refusals may be most likely to occur in states where 
same-sex couples are most legally vulnerable—able to marry because of a judi-
cial decision but insufficiently protected from private discrimination.240 Ulti-
mately, in more conservative, religious, and rural parts of the country, complic-
ity-based refusals have the capacity to construct separate, localized legal orders 
in which same-sex couples face an unpredictable marketplace and labor market 
and continue to encounter stigma and rejection. 
B. Dignitary Harms  
To this point, discussion has focused on how claims for religious exemp-
tion can obstruct access to service and information regarding alternative 
sources. But of course a refusal to serve also has dignitary effects. This objec-
tion became clear during the civil rights movement, when denials of service at 
 
237. See Carol Kuruvilla, Pennsylvania Bridal Shop Turns Away Lesbian Couple To Avoid  
Breaking ‘God’s Law’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 9, 2014, http://www.nydailynews.com/news 
/national/pennsylvania-bridal-shop-don-serve-lesbians-article-1.1898001 [http://perma.cc 
/G8CB-ML7X]; Meghan Packer, Bakery Denies Cake to Gay Couple, WFMZ (Aug. 13, 2014), 
http://www.wfmz.com/news/bakery-denies-cake-to-gay-couple/27463270 [http://perma.cc 
/47MK-BJZX]. 
238. See supra note 202. 
239. These might include nondiscrimination obligations relating to both sex and marital status. 
240. Cf. Oleske, supra note 50, at 136 (“As the debate increasingly moves from blue states to pur-
ple and red states, exemptions that provide protection to business owners who oppose 
same-sex marriage on religious grounds may well find greater political support.” (footnote 
omitted)). In some regions, refusing service to same-sex couples may help, not hurt, the 
business itself. See Mark Meredith & Will C. Holden, Cake Shop Says Business Booming Since 
Refusal To Serve Gay Couple, FOX 31 DENVER (July 30, 2012), http://kdvr.com/2012/07/30 
/denver-cake-shop-refuses-service-to-gay-couple [http://perma.cc/USF9-XRG9]. 
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lunch counters were understood as meaning-making transactions.241 As the 
Court has observed, when Congress adopted the Civil Rights Act, it made 
“clear that the fundamental object of Title II was to vindicate ‘the deprivation 
of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public es-
tablishments.’”242 In current discussions of complicity-based conscience claims, 
by contrast, the social meanings of accommodating refusals to serve often re-
cede from view. Just as Congress took the social meaning of refusals into con-
sideration in fashioning antidiscrimination laws governing public accommoda-
tions, so too should the social meaning of refusals factor in judgments about 
whether and how to grant persons religious exemptions from laws of general 
application.243 
In Hobby Lobby, the corporate claimants objected “to provid[ing] employ-
ees with insurance coverage that they believe implicates them in an immoral 
practice.”244 Their refusal to furnish insurance covering contraception labels an 
 
241. In prohibiting refusals of service in public accommodations, Congress appreciated their ca-
pacity to impose “humiliations.” 110 CONG. REC. 6531 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humph-
rey). Bruce Ackerman explains how the Congress that passed the Civil Rights Act, and spe-
cifically Title II’s prohibition on discrimination in public accommodations, understood the 
social meaning conveyed by refusals that impose “institutionalized humiliation.” 3 BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 142 (2014). Indeed, Ackerman 
links this to the legacy of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in which the 
Court recognized that subordinated groups do not choose the social meanings imposed on 
them by society’s institutions. See ACKERMAN, supra, at 150. For commentary drawing on 
this history, see Marvin Lim & Louise Melling, Inconvenience or Indignity? Religious Exemp-
tions to Public Accommodations Laws, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 705 (2014); and Louise Melling, Religious 
Refusals to Public Accommodations Laws: Four Reasons To Say No, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 177 
(2015). 
242. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (quoting S. REP. NO. 
88-872, at 16-17 (1964)). 
243. Some readers have questioned whether it would raise First Amendment issues to make ex-
pressive conduct an element of harm in religious accommodation cases. At issue is con-
duct—conduct that is motivated by religious convictions and often has a clear and some-
times even expressly articulated pejorative social meaning. It is hard to see why the First 
Amendment would apply any differently to a religiously motivated refusal to serve than a 
racially motivated refusal to serve of the sort at issue in the paradigmatic cases considered by 
Congress in enacting Title II. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. The Court has re-
peatedly upheld restrictions on conduct against First Amendment challenge, even when the 
law singles out conduct with reference to the beliefs that animated it. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. 
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993) (“[M]otive plays the same role under the Wisconsin 
[penalty enhancement] statute as it does under federal and state antidiscrimination laws, 
which we have previously upheld against constitutional challenge.”). Business owners with 
religious objections to same-sex marriage who serve customers in compliance with antidis-
crimination laws are still free to voice their objections to same-sex marriage.  
244. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction & Opening Brief at 9, Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 5:12-cv-01000-HE (W.D. Okla. Sept. 12, 2012). 
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entire group of employees—women using certain contraceptives—as sinners.245 
In other cases, the refusal is targeted. For instance, the bakery owner who turns 
away a same-sex couple treats that particular couple as sinners. Both the gen-
eral condemnation expressed by the corporate claimants in Hobby Lobby and 
the individualized condemnation in the bakery are actions that address third 
parties as sinners in ways that can stigmatize and demean. 
In some situations, social meaning is explicitly communicated during the 
religiously based refusal of service. Consider the operation of complicity-based 
conscience claims in the context of same-sex marriage. A bakery customer, for 
instance, reported being told, “[we] don’t do same sex weddings because [we] 
are Christians and being gay is an abomination.”246 A woman shopping for a 
wedding dress reported that, after a day of trying on dresses at a shop, the 
owner “would not work with [her] because [being gay is] ‘wrong.’”247 
We can observe a similar dynamic in the healthcare context. Patients can be 
gravely injured when they are denied service in emergency situations or de-
prived information regarding treatment options. But even aside from these in-
juries, refusal of service can inflict dignitary harms. A Walgreens pharmacist in 
Wisconsin refused to fill an emergency contraception prescription for a mother 
of six, reportedly telling her, “You’re a murderer! I will not help you kill this 
baby. I will not have the blood on my hands.”248 Similar meanings can be con-
veyed when a pharmacist simply refuses to fill or transfer a birth control pre-
scription because he deems it “wrong” or “a sin.”249 
Even when not stated explicitly, the meaning of the refusal is intelligible to 
the recipient because it reflects and reiterates a familiar message about contes- 
ted sexual norms.250 Gays and lesbians understand objections to same-sex mar-
 
245. See infra text accompanying notes 272-273. 
246. Rachel C., Review for Sweet Cakes, YELP (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.yelp.com/user 
_details?userid=a4fuAn84fRddJTt7jJEo7g [http://perma.cc/7VBA-CY7P]. 
247. Alix G., Review for Here Comes the Bride, YELP (Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.yelp.com/user 
_details?userid=3sMW6WLn3wVbmy-knXNd3g [http://perma.cc/M75S-PRYS]. On the 
potential psychological harms of religiously based refusal of service, see Sepper, supra note 
152, at 759. 
248. Pharmacy Refusals 101, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CENTER, 2 (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.nwlc.org 
/sites/default/files/pdfs/pharmacy_refusals_101_4.19.12.pdf [http://perma.cc/4UJG-Z6PE]. 
249. See Pharmacist Cites Sin in Birth Control Case, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, http://www 
.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/oct/11/20041011-115311-7515r [http://perma.cc/Z2WU 
-6KMA] (describing the refusal at a Wisconsin K-Mart in the Noesen litigation discussed su-
pra at notes 77 and 220); NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CENTER, supra note 248 (describing a refusal at 
a Seattle Rite-Aid). 
250. Cf. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 69 (1996) 
(“Stigma inflicts its greatest harm when the individual is part of the same community of 
shared meanings as those who stigmatize him.”). 
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riage as status-based judgments.251 Women encountering objections to contra-
ception may as well. For example, a college student whose regular doctor was 
not in the office when she called seeking emergency contraception reported be-
ing passed around to multiple staff members before eventually speaking to a 
doctor who “coldly” refused her request. As a result, the young woman said “I 
felt judged, embarrassed, mortified . . . . I felt like a whore. That’s how those 
people made me feel. I wasn’t about to go back to them for anything.”252 In a 
New Jersey hospital, a nurse allegedly refused, in front of the patient receiving 
abortion services, to provide any pre- or post-operative care. According to the 
hospital, the patient, understanding the meaning conveyed by the refusal, “was 
extremely upset and had to be counseled by other members of the nursing 
staff.”253 
Similarly, in the LGBT context, accommodation’s power to stigmatize de-
rives from the fact that the refusal reflects a widely understood message about a 
contested sexual norm. The individual or group a person of faith asserts is sin-
ning will immediately comprehend the social meaning that refusal expresses. A 
bakery customer planning a same-sex wedding reported that she had “never 
felt so low in [her] life” as when the owner terminated the cake tasting upon 
finding out that the woman was a lesbian.254 Another customer recalled 
“walk[ing] away feeling hurt and disgusted.”255 A lesbian couple turned away 
by a wedding venue near Albany, New York, reported to the state’s Division of 
Human Rights feeling “shell-shocked” and “horrible.”256 According to the 
Human Rights Division, while one of the women had been “feeling a lot more 
 
251. On the relationship between same-sex marriage objections and sexual orientation discrimi-
nation, see generally NeJaime, supra note 151. Of course, from the perspective of the reli-
gious objector, there may be a distinction between the sin and the sinner. 
252. Eileen Loh Harrist, Bitter Pill: Though Emergency Contraception Is Legal—and Similar to the 
Common Birth-Control Pill—It’s Not Always Easy To Obtain in Louisiana, GAMBIT (Nov. 23, 
2004), http://www.bestofneworleans.com/gambit/bitter-pill/Content?oid=1243558 [http:// 
perma.cc/FG5P-PNR6]. 
253. Affidavit of Tammy Ludwig ¶ 27, Danquah v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., No. 2:11-
cv-06377 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2011). 
254. Alison S., Review for Masterpiece Cakeshop, YELP (July 30, 2012), http://www.yelp.com 
/not_recommended_reviews/masterpiece-cakeshop-lakewood?not_recommended_start=10 
[http://perma.cc/D3CM-TLYJ]. 
255. Jennifer J., Review for Masterpiece Cakeshop, YELP (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.yelp.com 
/not_recommended_reviews/masterpiece-cakeshop-lakewood?not_recommended_start=10 
[http://perma.cc/K2K2-5RU7]. Cf. Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liber-
ties, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 174, 
at 123, 153 (“If I am denied a job, an apartment, a room at a hotel, a table at a restaurant, or a 
procedure by a doctor because I am a lesbian, that is a deep, intense, and tangible hurt.”). 
256. Notice and Final Order at 10, McCarthy v. Liberty Ridge Farm, LLC, Nos. 10157952, 
10157963 (N.Y. Div. Hum. Rts. July 2, 2014). 
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comfortable” with herself since coming out, she experienced the refusal as a 
“kind of blow” to her coming-out process.257 Indeed, the rejection upset the 
women so much that they stopped looking for venues in the area because they 
doubted they “would feel comfortable” holding the wedding there.258 
Beyond the individual transaction, refusing services creates social meaning 
on a larger scale. The refusals are asserted across a range of settings, and occur 
at the same time that advocates seek laws of general application condemning 
the third party’s conduct.259 Indeed, some who assert religious refusals in the 
LGBT context have become important figures in the broader movement oppos-
ing same-sex marriage.260 These dynamics intensify the stigmatization that ac-
commodation of complicity-based conscience claims can produce. The claim’s 
reiteration by a mass movement amplifies its power to demean. 
When complicity-based conscience claims exist side-by-side with efforts to 
oppose abortion, contraception, and same-sex marriage, the refusals animated 
by these claims play a key role in society-wide conflict over sexual norms. In-
deed, for those who view accommodation as “a mandate for evangelization,” 
religious exemptions provide an opportunity “to spread the Gospel, and . . . to 
transform [the] culture.”261 
 
257. Id. 
258. Id. at 11. 
259. See supra Part III. 
260. Oregon bakery owners who refused to sell cakes for same-sex weddings were recently fea-
tured at the 2014 Values Voter Summit, which is sponsored by the Family Research Council, 
on a panel called “Marriage in America: The Road Ahead,” along with Eric Teetsel, the 
Manhattan Declaration’s executive director. See VVS 2015 Schedule, VALUES VOTER  
SUMMIT (2015), http://www.valuesvotersummit.org/schedule [http://perma.cc/Z97F-E3T8] 
(displaying the schedule from the 2014 Values Voter Summit). The Values Voter Summit 
“was created in 2006 to provide a forum to help inform and mobilize citizens across America 
to preserve the bedrock values of traditional marriage, religious liberty, sanctity of life and 
limited government that make our nation strong.” VVS 2015: About VVS, VALUES VOTER 
SUMMIT (2015), http://www.valuesvotersummit.org/about [http://perma.cc/JDY6-5CT5]. 
Entire sections of ADF’s website are dedicated to its work on behalf of the florist who 
refused to provide flowers for a same-sex couple’s wedding and the photographer who re-
fused to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony. The Cost of Being a Christian, ALLI-
ANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, https://www.alliancedefendingfreedom.org/Home/Detail/4333 
[http://perma.cc/7AJD-A7CM]; The Story of Barronelle Stutzman, ALLIANCE DEFENDING 
FREEDOM, https://www.alliancedefendingfreedom.org/arlenes-flowers [http://perma.cc 
/D8YX-Q33Q].  
261. Conley, supra note 150; see also Defending Religious Liberty in America, ALLIANCE DEFENDING 
FREEDOM, http://www.alliancedefendingfreedom.org/issues/religious-liberty [http://perma 
.cc/S9RY-UQU2] (stating that religious liberty “[k]eep[s] the Door Open for the Spread of 
the Gospel”). 
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v.  considering accommodation  
Now that we have examined the form and social logic of complicity-based 
conscience claims and explained the impact of their accommodation on third 
parties, we turn back to doctrine to consider how our analysis bears on the en-
forcement of the law. We start with RFRA and Hobby Lobby, before consider-
ing the wider variety of judicial and legislative contexts in which these claims 
are arising. The impact on third parties of accommodating complicity-based 
conscience claims varies across contexts, and as it does, it implicates different 
kinds of values. We consider some of the fundamental and constitutional val-
ues that might shape approaches to accommodation.  
In what follows, we identify questions that courts and lawmakers need to 
ask if they are concerned—as our law directs them to be—about the harms to 
other citizens that accommodating complicity-based conscience claims may in-
flict. Decision makers may weigh the goods and harms of religious accommo-
dation differently, but few would endorse the principle that one group of citi-
zens should be singled out to bear significant costs of another’s religious 
exercise. Once we recognize that accommodating complicity claims inflicts dis-
tinctive forms of harm on other citizens, even proponents of expansive accom-
modations should be committed to minimizing those harms. (If they are not, it 
is likely because the argument for exemption is part of a larger effort to enforce 
norms of the faith on society as a whole.)  
A. Reconsidering Harm in Hobby Lobby’s Wake  
RFRA prohibits the federal government from “substantially burden[ing] a 
person’s exercise of religion” unless the government “demonstrates that appli-
cation of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling go- 
vernmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.”262 In what follows, we return to Hobby 
Lobby to show how the question of third-party harm arises as part of the RFRA 
analysis.263 We then consider questions of accommodation in contexts outside 
RFRA. 
 
262. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(a) to (b) (2012).  
263. RFRA does not explicitly mention third-party harm. This is not surprising given the specific 
cases to which Congress referred when it enacted the statute. As we observed in Part I, the 
free exercise claims in Sherbert, Yoder, and Smith—the cases mentioned in RFRA—did not 
focus on the conduct of persons outside the faith community. 
We focus on how third-party harm arises under the “compelling governmental interest” 
and “least restrictive means” prongs of RFRA. For cases discussing questions of complicity 
under the “substantial burden” analysis, see, for example, Geneva College v. Secretary of Unit-
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1. RFRA  
The Hobby Lobby Court granted the religious accommodation on the prem-
ise that it would have “precisely zero” effect on the claimants’ female employ-
ees.264 As we showed in Part I, this concern with third-party harm has been a 
cross-cutting constraint in adjudicated religious liberties law arising under 
both the Constitution and civil rights statutes.265 In Hobby Lobby, this concern 
played a critical role. Justice Kennedy, who specifically noted in his concur-
rence that accommodation may not “unduly restrict other persons, such as em-
ployees, in protecting their own interests,”266 provided the majority its decisive 
fifth vote. The majority opinion reiterated that concern with third-party harm. 
Justice Alito instructed that “in applying RFRA ‘courts must take adequate ac-
count of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbenefi-
ciaries.’ That consideration will often inform the analysis of the Government’s 
compelling interest and the availability of a less restrictive means of advancing 
that interest.”267 
In this passage Justice Alito explains that the injunction against third-party 
harm that we observed across religious liberties case law is an integral part of 
RFRA’s compelling interest and least restrictive means analysis. The govern-
ment’s compelling interests in enacting a law often include individual and soci-
etal interests, and these interests often have material and expressive dimen-
sions.268 If religious accommodation (1) would inflict material or dignitary 
harm on those the statute is designed to protect or (2) would produce effects 
and meanings that undermine the government’s society-wide objectives, this 
impact is evidence that unimpaired enforcement of the law is the least restric-
tive means of furthering the government’s interest.  
An antidiscrimination law can illustrate. In enacting an antidiscrimination 
law, legislators seek to provide the citizens the law protects equal access to em-
 
ed States Department of Health & Human Services., Nos. 13-3536, 14-1374, 14-1376, 14-1377, 
2015 WL 543067 (3d Cir. Feb. 11, 2015); and Priests for Life v. United States Department of 
Health & Human Services., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
264. See supra Part I.B and note 64. 
265. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
266. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
267. Id. at 2781 n.37 (majority opinion) (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 720 (2005)). 
268. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984) (in addressing a First Amendment 
challenge to a law proscribing sex discrimination, the Court observed “the importance, both 
to the individual and to society, of removing the barriers to economic advancement and politi-
cal and social integration that have historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups, in-
cluding women”) (emphasis added); see also Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Compelling In-
terests and Contraception, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1025, 1032-35 (2015). 
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ployment, housing, and public accommodations and to ensure that they are 
treated with equal respect; legislators also seek to promote the growth of a 
more integrated and less stratified society.269 If granting a religious accommo-
dation would harm those protected by the antidiscrimination law or under-
mine societal values and goals the statute promotes, then unencumbered en-
forcement of the statute is the least restrictive means of achieving the govern-
government’s compelling ends. If, however, the government can accommodate 
the religious claimant in ways that do not impair pursuit of the government’s 
compelling interests in banning discrimination, then RFRA requires the ac-
commodation. 
Looking back at Hobby Lobby, we are now situated to make several observa-
tions. The Court decided the case on the basis of least restrictive means analy-
sis. The Court required the accommodation because it thought the government 
had alternative means of providing the employees access to insurance for con-
traception, so that the accommodation would have “precisely zero” effect on 
them.270 In fact, the Court may have erred in assuming that accommodation 
would inflict no costs.271 If the Court was in error in asserting that accommo-
dating Hobby Lobby would have “precisely zero” effect on its employees’ ac-
cess to insurance for contraception, we learn something about narrow tailoring 
analysis. Narrow tailoring requires determining whether an alternative method 
of serving the government’s interests is available and adequate—whether it is 
feasible for the government to accommodate religious objections without im-
posing costs on the citizens the statute protects.  
Our analysis prompts another observation about the least restrictive means 
inquiry in Hobby Lobby. In concluding that religious accommodation was pos-
sible with “precisely zero” effect on the statute’s beneficiaries, the Court seems 
to have focused entirely on material, rather than dignitary, harm. The Court 
never considered whether accommodating the employers’ belief—that paying 
for employee health insurance would make the employers complicit in the em-
ployees’ sinful practices of contraception—might create harmful social mean-
ings that undermine individual and societal interests the statute promotes. Ac-
commodating such religious beliefs may stigmatize women who use 
contraception, either by entrenching old norms that condemn women for seek-
 
269. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 250, at 8 (explaining that “‘the antidiscrimination project’ seeks 
to reconstruct social reality to eliminate or marginalize the shared meanings, practices, and 
institutions that unjustifiably single out certain groups of citizens for stigma and disad-
vantage”).  
270. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760.  
271. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (reporting on the pending proposal to offer the ac-
commodations available to religiously affiliated nonprofits to some for-profit corporations, 
and on continuing litigation over the adequacy of those accommodations). 
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ing sex while avoiding motherhood272 or by labeling contraception as an “abor-
tifacient.”273 In these ways, sanctioning the employer’s refusal to pay can create 
 
272. Judgments about contraception have long been entangled in beliefs about women’s natural 
role as mothers. A year after Justice Bradley explained that “the constitution of the family 
organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, 
indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of 
womanhood,” Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring), Con-
gress criminalized contraception. The Comstock Act was premised on the view that it was 
obscene to separate sex and procreation. Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (prohibit-
ing circulation in U.S. mail of information regarding contraception, which was deemed ob-
scene) (repealed 1909); see also Carol Flora Brooks, The Early History of the Anti-Contraceptive 
Laws in Massachusetts and Connecticut, 18 AM. Q. 3, 3 (1966) (describing the enactment of a 
Connecticut law criminalizing contraception that was modeled on the Comstock Act and 
later declared unconstitutional in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). In this peri-
od, women who indulged in sex while endeavoring to avoid its natural procreative conse-
quences were condemned as engaging in “physiological sin.” See Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning 
from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 
44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 292-96 (1992) (quoting doctors on the sins and health harms of pre-
venting pregnancy). For an account that ties judgments about the use of contraception in 
the nineteenth and twentieth century to gendered double standards in sex and parenting, 
see Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Contraception as a Sex Equality Right, 124 YALE L.J.  
F. 349 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/contraception-as-a-sex-equality-right 
[http://perma.cc/MHL9-QRC9]. For an illustration of how religious refusal of contracep-
tion can make a woman feel “like a whore,” see text accompanying note 252; cf. KRISTIN 
LUKER, TAKING CHANCES: ABORTION AND THE DECISION NOT TO CONTRACEPT 44 (1975) 
(explaining that a woman may avoid taking steps, such as accessing and using contracep-
tion, that “notify [others] that she is participating in sexual behavior which she has reason 
to suppose they will disapprove” on religious and other grounds). 
273. In Hobby Lobby, the plaintiffs asserted a claim for religious exemption based on the belief 
that pregnancy begins at fertilization (rather than implantation) of an egg. See Hobby Lob-
by Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013). By contrast, the scientific 
community and federal law define pregnancy as beginning with the implantation of a  
fertilized egg in a woman’s uterus. See Rachel Benson Gold, The Implications of  
Defining When a Woman Is Pregnant, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, May 2005,  
at 7, https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/08/2/gr080207.html [http://perma.cc/NA27 
-ARWD] (“According to both the scientific community and long-standing federal policy, a 
woman is considered pregnant only when a fertilized egg has implanted in the wall of her 
uterus . . . .”). 
The methods of contraception characterized as abortifacients in Hobby Lobby do not op-
erate post-implantation, and so do not cause abortion in the view of medical science or the 
federal government. See, e.g., Brief of Physicians for Reproductive Health et al. as Amici Cu-
riae Supporting Defendants-Appellees at 10-12, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebe-
lius, 724 F.3d 377 (2013) (No. 13-1144), 2013 WL 1792349 (citing authority); James Trussell & 
Eleanor Bimla Schwartz, Emergency Contraception, in CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 113, 121 
(Robert A. Hatcher et al. eds., 20th ed. 2011). In fact, all but one of the challenged contra-
ceptive methods are now understood to operate before ovulation, and so may well not count 
as abortifacients even under the plaintiffs’ religious definition of pregnancy. See Kristina Gemzell-
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meanings that deter women from using contraception, compromising both the 
individual and societal interests that the statute furthers.274 Perhaps, however, 
the government has alternative means of providing employees insurance for 
contraception that would not create these pejorative social meanings.275  
 
Danielsson et al., Emergency Contraception—Mechanisms of Action, 87 CONTRACEPTION 300 
(2013). 
One observer points to evidence suggesting that advocates intend to blur the line be-
tween abortion and contraception, including the fact that advocates (1) have characterized 
contraceptive methods as abortifacients, when the contraceptives in question do not satisfy 
their religious definition of abortifacients; and (2) have appealed to religious criteria for de-
fining abortifacients in some contexts but not in others, so as to avoid condemning popular 
methods of contraception. See Joerg Dreweke, Contraception Is Not Abortion: The Strategic 
Campaign of Antiabortion Groups To Persuade the Public Otherwise, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., 
Fall 2014, at 14, http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/17/4/gpr170414.html [http://perma 
.cc/D8YF-27MF]. Efforts to stigmatize contraception as “the new abortion” might appeal to 
some critics of contraception. Cf. supra notes 120-123 and accompanying text (discussing 
Christians who condemn the “contraceptive mentality” and who argue that contraception 
harms women).  
274. See Siegel & Siegel, supra note 268, at 1028 (observing that the government’s compelling in-
terest in providing employees access to contraception “encompass[es] not only core con-
cerns of the community in promoting public health and facilitating women’s integration in 
the workplace,” but also “crucial concerns of the employees who are the intended beneficiar-
ies of federal law’s contraceptive coverage requirement—interests that sound in bodily in-
tegrity, personal autonomy, and equal citizenship”). As the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services explained: “Researchers have shown that access to contraception improves the 
social and economic status of women. Contraceptive access . . . allow[s] women to achieve 
equal status as healthy and productive members of the job force.” Group Health Plans and 
Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725-01 (Feb. 15, 2012). Cf. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2779-80 (discussing the government’s asserted interests in requiring employers to 
provide employees insurance for contraception, including “‘public health’ and ‘gender 
equality’” (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. 479)). 
275. We know that religious refusals to provide contraception in a face-to-face encounter can 
demean and stigmatize. For illustrations of the dignitary dimensions of the transaction, see 
supra notes 248-252 and accompanying text. Providing and withholding insurance may pre-
sent a different case. Some have argued that because insurance benefits are fungible goods, 
the rerouting of benefits through an alternative mechanism neither harms the statutory ben-
eficiaries nor undermines the government’s interest. See Berg, supra note 18, at 124-25 (citing 
Vikram David Amar & Alan E. Brownstein, The Narrow (and Proper) Way for the Court To 
Rule in Hobby Lobby’s Favor, VERDICT (Apr. 11, 2014), http://verdict.justia.com/2014/04/11 
/narrow-proper-way-court-rule-hobby-lobbys-favor [http://perma.cc/6UDL-F929] (“The 
benefits provided by the Act . . . are fungible, intangible goods that can be provided by ei-
ther the public or private sector. And the Act’s beneficiaries have no reason to care about the 
source of the insurance.”)). Whether a government accommodation expresses the message 
that contraception is sinful would depend on the way the government structures the ac-
commodation.  
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In short, the least restrictive means analysis requires examining the mean-
ings as well as the material arrangements that a proposed accommodation of a 
religious claim would create.276 If the accommodation does not obstruct the at-
tainment of any compelling governmental ends, then RFRA directs accommo-
dation of the claim. If such an accommodation cannot be devised, RFRA allows 
the government to pursue its compelling interests through unobstructed en-
forcement of the statute. Yet even in these circumstances, the religious claimant 
has resources for expressing concerns of conscience and for advocating change 
of religiously objectionable laws. The claimant has at her disposal all of the re-
sources of speech and political advocacy available to others in society, but does 
not have the special advantage of an exemption from complying with the 
law.277 (RFRA confers that advantage on persons engaged in religious exercise 
only in the circumstance where the exemption does not obstruct the attainment 
of compelling governmental interests.) 
Hobby Lobby is distinctive: it focused on a claim for religious accommoda-
tion in circumstances in which the Court believed that the government already 
had devised alternative means of vindicating its interest in the statute’s en-
forcement. In adjudicating complicity-based claims to religious accommoda-
tion not involving the ACA—arising under RFRA, under state RFRAs that re-
semble the federal statute,278 and outside the RFRA context—it will be 
 
276. See Loewentheil, supra note 50, at 495 (“[T]here may be cases in which the state could con-
ceivably have produced a more narrowly tailored practical solution to a given problem, but 
could not produce a more narrowly tailored solution that would respect the expressive 
equality norms at stake . . . .”). 
277. At least one commentator sympathetic to religious refusals has suggested that religious ob-
jectors comply with antidiscrimination laws while voicing their objections. See Russell Nieli, 
Gay Weddings and the Shopkeeper’s Dilemma, PUB. DISCOURSE (Dec. 17, 2014), http:// 
www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/12/14190 [http://perma.cc/4A6A-EYTV] (encouraging 
business owners to “obey the law and serve gay weddings, but [to] make it known publicly 
that you believe that the law forcing you to do this is unjust, needs to be changed, and is 
obeyed only out of your respect for law and the democratic process”); see also Russell Nieli, 
Challenging Unjust Laws Takes Prudence, Courage, and Common Sense, PUB. DISCOURSE  
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/01/14335 [http://perma.cc/H5UJ 
-LEGK] (“Even if, under the ‘hostile work environment’ exception, a workplace sign of pro-
test were prohibited, nothing would prevent a business owner from taking out ads in local 
media publicly announcing his conscience-based objections to serving same-sex wed-
dings.”). Speech may in fact serve to quell some concerns with the apparent sanctioning of 
conduct—concerns associated with complicity claims sounding in scandal. (For a discussion 
of scandal as occurring when the individual or institution engages in conduct that appears to 
sanction someone else’s wrongful behavior, see supra note 23.). 
278. Many states have their own RFRAs that track the federal RFRA. To the extent they do, our 
analysis of the federal RFRA will be relevant. On state RFRAs, see Christopher C. Lund, Re-
ligious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010); and Eugene 
Volokh, 1A. What Is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 2, 
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important to examine carefully the existence and adequacy of alternatives, as 
well as the material and dignitary effects of an accommodation. 
2. Non-RFRA Contexts  
Complicity-based conscience claims arise under bodies of law other than 
federal and state RFRAs. They are asserted in a variety of statutory settings, as 
healthcare refusal laws and debates over same-sex marriage illustrate.279 In  
these settings, decision makers will have to determine not only whether but 
how to accommodate religious exercise. Concern about material and dignitary 
harm to third parties might lead legislators to reject a proposed accommoda-
tion or, at the very least, to consider strategies to minimize the accommoda-
tion’s impact on other citizens. Accommodations that do not include mecha-
nisms to offset significant third-party effects—such as those common in 
healthcare refusal laws—single out some citizens to bear the cost of others’ reli-
gious convictions.280 
The question of how to minimize the impact on third parties will vary 
across circumstances.281 The feasibility of providing alternative access to ser-
vices may depend on the availability of other willing providers—an assessment 
that may include consideration of the claimant’s market position282 as well as 
 
2013, 7:43 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/12/02/1a-religious-freedom-restoration-act [http:// 
perma.cc/43MG-QXAQ]. 
279. Complicity-based conscience claims are being made to support “marriage conscience protec-
tion” provisions in state legislation codifying same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Letter from Robin 
Fretwell Wilson et al. to Pat Quinn, supra note 194. Some state legislatures have considered 
statutes that would allow businesses to refuse service to same-sex couples based on  
notions of complicity. See, e.g., H.B. 2453, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2014), http://www 
.kslegislature.org/li/b2013_14/measures/hb2453 [http://perma.cc/R2LC-P9VC]; S.B. 1428, 
126th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Me. 2014), http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/display 
_ps.asp?paper=SP0514&snum=126 [http://perma.cc/M8YS-U6DN]. 
280. Some healthcare refusal laws do not provide an exception for emergency situations. See, e.g., 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.20181 (West 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.414 (West 
2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5 (West 2014); see also Sonfield, supra note 92. And some 
of these laws permit providers to withhold referrals or other information that would notify 
patients of restrictions on services and enable them to find alternative providers. See, e.g., 42 
U.S.C. § 238n (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.    
§ 25-6-102 (West 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051 (West 2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-
107-3 (West 2014); see also Sonfield, supra note 92. 
281. Proposals to balance access against accommodation have been extensively considered by 
scholars of health law and bioethics. For a helpful summary, see Sepper, supra note 72 
(manuscript at 9). 
282. See Berg, supra note 18, at 139 (noting a problem “if religious objectors are numerous or 
large enough to hold market power over the matter in question”); cf. Att’y Gen. v. Desilets, 
636 N.E.2d 233, 240 (Mass. 1994) (inquiring into whether accommodation of a complicity-
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the likely number of other claims for accommodation.283 For example, when a 
Catholic-affiliated hospital is the only hospital in a particular locale, exercise of 
exemptions by the institution and its affiliated personnel could significantly af-
fect residents’ access to certain healthcare services.284 
Even if the government can provide for affected third parties in alternative 
ways, these alternatives may not shield third parties from dignitary harms.285 
The question of whether a complicity claim can be accommodated in terms that 
ameliorate the dignitary affront to other citizens is at root practical. In the 
healthcare context, for example, decision makers might respond by requiring 
internal procedures that shift patients away from refusing providers and to-
ward their willing colleagues, in ways that shield the patient from stigmatizing 
encounters. 
More broadly, lawmakers might consider the message the government 
sends in furnishing an exemption. Context matters in assessing social meaning. 
Are there ways to accommodate religious persons without giving legal sanction 
to their view that other law-abiding citizens are sinning? If the government 
grants an accommodation, is the accommodation structured to block or ampli-
fy dissemination of religious claims about the sins of other citizens? 
B. The Values To Guide Approaches to Accommodation 
We have been focusing on the practical considerations that should guide 
approaches to accommodation of complicity-based conscience claims. But there 
 
based conscience claim from state housing law that prohibited marital status discrimination 
would “significantly imped[e] the availability of rental housing for people who are cohabit-
ing or wish to cohabit”). 
283. See Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 968 
(2004) (“Exemptions prompt the worry that granting one will invite a series of future claims 
whose cumulative effect on social interests will be damaging. But the smaller and more un-
conventional the group, the fewer the likely prospective claims.”). As Martha Minow has 
observed in her treatment of conflicts between civil rights laws and religious objections: 
“Because of the size of relevant religious groups, exemptions would enormously affect the 
number of workplaces and other settings where the antidiscrimination norm is bent or bro-
ken.” Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. 
REV. 781, 822-23 (2007). 
284. See supra Part IV.A; see also Ikemoto, supra note 214, at 1102; Laycock, supra note 197, at 848, 
879. 
285. See, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274, 283 (Alaska 1994) 
(“The government views acts of discrimination as independent social evils even if the pro-
spective tenants ultimately find housing. Allowing housing discrimination that degrades in-
dividuals, affronts human dignity, and limits one’s opportunities results in harming the 
government’s transactional interest in preventing such discrimination.”). 
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are broader normative and constitutional concerns at stake, some of which will 
vary across the contexts in which these claims are asserted.  
In courts, and especially in legislatures where complicity-based conscience 
claims will be subject to negotiated settlements, government actors will make 
judgments about which claims to accommodate and how to design accommo-
dations. In doing so, they will continually grapple with questions of funda-
mental fairness. As our religious liberties case law emphasizes, one group of 
citizens should not bear the significant costs of another’s claim to religious ex-
ercise.286 
A different kind of fairness concern is likely to arise as lawmakers and 
courts distinguish among religious claimants.287 There is evidence that claim-
ants who appeal to religious convictions consistent with mainstream Christian 
faiths may be more likely to secure judicial or legislative exemptions than those 
invoking minority religious convictions.288 This would seem to be especially 
likely in the context of complicity-based claims, where the relationship between 
the claimant and the objectionable conduct may be quite attenuated. In these 
circumstances, there is a risk that decision makers may recognize a burden on 
religious exercise when the claimant invokes familiar norms condemning the 
 
286. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text; see also Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 
(2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[A]ccommodating petitioner’s religious belief in this 
case would not detrimentally affect others who do not share petitioner’s belief.”). 
287. Complicity claims are asserted by religious claimants who represent minority faiths in the 
United States. See, e.g., John Reinan, Taxi Proposal Gets Sharp Response, STAR TRIB. (MINNE-
APOLIS), Feb. 27, 2007, http://www.startribune.com/local/11586646.html [http://perma.cc 
/9G2F-EDAN] (explaining that the Minnesota chapter of the Muslim American Society in-
structed that taxi drivers should not carry “passengers with alcohol ‘because it involves co-
operating in sin according to Islam’”). 
288. Recent empirical work suggests that the religion of a claimant seeking accommodation in 
court correlates with the likelihood of accommodation being granted, with Catholics and 
Protestants, for instance, having higher success rates than Muslims. See Michael Heise & 
Gregory C. Sisk, Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench: Empirical Evidence from the Federal 
Courts, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371 (2013); Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and 
Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 
231 (2012). On judicial accommodation, see Mark Tushnet, “Of Church and State and the Su-
preme Court”: Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373, 383, which argues that “[t]he less 
familiar the claim is—that is, the less connected it is to the kinds of worship that the Justices 
of the Supreme Court are accustomed to—the less likely it is that they will regard infringe-
ments on those forms of worship as really serious.” On legislative exemptions, see William 
P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 318 
(1991), which suggests that “[l]egislators are more likely to be aware of majoritarian reli-
gious practices (their own) when they fashion general regulations, and thus are unlikely to 
place disabilities on those practices. Similarly, they are less likely to be concerned with reli-
gious practices outside their religious tradition and accordingly are more likely to place bur-
dens on those practices inadvertently.” 
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conduct or when decision makers themselves believe the conduct to be wrong-
ful.289 
In addition to basic questions of fairness, specific constitutional norms may 
be implicated when one citizen is asked to bear the costs of another’s religious 
exercise. Granting an accommodation may not rise to the level of an independ-
ent constitutional violation, yet it may still be in deep tension with important 
constitutional values. For example, healthcare refusal laws may violate duties of 
care that healthcare institutions and professionals owe patients and may also 
impair exercise of patients’ constitutionally protected reproductive rights.290 
Accommodation of complicity-based conscience claims may also undermine 
equality norms.291 Although legislative exemptions from antidiscrimination law 
do not ordinarily constitute freestanding equal protection violations, some re-
cent proposals would specifically allow refusals of same-sex couples.292 Such 
singling out might undermine the forms of respect that guarantees of equal 
protection promote.293 Finally, accommodation of complicity-based conscience 
 
289. Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 172, at 821 (“A legislator might think that protecting conscience is 
so important that persons should not be made to act against conscience, however odd the 
basis for their judgments. But a legislator who believes that a particular procedure is seri-
ously wrongful, and should be performed as little as possible, might approve a right of re-
fusal independent of any special sensitivity about the conscience of those who refuse.”). 
290. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965). Concerns are heightened by the combination of institutional exemptions and in-
creasing mergers involving Catholic hospitals. See Martha Minow, On Being a Religious Pro-
fessional: The Religious Turn in Professional Ethics, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 661, 683-84 (2001) 
(“[T]he number of mergers between Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals is rising sharply. 
In about half of the mergers over the past decade, all or some reproductive health services 
previously provided by the non-Catholic institution have been eliminated. State attorneys 
general, entrusted with the responsibility of approving such mergers, . . . could consider the 
impact of the mergers on the constitutionally-protected right for individuals to make their 
own reproductive choices.”). 
291. Cf. Laura S. Underkuffler, Odious Discrimination and the Religious Exemption Question, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2069 (2011) (addressing claims to religious exemptions from antidiscrim-
ination laws that include race, sex, religion, sexual orientation, and gender identity). In the 
LGBT context, see NeJaime, supra note 151, at 1226-29, 1236; and Oleske, supra note 50, at 
144. For the sex equality dimensions in the healthcare context, see Sepper, supra note 72 
(manuscript at 19); and Sepper, supra note 50, at 208-11. As Laurence Tribe has shown, lib-
erty and equality “are profoundly interlocked in a legal double helix.” Laurence H. Tribe, 
Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1893, 1898 (2004). 
292. See H.R. 3133, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 1808, 113th Cong. (2013); H.B. 2453, 85th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Kan. 2014). 
293. See Mary Anne Case, Why “Live-And-Let-Live” Is Not a Viable Solution to the Difficult Prob-
lems of Religious Accommodation in the Age of Sexual Civil Rights, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2015) (manuscript at 19) (on file with authors) (“The constitutional concerns are 
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claims may implicate concerns about religious establishment, as the costs of 
claimants’ religious practices are imposed on other citizens.294 
conclusion 
Pluralism is commonly invoked as a value that justifies religious accommo-
dation.295 Indeed, religious exemptions historically have protected minority 
practitioners from the operation of generally applicable laws.296 Accommoda-
tion, therefore, respects and preserves religious diversity. Today, many scholars 
and advocates cite this pluralistic tradition to support accommodation of com-
 
compounded when one considers . . . that the brunt of the proposed exemptions will fall 
almost exclusively on individual members of historically disadvantaged groups, notably gay 
men, lesbians and other women, creating equal protection problems.”); Oleske, supra note 
50, at 144 (“Only after same-sex couples were allowed to marry was there an effort to allow 
business owners to discriminate for religious reasons, and such an ‘unusual deviation from 
the usual tradition’ would appear to be ‘strong evidence’ under Windsor of an unconstitu-
tional intent ‘to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter 
into same-sex marriages.’”); Letter from Dale Carpenter, Douglas NeJaime, Andrew Kop-
pelman, Ira C. Lupu & William P. Marshall to Michael Madigan, Speaker, Ill. House of 
Representatives, at 10 (Oct. 15, 2013) (on file with authors) (“[T]he inclusion of the proviso 
means that the law would single out lesbians and gay men, carving out from antidiscrimina-
tion law only this discrete group, a form of discrimination that may well be unconstitution-
al.” (citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013))). 
294. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. On the general conflict between accommodation 
and the Establishment Clause, see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 
2802 n.25 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), which explains that “the government’s license to 
grant religion-based exemptions from generally applicable laws is constrained by the Estab-
lishment Clause”; and TRIBE, supra note 43, at 1195, which warns that “unbounded tolerance 
of governmental accommodation in the name of free exercise neutrality could eviscerate the 
establishment clause.” In fact, some scholars have argued that independent Establishment 
Clause violations may arise in some of these contexts. See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Religion and 
Marriage Equality Statutes, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 25, 46-52 (2015). For instance, in the 
same-sex marriage context, legislative exemptions from antidiscrimination laws impose 
costs on same-sex couples. See id. at 47-48. Some statutory regimes, such as healthcare re-
fusals legislation, may avoid these issues by covering both religious and moral objections. 
See id. at 44. Nonetheless, exemptions in the healthcare context may still raise constitutional 
issues by “impos[ing] restraints that are too severe on private actors,” including the employ-
ers. Greenawalt, supra note 172, at 821. 
295. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Religious Freedom and the Nondiscrimination Norm, in MATTERS 
OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND LEGAL RESPONSE 194 (Austin Sarat ed. 2012); Abner 
S. Greene, Religious Freedom and (Other) Civil Liberties: Is There a Middle Ground?, 9 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 161 (2015); John D. Inazu, A Confident Pluralism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2470788 [http://perma.cc/3922-MCZM]; see also 
supra note 152. 
296. See generally McConnell, supra note 36. 
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plicity-based conscience claims.297 
Yet examination of the form and social logic of these claims suggests that 
their accommodation may subvert, as well as serve, pluralistic ends. Complici-
ty-based conscience claims are faith claims about how to live in community 
with others who do not share one’s religious beliefs on contested questions of 
sexual morality. The claimants treat the lawful conduct of other citizens as sin-
ful and object to being associated with those citizens. Many believe their reli-
gious convictions should govern the conduct of citizens who do not belong to 
their faith community. 
In this sense, complicity-based conscience claims can be animated less by a 
pluralistic interest in preserving space for distinctive religious beliefs and prac-
tices and more by what political theorist Nancy Rosenblum has described as an 
“integralist” orientation.298 The religious integralist believes that “religious au-
thority should guide every aspect of social and political life of the nation as a 
whole.”299 Some advocates for cross-denominational coalitions asserting and 
supporting complicity-based conscience claims aspire to a legal and political 
 
297. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 36, at 207-08, 211-12, 216, 218, 226-28; Wilson, supra note 152, at 
1437, 1482-83, 1487-89, 1508; Ryan T. Anderson, Sexual Liberty and Religious Liberty Can  
Coexist. Here’s How, DAILY SIGNAL (Nov. 9, 2014), http://dailysignal.com/print/?post_id 
=164652 [http://perma.cc/NN7P-PB7A]. 
298. See Nancy L. Rosenblum, Introduction to OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF 
FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES 3, 15 (Nancy L. Rosenblum 
ed., 2000) (explaining that “integralism” is “a set of challenges to democratic government in 
the name of faith”); Rosenblum, supra note 108, at 25 (describing “integralism” as “the view 
that values and practices in every sphere must be religious and congruent”); see also Mark 
Jensen, The Integralist Objection to Political Liberalism, 31 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 157 (2005). 
On the distinct, specific tradition of Catholic integralism, see Christopher van der Krogt, 
Catholic Fundamentalism or Catholic Integralism?, in TO STRIVE AND NOT TO YIELD: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF COLIN BROWN 123 (James Veitch ed., 1992). 
299. Nancy L. Rosenblum, Faith in America: Political Theory’s Logic of Autonomy and Logic of Con-
gruence, in RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: DANGER OR OPPORTUNITY? 
382, 384 (Alan Wolfe & Ira Katznelson eds., 2010). As Paul Horwitz explains, this integralist 
perspective is also reflected in claims that seek to bring religion further into the commercial 
sphere and the public square. See Paul Horwitz, Comment, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 
HARV. L. REV. 154, 180 (2014) (“To a growing and increasingly visible extent, a range of 
faiths and sects take an ‘integralist’ view that sees ‘religion not as one isolated aspect of hu-
man existence but rather as a comprehensive system more or less present in all domains of 
the individual’s life.’”) (quoting Kenneth D. Wald, Religion and the Workplace: A Social Sci-
ence Perspective, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 474 (2009)). Some scholarly commentators 
supporting broader religious exemptions for for-profit corporations have drawn on the inte-
gralist ethos animating some of today’s claimants. See Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Pri-
vate Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 18 (2013) (“Although religious integralism is not ordinarily a 
feature of mainstream Protestantism in America, it is a feature of the fastest growing reli-
gious groups in America: Islam, Orthodox Judaism, Mormonism, fundamentalist and evan-
gelical Protestantism, and the more traditional expressions of Catholicism.”). 
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order shaped by their underlying religious convictions.300 For instance, they 
seek generally applicable laws that reflect traditional religious views about mar-
riage and abortion. In the absence of laws enforcing traditional sexual norms, 
they seek to enforce those norms through a web of religious exemptions. Reli-
gious liberty, through this lens, is a “mandate for evangelization.”301 
Asserted in this spirit, the claim for accommodation is not simply an act of 
withdrawal. Instead, in advancing complicity-based claims for exemption, mo-
bilized groups and individuals may seek to enforce traditional norms against 
those who do not share their beliefs. Accommodation of these claims may un-
dermine, rather than advance, pluralistic values. 
 
300. See supra Part III.A; see also supra note 108 (describing ADF’s campaign to end IRS regula-
tions that condition religious institutions’ tax-exempt status on restrictions on supporting 
particular candidates). 
301. Conley, supra note 150. 
